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SELECTIONS FROM CHE-HSUEH YEN-CHIU
(PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH)

[The following are translations of selected articles from
Che-hsueh Yen-chiu (Philosophy Research), No. 1, Peiping,
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TRUE RECOGNITION OF PEDOLOGICAL REFORMS AND THE
CONTRADICTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN PEDOLOGY

Following is the translation of an article by Shih Yuan-ch'un (4258 0337 2504) in Che-hsueh Yen-chiu (Philosophy Research), Peiping, No. 1, 25 January 1961, pp. 1-12.

The "eight-word constitution" of agriculture begins with the word "earth." Among the essential elements--sunlight, air, heat, water, plant nutrients, etc.--required for the growth of crops, all but sunlight are supplied by the soil. The series of operations in farming such as irrigation, fertilization, plowing, harrowing, and hoeing are all for the control of the above-mentioned elements to satisfy the requirements of the crops. Therefore, understanding the laws governing the functioning of the soil and a conscious soil improvement program are two of the most important tasks in realizing better and larger crop yields and a greater leap forward in agriculture.

Our farmers have gained a profound understanding of the soil through ages of farming practice and have accumulated extremely affluent experiences in soil conservation and improvement. Modern pedological science has indeed achieved a good deal, but some of its theories and viewpoints are metaphysically quite limited in concept. Ever since the Great Leap Forward started in 1958, the nation-wide mass movement for a general survey and determination of soils has brought forth a tremendous amount of data for pedological study and numerous fresh problems as well. Therefore, insistence on the employment of dialectic materialistic viewpoints and methods in the study of soils, arranging and analyzing mass experiences with scientific rigor, making active and positive use and study of all the results of pedological science, correctly understanding the counteracting forces of soils, and developing the people's conscious initiative in soil reforms are all the very challenging tasks facing our pedological study today.

I.

In the people's understanding of soils there exist two opposite views: one is metaphysical and the other is dialectic materialistic.

Some pedologists start out with a geological analysis which treats soil as something composed of rocks eroded and decomposed through the effect of weathering and which produces vegetation and contains the dead bodies of living things. Therefore, their definition of soil is: "Soil is a mixture of minerals and organic substances," and they say that soil is like a kitchen stored with plant nutrients. They regard the process of soil development as being primarily due to erosion of this mixture by the wind and the moving and reduction of the most active soluble substances in the soil during leaching by rainfall; and that the force behind the process is mainly weathering and precipitation. Obviously they cannot give a profound, adequate, and overall exposition of the make-up and the regularity of the development and changes of the soil insofar as such basic problems as what soil is, how soil is developed, and what the forces behind the development of soil are.

We ought to recognize that minerals and organic substances are the most fundamental substances in soil. However, it would be utterly naive to simply say that soil is a mixture without making intrinsic correlations, for that would be like denying that soil has its own qualitative regularity. In this way, one would not be able to understand the property of soils from the special operational forms and the peculiar inconsistencies of soils.

Chairman Mao has taught us that "attention must be directed to those things common to a given type of operational form of a certain material and other types of operational forms. However, of fundamental importance in enabling us to understand things is noticing their characteristics, i.e., paying attention to the qualitative differences between one operational form and another. Only by so doing is one able to distinguish between things."¹ And he added, "The distinction of scientific study is based upon the particular contradictory natures possessed by the scientific object."² Here Chairman Mao has told us that in studying something one should give special attention to its contradictory and operational forms. Only by so doing can one get a real grasp of the nature of the thing. The object of pedological study is soil. Soil is the soft and loose surface of the earth which is coarse in texture and can support vegetation. Its distinction from other things on the earth's

surface such as rocks, oceans, forests, and other things lies in its ability to simultaneously and continuously supply water, nutrients, and heat needed for the growth of green vegetation, or in other words, its fertility. Thus fertility is the most essential characteristic of soil. Without fertility there wouldn't be much to say about soil.

The fertility possessed by the soil is caused by its internal contradictory actions. In the action, development, and process of furnishing vegetation with water, nutrients, air, and heat, there are all sorts of contradictions, such as evaporation and retention of water in the soil, synthesis and decomposition of organic matter, accumulation and consumption of nutrients, heat absorption and dissipation in the soil, rise and fall in the temperature of the soil, the great geological cycle and small biological cycles, and so forth. The two profiles of a pair of contradictions are mutually dependent, mutually exclusive, and under certain conditions mutually inverting. In the meantime, these contradictions do not exist in isolation in soils. Instead of acting alone, these contradictions are mutually related, checked, and balanced. When we experimented with medium farming in raising corn we found a temperature rise of 2-4°C in surface soil and a universal increase in temperature differences between different soil types. Changes in soil in turn cause changes in directions of water movements in soil. Due to medium cultivation, surface soil loses a great deal of its water while lower soil layers have a 10-20% gain in water content. In accordance with many test results, the dissolution of nutrients is improved as a result of changes in soil temperature and water content. The available plant nutrients are increased in amounts varying from 100 to 200%. In addition, corresponding changes are produced in the activities of organic substances and in a series of physical conditions.

This is true under all natural conditions. For instance, microbes in soil on the one hand decompose organic materials to make simple mineral nutrients, while on the other hand they synthesize themselves with putrefied matter which possesses even more complex composition. This kind of Biochemical product further undergoes chemical and physiochemical reactions and thus enables different kinds of organic matter and minerals to form organic-mineral composites. Consequently, a series of changes takes place in soil composition, porousness, water percolation and absorption, air content, and temperature. Thus, soil is an organic integral body formed by the minerals, organic substances, and microbes in it, and a mixture cannot be disintegrated by mechanical means.

In this complex contradictory unity of soil, every subtle change is not only related but also induces other changes, and together they form a relation of check and balance. Soil is at the center of contradictory inequilibrium. The numerous mutually exclusive and opposite inconsistencies and contradictions, together with their counter-actions and unities, indicate precisely the intrinsic nature of soil development. Just as Chairman Mao has said, "A simple process has only one pair of contradictions whereas a complex process has more than one pair of contradictions. Among the pairs of contradictions new contradictions emerge. This is the way human thoughts and all things are formed in the objective world and how they are put into operation."³ Therefore, when we study why soil possesses fertility and how it develops and changes, we must first grasp its internal inconsistencies and contradictions.

Soil is a thing of complex contradictory unity which consists of many mutually connected and mutually checked internal contradictions. Among all these contradictions, the basic one which determines the quality of soils and "ascertains or affects the existence and development of other contradictions"⁴ is the waning and waxing of soil fertility. Or in other words, it is the contradiction of the continuous increase and decrease of the constituent factors of soil fertility such as water, nutrients, air, heat, texture, etc.

In the entire process of soil development, a series of wanings and waxings are taking place at all times, such as fluctuations of the water content in soil, changes in component parts and the quantity of air in soil, variations in types, accumulation and consumption of nutrients in soil, and changes in soil temperatures and textures. During our experiment with medium cultivation of corn, it was proved that under certain conditions the favorable water and heat environments created by medium cultivation together with the induced corresponding features of nutrients and microbes will disappear after eight days. Similarly, after a certain period of time, the loosened soil will also tend to be tightly packed in a patternless state. Through centuries of practical experience, our farmers have witnessed how animal manures were combined with soil to form "earth velvet" and how "earth velvet" turned into soil. The theory of "manure turning into soil" likewise expounded the waning and waxing process of organic nutrients in soil. Evidently, the waning and waxing process of the interrelated and mutually checking fertility factors is not a simple repetition, but a process of the rise of a new waning and waxing cycle permanently built on an

existing foundation. The turning of "dead soil" into "live soil" and "live soil" into "fat soil" by the farmers is exactly the process of incessant adjustment of fertility factors in soils so that the soils may develop from one stage to another and that one kind of soil may develop into another.

In natural soils, the various fertility factors are also carrying on a continuous waning and waxing process with the change of time. The change of meadow soil into marsh land is primarily a result of an abrupt increase of water. Meanwhile, in this process, the water itself is also undergoing waning and waxing in different times and seasons. Changes from forest soils to prairie soils, and from saline soils and non-saline soils are all good examples. They are nothing but natural operations automatically taking place. Thus throughout the entire process of soil development, the waning-waxing contradictions of fertility factors have always existed in all types of soils. It is during this very process of incessant waning and waxing of fertility factors that soils satisfy the needs of vegetation and further develop themselves. It is also this very process which reflects the most essential features or characteristics of soils. Therefore variations and fluctuations of fertility factors are the basic contradictions in soils.

The series of internal contradictions in soils, such as synthesization and decomposition, exidization and reduction, heat-absorption and heat-dissipation, leaching, solution and dissolution, sedimentation, and so forth, constitute the contradictions of fluctuations and variations of fertility factors. Moreover, there are always counteractions and unities working on the periphery of this pair of fundamental contradictions. Although in certain stages a certain pair of contradictions among all these contradictions may rise above others and become principal, such as the synthesization and decompositions of organic matters, this pair can only reflect some respects of the entire soil operation. They cannot determine the fundamental properties of soil, and they can play a principal role in a certain period. Thus, they can never be the fundamental contradiction in soil. Precisely speaking, this series of contradictions makes up the contradictions of fluctuations of fertility; and to the contrary, the contradictions in fluctuations of fertility determine the former. In this manner, soil operations are carried on and further developed. As the series of contradictions, such as water absorption and evaporation, assimilation and respirations, storage and conveying of organic matter, formation and conversion, etc., go on in the bodies of plants, they reflect certain aspects of the

phenomenon of life and also constitute the fundamental contradictions in vegetation, i.e., assimilation and differentiation (different types of plants are exceptions).

The contradictions of fluctuations of fertility factors are the ubiquitous and most fundamental contradictions in all types of soils. Once natural soil is used by man for the cultivation of crops in agricultural production it enters a new stage different from its own, namely the agricultural or farming soil stage. Natural soil is formed under only natural forces, whereas farming soil is formed under both natural forces and human farming activities, tilling, harrowing, hoeing, weeding, irrigation, fertilizations, and so on. Natural soil satisfies the needs of vegetation by spontaneity, while farming soil is made to meet the demands for the cultivation of crops by man's deliberate and conscious manipulation. Natural soil slowly and gradually changes by itself, whereas farming soil is rapidly changed purposefully by people's doing. Consequently, farming soil is not a natural thing historically, and what is even more significant is that it is the product or result of human effort and the basic factor of production. All these things together determine and help to promote the fundamental contradictions of soil development and to show the characteristics with certainty in the farming soil stage.

In the farming soil stage, two active factors are added to the development of soil. They are the requirement for the cultivation of crops and man's conscious productive activities to meet such requirement. Consequently, contradictions are further complicated. First of all, the direction in which farming soil development is to be made is the concern of soil reform needed for the particular crops cultivated. Naturally, before any soil reform is carried out, environmental patterns have to be clearly understood. For instance, in order to grow paddy rice, plantation crops, vegetables, tea trees, rubber trees, coffee, and the like, different measures have to be taken so as to enable a great variety of natural soils to be developed for paddy soil, plantation soil, vegetable garden soil, plantation forest soil, and so on. So when we analyze the development of farming soil and its internal contradictions we must, first of all, consider the requirements for the cultivation of various crops and the farming activities we are to engage in for meeting the requirements. Secondly, in the farming soil stage, fertility factors of soil wane and wax under the influence of such ever-changing natural forces as weather, underground water, land forms, and so forth, but the waning and waxing are controlled by plowing, harrowing, raking, hoeing, weeding,

fertilization, and irrigation to satisfy the needs for crop growth. Hence, the waning and waxing of fertility factors of farming soil is actually the interaction and unity between the operating natural effects in soil under the influence of natural forces and the working of man-made effects in soil under the influence of human forces. For example, the salt content of saline soil is, on the one hand, undergoing a certain process of waning and waxing under the effect of natural forces such as the underground water level, water quality, seasonal variations in weather, and the like (this is also called the process of natural actions), while on the other hand, it is undergoing another type of waning and waxing under the influence of human power, such as flushing and draining of salt, shallow harrowing for salt removal, copious application of organic fertilizers, and so on, to prevent crops from being harmed by salt by changing the amount and type of salt and time required for the accumulation of salt around the roots of crops (this is also called the process of human actions). Under any specific conditions and at any time and place, whether the saline feature of soil harms it or not is the direct result of the action-counteraction and unity between the natural and the human influences. Conditions of salt content in soil are like this and so are the rest.

According to the above analysis, we found that the principal motivating force behind the development of farming soil is, for maximum satisfaction of the requirements for more crop yields, the contradictions in the soil between natural influences and human powers. This pair of contradictions emerge with the appearance of and have determined the special features of farming soil throughout the entire development of the latter. In understanding the fundamental contradictions in soil, we must bear in mind at all times the promise of maximum satisfaction of the requirements for more crop yields, and under no circumstances, should we view the natural effect process and the human effect process operating under the joint influence of natural and human forces as something working in isolation. They are merely two phases of a pair of contradictions which are interdependent, interwoven, co-existing, and interacting, and not two irrelevant processes independently existing in soil.

Generally speaking, the human effect process in farming soil is the main guide of the contradictions. Undoubtedly, with the development of productivity in human society and the people's increasing understanding of soil, the human effect in soil is more and more obvious as the main guide. However, in the various specific stages of development, these

two processes in soil are continuously waning and waxing and mutually converting.

From the above statement, we found that even though the fundamental contradictions in the waning and waxing of fertility factors remain unchanged in the process of farming soil development, the contradictions between the natural effect process and the human effect process have appeared in soil with the appearance of farming soil and have mutually counteracted each other to become the fundamental contradictions in farming soil. This pair of contradictions determines the essential characteristics of farming soil and has much bearing in the development and existence of other contradictions. Soil and farming soil have properties in common and are individually related. The relations are both particular and general. The common properties of natural soil and farming soil lie in the fact that both possess the natural intrinsic property of a natural body and both have the quality of being fertile. The special property of farming soil lies in that it is used as material of agricultural production and in the new properties it produces, while its essential feature is the possession of economic fertility. Fertility of soil is not determined by man, whereas the economic fertility of soil is the resultant effect of active productive activities of a society upon soil.

To view soil as independent matter having a special operational form and with fertility as its essential characteristic, and which is in continuous development due to its complex internal contradictions, is a strong rebuttal to the view which regards soil as a mixture of mechanically unrelated organic materials and minerals. If one held the latter view, he would not be able to solve the problem of soil development by means of its internal contradictions, but would grossly exaggerate a certain partial process in a single phase and mistake it for the basic process of soil development. Such an erroneous view of development would logically and necessarily lead to the reasoning that the motivating power behind soil development is not in soil itself but in the external factors affecting soil formation such as weather, etc. Obviously, as to what soil is, how soil is developed, and other basic problems such as what the driving force is after soil development, the metaphysical view is wrong. As a matter of fact, such a view regards soil as a mixture of dead and quiet things with only quantitative but not qualitative changes.

Our analysis of the internal contradictions of soil is a necessary prerequisite for the understanding of soil. From materialistic dialectics we have also learned that in analyzing complex things we must start with the analysis

of their most basic contradictions, namely, the internal contradictions. But the confirmation that internal contradictions in soil are the basic cause of soil development is by no means to be construed as ignoring the significance of external conditions. On the contrary, like all other things, soil cannot be separated from its surrounding environment to stand alone in the nature it is actually closely related to, checked and balanced by, and forms the two profiles of a contradiction with. For this reason, when we study the operating rules and patterns of the internal contradictions of soil, we must understand the dialectic relationship between soil and its environmental conditions. Otherwise, we cannot gain a correct understanding and make an effective reform of soil.

Soil is a constituent part of nature as a whole and is formed under the comprehensive influence of various external factors. Weather has a direct effect on weathering of soil, release of nutrients, type and speed of the synthesis and decomposition of organic matter, features of the shifting of matter, and water and heat conditions in soil. Topographical conditions regroup and re-distribute soil-affecting factors such as sunlight, temperature, atmospheric precipitation, etc. Parent materials of soil affect a series of special features of the physical properties, physical-mechanical properties, and chemical reactions in soil. Biological factors are even more essential in soil formation and conservation for they are present in the vicissitude of birth, life, and death of living things; and due to these factors, nutrient elements needed by green plants are preserved and accumulated in and not entirely leached off from soil. Nitrogen, which is necessary for the growth of plants, is also a product of biological activities. The important reason why soil is different from weathered rock fragments or its own parent materials lies in the fact that it possesses the most basic fertility factors which are built by biological actions and effects. Therefore, we may say that among the various factors affecting the formation of soil, biological factors are the primary ones.

These factors serve as external conditions of soil, and are not isolated things but act collectively upon the soil. For instance, if precipitation remains unchanged, the amount of water entering the soil depends on topography and slope of the land. In mountainous areas and hilly regions, exposure, temperature, humidity, etc., vary a great deal with different slopes. Such variations will in turn make the distribution of vegetation non-uniform. Different types of vegetation have an effect on adjusting the flow of

surface water and local surface weather conditions. Therefore, we must treat the external factors as a complicated and inter-controlled organic integral which collectively acts upon soil. Conversely, features of soil also, to a certain extent, affect types of vegetation, topographical formations, and particulars of local surface weather conditions. Consequently, only when we can grasp the patterns and rules of changing inter-relationships among the external factors and the counteraction and unity between such inter-relationships and the soil can we correctly understand the dialectic relation of soil and its external conditions. Then we can effectively adjust the relations among these external factors and control the internal changes in soil.

What we spoke of above are the relations among individual factors under natural conditions. However, when farming activities began, people actively interfered with nature so as to make it work for the benefit of man. Wild plants which had been the original forces affecting soil have now been replaced by cultivated crops. Land that was uneven has now been levelled. Besides, men have greatly changed the quality of soil by means of cultivating activities, fertilization, irrigation, and other farming measures, and as a consequence, a new quality which does not exist under natural conditions has now been realized. So human farming activity has, in the development of farming soil, become a strong factor affecting soil. Qualitatively speaking, human effects are different from natural factors. In production practice, man can understand the pattern of and the law governing soil and its external factors, and thereby consciously and purposefully adjust the relations among the various factors which, subsequently, are directed toward human needs. Marx once said that the very essence of soil maturation, which serves as an indicator and a record of human interference in the formation and development of soil, compels the soil development process to be weakened or strengthened as a result of changes in quantity and relative relations of various factors and changes in environmental conditions, and that the entire process of soil formation has found a new direction while soil has acquired new qualities as a result of changes in composition relations. Such qualities were not previously possessed by some types of soil, but were partially possessed in other types of soil. Since this is the case, human production activities, on the one hand, have directly changed the quantities and ratios of the various factors of soil and adjusted and controlled its internal contradictions, and on the other hand, have also changed the external environmental conditions affecting soil. Thereby,

soil has acquired new qualities and has moved in the direction of being beneficial to mankind.

Human production activity is an external factor affecting soil, and it affects soil in joint action with other factors (natural factors). However, it is not qualitatively the same as natural factors. In other words, it is not voluntarily, but consciously, affecting soil. It is on the basis of a thorough understanding of the operational patterns of soil and the dialectic relationship between it and its external conditions that we must make a forceful and purposeful soil reform. Thus, to ignore the view of human factors is wrong. Of course, it should be considered as a step toward correct understanding of the patterns and laws governing soil development so that subjective initiative can be better developed.

Soil and its external factors form a contradictory unity. However, external factors of soil can only exercise their influence through its internal contradictions. For instance, atmospheric temperature can only affect soil through the heat conductivity of the soil. For example, under the same weather conditions, a young plant in the black soil to the east of a village is green and luxuriant, while the same plant is often burned to death in the hot sandy soil to the west of the same village. The death of the plant in the field to the west of the village was indirectly caused by sunlight and atmospheric temperature but directly by sudden cold and sudden hot temperatures in the hot sands soil of course texture containing much granular quartz but little organic matter. Chairman Mao used the example that at the proper temperature eggs can be turned into chickens but rocks cannot. And he further taught us, "Materialistic dialectics place external causes as conditions and internal causes as the basis of changes, but it is through internal causes that the external causes work."⁵ So we must begin with the internal contradictions of soil and study carefully and scrupulously how external conditions work through internal contradictions as mediums. People who think that under certain weather conditions certain types of soil emerge and certain types of rocks are weathered to become certain kinds of soils really do not understand this fundamental principle.

Chairman Mao said, "The cosmological view of dialectics is primarily to teach people how to properly observe and analyze the contradictory operations of all sorts of things, and how to discern the methods for solving such contradictions on the basis of this analysis."⁶ Soil is a complex synthesis of contradictions. To know and to reform it, we must begin

with the analysis of its various types of contradictions and the different angles of each contradictions. We need to analyze the nature of the internal contradictions of soil and its basic contradictions, the contradictions among factors serving as external conditions of soil, how antithetical unity is reached between soil and its external factors, and how the external factors work by way of internal contradictions. Only in this manner can we truly and thoroughly understand the operational patterns and rules of soil development and make an energetic reform.

Opposition between dialectics and metaphysics is shown clearly in the process of man's understanding soil. In the study of soils, there are a few different views such as the following: The first view does not seek the regularity in quality between other things and soil through its special operational form but regards soil as a body of dead and unmoving mixtures. The second view does not begin with an analysis of the internal contradictions of soil to find the basic causes of soil development, but concludes that the forces behind soil development are weather factors which are the external conditions of soil. A third view does not consider external factors affecting soil as a comprehensive entirety which work by way of the internal contradictions of soil but treats them as isolated and thereby exaggerates the effect of each factor upon soil. We must make a strong and determined critique on the metaphysical views in the understanding of soil and insist on the dialectical materialistic view to get a correct understanding of soil.

II.

A correct understanding of soil is necessary for a more effective reform of soil so that soils can be developed for the benefit to man. On the other hand, in order to make a more effective reform of soil, we must give due regard to and correctly understand the objective patterns of and rules governing soil development.

The process which we have gone through in agricultural production in the last several thousand years is a process of continuous understanding, control, and reform of soil. And during the process, our understanding has gained depth, while control and reform have gradually become more accurate, effective, and extensive. The mission of pedological studies is to gain a more profound understanding of the objective regularity of soil operations and to develop more extensive, effective, and accurate control and reform of soil so as to promote the development of agricultural production. However,

some of the old pedologists often overlook or even deny the conscious and tremendous influence of man in soil reform and unilaterally emphasize the natural factors determining the properties of soil (particularly weather factors), and ignore the enormous effect of human production activities in altering the properties of soil. Consequently, in classifying soils, they use the effects of natural factors as advanced and higher criteria of classification, while influences of human factors are used as elementary and lower criteria of classification.

Since 1958, we have found in the nation-wide mass movement for soil surveys, intensive cultivation, and soil reform a great number of facts which show that after the objective patterns of laws governing soil operations are thoroughly understood, not only can we control and change the nature of soils by means of various kinds of farming manipulations, but we can further change soils into soils with different properties, and not only can we change different soils in a small area into soils of similar nature, but we can do the same thing by human effort in regions with different climates. Naturally, in practice, we have to begin with specific conditions and carefully consider the merits and demerits and to weigh the advantages and disadvantages before we can adopt the appropriate measures.

In the areas surrounding Peiping, we conducted a better crop yield experiment with the farmers. Having understood the pattern and regularity of soil changes and the soil conditions needed by crops in different growing periods, we then employed all kinds of measures to adjust water, air, heat, and fertilization in the soil to give the maximum satisfaction to the growth of the crops. For instance, it is better for the wheat to bud early in the Spring, and it needs a well cultivated and relatively warmer soil. But when the ground thaws in the Spring, the wheat fields in the region of Peiping are often too wet and the low temperature rises very slowly. Obviously, such soil conditions are not proper for the budding of wheat, so the farmers take such measures as applying warm fertilizers in the winter, surface harrowing, and so forth, so as to adjust the water content and ventilation of the soil and raise the ground temperature. The result is a five to seven day advancement of wheat budding time and the satisfaction of the soil requirements necessary for the budding period. After the wheat begins to grow high, the rapid growth requires sufficient water and nutrients. When the temperature is rising and the frozen layer of soil is completely thawed, the unfavorable weather conditions in the area, such as scanty precipitation, dry winds, and high evaporation, cause a

tremendous loss of water from the soil and create a Spring drought. That is to say that soil conditions in the natural setting are unfit for the further growth of budding young wheat.

To combat the situation, the farmers employed methods like watering, proper medium tilth, and a series of experiences consisting of early medium tilth for ground warming, multiple medium tilth for earth loosening, and deeper medium tilth for resisting flood and drought. Of course, this is only the experience of one region, while in different regions studies should be made together with special weather and soil conditions. This example tells how our farmers, through long production practice, understand the patterns of and laws governing soil operations and have analyzed the supply-demand contradiction between crops and soil and thereby adjusted the variations of water, fertility, air, and heat in soil to better satisfy the needs of crops.

It is in this very manner that people consciously and with purpose reform and control the changes of soils in a long process of agricultural production. After years, decades, or centuries of cultivation, soils have changed their original form or appearance and acquired new qualities which they have never possessed before. For instance, in the plantation soil in North China, there are such soil structures as mature soil, plowing bed soil, cold soil, and young immature soil which did not exist when it was under purely natural conditions. They are all evidences of human soil reform.

As was described above, with the understanding of the regularity of soil operations, men can adjust and control soil changes in accordance with the needs of crops, and the long-term adjustment and control of soil will make basic changes in it. In the meantime, people can thoroughly change the qualities of soil by revolutionary means in a relatively short period. For example, in the foothills in the greater Peiping suburbs, there are vast areas of "young yellow soil" (brown soil, as it was called before), which is sticky, leaches and plows poorly, and is not drought resisting. Thus, farmers can only grow such drought resisting crops as spiked millet and a certain type of beans, of which the per mou production is much less than one hundred chin.

When we were conducting a typical survey of this type of soil in Ch'eng-kuan Commune in Mi-yuan Hsien, we were told the following story by the good old country folks: After the collective farm was organized, we applied a great quantity of mixed sand and animal manure in this kind of young yellow soil. Three years later, the top six ts'un of surface soil was less sticky, became easy to cultivate, and had increased in

percolation and drought resistance. Corn and wheat began to be grown on this new type of soil and the production was close to 200 chin. After the improvement, we called the young yellow soil second yellow soil. After the establishment of the people's commune, not only was even a greater amount of animal manure added, but the soil was also deepened by two ch'ih. Starting this year, this soil area will be irrigated; and this type of soil will be neither sandy nor sticky, but just right for farming. It has good percolation and water retention, and as a result, it will be drought resisting and flood proof and suitable for crops of higher cash value, such as corn, wheat, vegetables, and the like. The per mou yield will easily amount to four or five hundred chin, which is equal to that of old yellow soil (which used to be called light-colored meadow soil) by the rivers. Thus, this second yellow soil, which is top grade land now, should be rightfully called old yellow soil in the future. The above story of immense changes, told by the good old native country folks, was further proved by the result of our analysis of the physical, chemical, and other qualities of these three kinds of soil.

When we asked about their experience in turning young yellow soil into old yellow soil, the good old native country folks answered, "Of the many defects of young yellow soil, the majority are caused by its stickiness. If soil is sticky, it will be poor in percolation, so the ground will be dry and very hard to plow. It will easily cake together and affect the budding of vegetation. When the stickiness of the soil was corrected, the soil became water-percolating, preserved its richness, was flood-resisting, drought-enduring, and easy to till, and would not cake. The removal of stickiness requires mixing with sand and manure, for it is sand which makes soil loose or coarse in texture, and manure makes soil rich or fat." It is in the long practice of production that our farmers have fully realized the pattern of and laws governing soil changes, have grasped the key problems, and have changed soil conditions so as to make soil change in the direction of being beneficial to agricultural production.

The above is an example of a typical survey which very well explains that the change of young yellow soil into old yellow soil is a product of human effort. Without human production activities, there would be no old yellow soil of this kind. Young yellow soil changes into second yellow soil, which in turn changes into old yellow soil, which is entirely different from the original soil in quality. This process serves to explain that human production activities not only can affect soils but also can manipulate soil in a certain

direction coinciding with the needs of human production activities. In the past, young yellow soil in the foothills and old yellow soil along the streams were viewed as two qualitatively different types of soil formed under the influence of different land-forms, types of underground water, weather conditions, and other types of natural factors, and that human power was not capable of changing the qualitative differences between the two. But the facts have shown that human production activities can, indeed, change the properties of soil.

If we take paddy soil as an example, we can see that not only two types of qualitatively different soils formed under the same natural conditions in the same climatic region can be made into soils of similar character, but even in different climatic regions, soils of similar properties can be made by human action. According to the research findings of the Institute of Pedology of the Academy of Sciences of China,⁷ it is verified that the many types of paddy soil in a wide variety of climatic regions (including Kiangsi, Kwangsi, Yunnan, and other provinces) with different origins, natural settings, cultivation conventions and methods, maturing patterns, etc., can be made very similar in a number of fertility features such as acidity, organic matter, structure, cultivability, and nutrients through adjustments of water content and air conditions in soil and alternating wet cultivation maturity and dry cultivation maturity. In other words, in order to satisfy the special requirements for paddy rice growth, a kind of paddy soil is created with special soil properties and fertility features which are absent in natural soils and all other types of soil. Thus paddy soils in different regions have shown even more properties in common. Differences due to natural factors still exist, but have been reduced to secondary importance; and the longer the history of cultivation and the more concentrated operation is, the more obvious the effects of human factors upon soil are.

From the above-mentioned examples, we can see the following summary: If soil conditions under natural settings are unfit for the requirements of more and better yields of wheat, they can be made to satisfy the requirements by means of a series of measures to change the conditions of water, fertility, air, and heat in soil. Through the conscious production activities of man, the influences of natural factors like land-forms, underground water, etc., upon young yellow soil can be modified to change the soil into old yellow soil entirely different from the original. Soils of great difference in various regions also can be turned into fertile paddy soils of similar properties by altering the effects of weather and other natural

factors in the process of man's cultivation of paddy rice.

All these facts have explained that man can, through the practice of production, understand the pattern of and laws governing soil changes and thereby, in accordance with the demands of agricultural production, adjust and control soil changes so as to exert greater influence on soil and thoroughly alter its nature. Thus, human production activities can strongly reform soil, but the extent of reform is primarily determined by the degree of man's understanding of the objective rules governing soil operations and the level of productivity. Also, we must have a correct and profound understanding of the patterns of and laws governing soil operations, be guided by circumstances, and do what is suitable to the location to fully make use of and promote favorable factors and limit and eliminate unfavorable factors. Then and only then can we cause soil to develop in the direction of benefit to human beings. The denial of man's conscious motivation in the understanding and reforming of soil and the metaphysical views regarding soil properties as being completely determined by natural factors are not only erroneous but also extremely harmful. This kind of thinking disarms people in their struggle against nature and causes them to take a strategically passive position.

Nevertheless, we recognize the gigantic motivation of human beings in the process of understanding and reforming soil and not by means of entertaining the thought of possibly ignoring the objective rules and other objective conditions and doing what they please. To develop greater subjective motivation, one must go deeper to understand and utilize objective rules. Engels said, "Freedom is not the isolation of natural laws in imagination, but rather it depends on the understanding of these laws. Furthermore, on the possibility derived from such understanding, natural laws are made with design to work for a certain purpose."⁸ In pedology, the principal thing is to understand and make use of the rules and laws of soil and thereby reform soil with energy and serve agricultural production.

According to Marxism, understanding originates from practice and is a guiding force for the latter. The same is true with man's understanding of soil and its reforming process in agricultural production. After several millenia of production toil and through innumerable trials and errors, our farmers have understood and used the regularity and patterns of soil operations and efficiently controlled and reformed soils. Especially since liberation and the Great Leap Forward, they have shown even greater initiative. In order to realize record production, they have, through a series of technical measures like optimum dense growth, intensive cultivation, soil

reform, reasonable irrigation and fertilization, and so forth, created the best possible environment needed for the realization of record yields. For the purpose of carrying out plantation cultivation they have, in the shortest possible time, turned the "raw earth" exposed after leveling and grading of land, into "mature soil" and into "rich (or fat) soil"; and they have even made the "rich soil" richer. So with the fast development of agricultural production, human understanding of control over and reform of soil are continuously intensified. During the rapid development of agriculture production, pedology must, through practical production experience, raise and sum up popular efforts to bring about better understanding of soil and to more thoroughly and efficiently control and reform soil so that human initiative for the understanding and reforming of nature can be fully developed. Chairman Mao has taught us that "All thoughts based on and in accord with facts are correct thoughts, and all actions based on correct thoughts are correct actions. We must encourage such thoughts and actions and bring to light this kind of initiative."⁹ That is to say that correct theories are necessarily the theories that accord with facts, and only this kind of theories are genuine scientific theories which can lead people to the better development of subjective initiative.

In the understanding and reforming of soil we must, first of all, reject partiality which sees only the influence of natural factors on soil and ignores or even denies human initiative in the understanding and reforming of soil. In practical work, partiality in the understanding of soil will necessarily lead to the conclusion that "man cannot win over heaven." Eventually, this sort of thinking will inevitably lead to a fall into the mire of fatalism. For instance, during the soil survey conducted in Turfan depression in Sinkiang, there were people who saw only the unfavorable natural factors affecting soil, such as the low terrain in the regions near lakes, high underground water level, easy accumulation of salt in the heavy and sticky soil, and the like, and forgot to analyze the favorable aspects, especially the enormous human influence on soil and the effect of human motivations. Consequently, they reached the conclusion to recommend the removal of the farms elsewhere. However, farms in the region have brought water from places over fifty kilometers away. With the water brought and a drainage canal built, they engaged in large-scale salt-flushing and greatly improved the heavily saline soil. The year after the soil survey, cotton production was the highest in the nation. This fact has overthrown the conclusion of "forced

removal due to poor conditions." Another example of poor survey conclusions comes from a soil investigation conducted in Ch'ang-hsin-tien area in metropolitan Peiping for the purpose of locating farm sites. The recommendation made by some people was that the said area was too sandy, wet, alkaline, and sterile for farming. The final outcome was that not only were farms built in the area, but the first year average production per acre topped 400 chin, which is a record surpassing that of the Yellow River regions. Examples like this are innumerable.

On the other hand, while we may strategically treat difficulties with contempt in understanding and reforming soil, we must tactically give attention to all sorts of difficulties. That is, while emphasizing initiative, we must give due regard to objectively existing laws and conditions. In conducting soil reform we must insist on the principle of doing what is best for the places. For instance, conditions can be altered, but before changes are made, we can only take measures which are adapted to the environment. Some conditions can be changed, while others cannot. For instance, uncultivated raw soil derived from levelling and grading land is hard, sterile, and too coarse for the growth of crops. On the one hand, the big pieces are broken up by farmers through more plowing and harrowing, and on the other hand by such natural forces as wind, the sun, and weathering of all sorts. So we have to examine the possibility of soil reform to understand the circumstance and do our best to reform soils in the simple, most effective, and most economical way. We must fully understand the characteristics of agricultural production and the difficulties and complexity of man's fight against nature. Insofar as the relation between crops and soils are concerned, farm crops are living things of different kinds with many distinct features. Agricultural production is, to a great extent, limited and controlled by natural conditions, some of which change with different seasons of the year, while others vary with different localities. There are a great many differences between different types of soils, and contrasts between farming regions are also quite striking. But all these differences are not incorrigible. Our proper understanding about soil must be as follows. On the one hand, we ought to know that all conditions are manageable and corrigible. Corrigibility, of course, applies to soils of all types. Our understanding would amount to partiality if we failed to realize this. On the other hand, conditions are concrete and specific. Different regions have different special features. If we fail to recognize these features and picture homogeneous features.

If we fail to recognize these features and picture homogeneous features for the soils in all regions, we will be at a loss and naively mistaken. In other words, in understanding and reforming soil, we must pay close attention to both the peculiarity and the universality of contradictions.

In our country, rich experiences in socialistic agricultural production are the motivating force behind the improvement and development of pedological sciences. After the liberation and especially since the Great Leap Forward, our enormously huge farming population has, under Party leadership, unleashed skyrocketing and revolutionary energy to launch a soil reform movement. At the height of the 1958 Great Leap Forward, more than seven million farmers throughout the country launched a popular campaign for soil surveys. Within a year, a preliminary survey was completed for the 1.6 billion mou of arable land in the entire nation; and thus we were able to know in great detail the various types of soil in all parts of the country. By so doing a good foundation was laid for the execution of the "eight word constitutions of agriculture"--use soil, reform soil, correct application of soil. At the same time, a nation-wide drive for intensive cultivation and soil reform was also launched. Up to last Spring, the amount of land being intensively cultivated had reached over 80% of the 1.4 billion mou and 450 million mou of previously low yield land had been improved to different degrees. Owing to several successive years of popular effort in irrigated areas, by 1958 the land being irrigated amounted to more than one billion mou, which was a four-fold increase. Fertilized areas and the extent of fertilization were also greatly increased. It is because of such large scale land reform and employment of all sorts of production boosting measures that crop yields have improved continuously. From 1949 to 1958, the average increase in food production was raised from 140 chin to 275 chin per mou, and cotton from 21.6 chin to 49 chin per mou.

Universal soil surveys, intensive cultivation, soil reform, irrigation advancement, increased fertilization, collectivization of vast areas, and a number of other measures have changed the appearance of our 1.6 billion mou of arable land, and the fertility of the land is rapidly rising. Salt has been flushed off previously saline soils; the originally sandy and barren land is now paddy fields and orchards, dead soil that appeared often and levelling and grading was quickly made into live soil, and the live soil into rich soil; and paddy fields in the South are day by day being enriched by fertilizers made from blood and dead bodies of animals such as eels. These gigantic achievements

are the result of the first battle in our war against the soil. In the future, we shall undoubtedly even more profoundly and thoroughly reform and control soil and make it work for the welfare of the people. In the course of such an affluent and socialistic farming practice, our pedological sciences will certainly be even more profoundly reformed and rapidly developed. Meanwhile, production practices will also raise immense assignments for pedology! At present, all types of low-yield land, such as saline and alkaline land, sandy land, clay land, muddy land, hilly land, etc., constitute three-tenths of the total arable land in the nation, or even more if low swampy land and flood endangered land are included. How to reasonably and fully utilize poor land and remote land is a very important problem (see the editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao, 14 December 1960). Besides, in order to carry out collectivization of large areas, to realize bigger yields in large areas, to promote nation-wide intensive cultivation and soil reforms, to carry out what is stipulated in the forty paragraphs of the "Outline of Agricultural Development," and to accomplish the great and grand plan for agricultural modernization, more contributions are required from pedology for the socialistic construction of our country.

To make our pedology advance better and faster, we must fight all the metaphysical and idealistic views of the capitalist class with strong resolution and under the guidance of Marxism, Leninism, and the teachings of Mao Tse-tung so as to make our pedological sciences a citadel for the thought of materialistic dialectics and a powerful weapon for the advancement of our agriculture.

Footnotes:

¹The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, 1952 edition, pp. 296-297.

²The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, 1952 edition, p. 297.

³The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, 1952 edition, pp. 315-316.

⁴The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, 1952 edition, p. 308.

5The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, 1952

⁶The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, 1952

7T'u-ang Hsueh-pao, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 79-100.

⁸Engels. Anti-Duhring. People's Publishing Company.

⁹The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, 1952

THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE CONTRADICTION PROBLEM
ON THINGS IN GENERAL IS THE CONTRADICTION
BETWEEN CONFORMITY AND HOSTILITY

Following is the translation of an article by
Chung Hsueh (4191 1331) in Che-hsueh Yen-chiu
(Philosophy Research), Peiping, No. 1, 25
January 1961, pp. 32-41.

1. Where is the Key?

The problem of the relationship between the conformity and hostility of contradiction is the center of several problems concerning the law of the unity of opposites as being discussed by philosophers at the present time. Due to the differences in the understanding of the problem, the answers to the other problems are different. The many diversified ideas do result fundamentally from the different viewpoints adopted toward the solution of the problem of the relationship between the conformity and hostility of the aspects of contradiction. Comrade Hsieh Ching (5641 7231) viewed this relationship as being that of the unity of opposites. But from there on, he made many erroneous conclusions such as "struggle is also relative." Other comrades, in pointing out the errors of Comrade Hsieh Ching, went to the other extreme. They fundamentally repudiated the theory that the relationship between the two is the unity of opposites. Where then is the key to the problem?

We think that the key lies in the question of whether or not we truly recognize the relationship of the unity of opposites between conformity and hostility. The mistake of Comrade Hsieh Ching is not due to the fact that he tried to analyze the relationship as a unity of opposites relationship. It originated from the fact that he actually (not verbally) did not recognize this relationship. Therefore, it is also incorrect to fundamentally refuse to recognize this relationship simply because Comrade Hsieh Ching has made many erroneous conclusions.

The unity of opposites relationship between conformity and hostility should and must be recognized, because the

problem of the relationship between the two is actually the problem of recognizing the relationships between the following qualities: the individual and the common, the particular and the universal, the relative and the absolute. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has pointed out that the relationships of these qualities are "the essence of contradiction concerning matters and things. Without a proper understanding of them, it is like discarding dialectics." ("On Contradiction.")

As a matter of fact, the orthodox Marxist-Leninist authors have always looked upon the relationship between conformity and hostility as a unity of opposites relationship. As everybody knows, Engels, in his "Dialectics of Nature," analyzed a great many natural facts and established the conclusion that the dialectic relationship between conformity and hostility is that of the unity of opposites. He pointed out that the metaphysicians established conformity and difference as two absolute opposites. When they saw conformity, they fundamentally refused to admit the existence of difference. When they saw difference, they fundamentally refused to admit the existence of conformity. This is entirely without any foundation. Conformity and difference are "the two poles of the same thing. The reason why these two poles are real is due to their interaction, and the inclusion of difference within conformity." :When they are taken apart to be examined, they start their inter-change."¹ Lenin further explained the relative and absolute relationship between conformity and hostility. He pointed out that "the conformity aspect of the opposites (uniformity, conformity, and equilibrium) is conditional, temporary, transient, and relative, but the struggle aspect of the mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just like the absoluteness of development and motion."² In his "On Contradiction," Comrade Mao Tse-tung made an over-all and detailed analysis of the mutual relationship between conformity and hostility. First, he analyzed the differences between conformity and hostility, and developed Lenin's theory of the relativity of conformity and the absoluteness of hostility. Next, he analyzed their mutual relationship, and pointed out that absolute hostility lies in relative conformity. Without hostility, there would be no conformity. He further stressed that this theory of relativity and absoluteness is the "essence" of contradiction.

But why has this problem again become the center of controversy? We think that it is engendered by our own lack of deep understanding of "the essence of the problem of contradiction concerning matters and things."

2. Materialistic Dialectics or a Game of Ideas?

Whether or not there is any relationship between conformity and hostility is a question that requires no answer, because in the discussion, everybody is already trying to analyze the problem of the relationship between the two, and most of the comrades consider this relationship as a relative and absolute relationship. But some comrades look upon conformity and hostility of contradiction as a dual quality. They do not constitute two opposites, and therefore they do not have a unity of opposites relationship. Even though it is a unity of opposites relationship, it is nothing but a game of ideas, and not the dialectics for matters and things, etc., etc. We concur with many comrades' criticism when they consider Comrade Hsieh Ching's way of putting a clear line of demarcation between the two as an idealistic consideration of their relationship. But for the sake of clearing up the problem, we must start from reality, concretely analyze the contradictions in matters and things, and decide whether or not, in considering the relationship between the two as a unity of opposites relationship, we are engaged in the dialectics of matters and things or in a mere game of ideas.

In natural phenomena, it is not true that mechanical motions are due to attraction and repulsion as a result of the contradictions between matter? It is not true that the physical movement of the solid, liquid, and gaseous states are formed by condensation and evaporation as a result of the contradictions between the elements? If the contradictions between the elements do not cause combination and separation, how can the chemical phenomena be explained? Furthermore, if in the contradictions between living organisms and their environment there is no assimilation and evolution, how can the life process be imaginable? If in the contradictions between parents and progenies there is no relationship between heredity and mutation, how can there be the development and change of species? This is true in nature: the contradictions of all matters and things possess a dual nature; they all contain the aspects of conformity and hostility. Even though in different areas and in different processes this dual nature has its special expression, without exception it forms contradictions and the relationship of the unity of opposites.

The same theory can be applied to the different kinds of contradictions in our social life. It is impossible that the conformity and hostility of contradiction have absolutely no relationship or form no contradiction. In the

contradiction between the lower and the higher economic strata, if there is no contradiction of the dual-natured fitness and unfitness, there would be no possibility of society developing. If among the different branches of our people's economy, for example among industry and agriculture, there is no contradiction of balance and imbalance, the economy cannot develop. Besides, in the contradictions that existed between the different stages of the united front, without the unified and conflicting dual-natured contradiction, the united front could not have been formed, consolidated, and developed. Within the different kinds of contradictions in the nation, it is unimaginable that there is no contradiction between unity and criticism. In the Party's existence, if there is no contradiction between unity and criticism, then the life of the Party will be terminated. Therefore, in human society, even though different kinds of contradictions have different concrete situations, all the contradictions possess the aspects of conformity and hostility. At the same time, they actually form contradictions and actually possess the relationship of unity of opposites.

In conclusion, all the matter and things in nature or in social life are unified contradictions, and all the relationships between the opposites of contradictions possess the dual nature of conformity and hostility. "The opposites of contradiction are at once unified and conflicting. From this, the motion and change of matters and things are started." ("On Contradiction") The aspects of conformity and hostility of matters and things exist objectively in everything. They are reflected in our ideas. They are facts. They are not contradictions formed in our minds. They are by no means a game of ideas.

The relationship between the contradictory opposites and their dual nature constitute the relationship between conformity and hostility. It cannot be split, nor can it be mixed. Surely, the conformity and hostility of the contradiction of concrete matters and things are at once an identical and conflicting relationship between the two opposites of matters and things, and they should never be separated from the contradiction of matters and things. It would be totally erroneous not to recognize this point. But, the contradiction of conformity and hostility is not the contradiction of matters and things itself. It is the contradiction of the dual nature of the contradiction of matters and things. In other words, this unity of opposites relationship is not the unity of opposites relationship of the opposites of matters and things itself, but that of the conformity and hostile dual nature of the opposites of matters

and things. Obviously, we cannot entirely consider the unity of opposites relationship of attraction and repulsion or condensation and evaporation as the unity of opposites relationship between matter and elements. Nor can we consider the contradictions between suitability and unsuitability or balance and imbalance as completely equal to the contradictions between productive forces and production relationships, the lower and upper economic strata, and industry and agriculture. If we confuse them, it will be a joke.

If the contradiction between attraction and repulsion is the same as the contradiction between two types of matter, then which type of matter is attracting and which is repelling? In the same way, if the contradiction between suitability and unsuitability is the same as that between productive forces and production relationships, then can we say that the productive forces are suitable and the production relationships unsuitable; or, to the contrary, can we say that the productive forces are unsuitable and the production relationship is suitable? Therefore, we cannot confuse in our minds the dual nature (conformity and hostility) of contradiction of matter and things with the matter and things themselves. Attraction and repulsion, condensation and evaporation, combination and separation, assimilation and evolution, fitness and unfitness, and balance and imbalance, are the dual nature relationships of the contradictions of matter and things. Attraction, condensation, combination, assimilation, fitness, and balance are the concrete aspects of conformity. Repulsion, evaporation, separation, unfitness, and imbalance are the concrete aspects of hostility. "The unification of the conditional and relative conformity and the unconditional and absolute hostility forms the contradictory motion of all matter and things." ("On Contradiction") This mutually dependent dual nature of contradiction is located in the contradictory relationship between matter and things. It is this same mutually exclusive, opposite, and struggling dual nature that starts the development of matter and things.

Some comrades are of the opinion that the philosophical concept of conformity and struggle cannot be confused with the notions of attraction and repulsion, condensation and evaporation, balance and imbalance, fitness and unfitness, and unity and conflict. Therefore, it is impossible to arrive at the conclusion that because of the existence of contradictions between attraction and repulsion, etc., there is also contradiction between conformity and hostility.

Actually, this kind of opinion only states one side of the theory. There is another side to it. No doubt, there is a difference between the notions of attraction and repulsion,

balance and imbalance, etc., and the philosophical concept of conformity and hostility. We should not place an equal sign between the two; but we shouldn't build a high wall between the notions of attraction and repulsion, balance and imbalance, etc., and the philosophical concept of conformity and hostility and make a clean division. This is because a philosophical concept is nothing but the common basic quality of all matter and things, and the reflection of the most universal kind of relationship, not an out of this world mysterious thing. The relationship between philosophical concepts and common ideas is the relationship between the universal and the particular, between the common quality and the individual quality. Conformity and hostility, when considered as philosophical concepts, are nothing but the general reflection of the conformity and hostility existing objectively among concrete matter and things such as attraction and repulsion, balance and imbalance, etc.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung considers the balance and imbalance in our national economy as the concrete expression of conformity and hostility. He has said: "Each year our nation makes an economic plan to arrange for a suitable ratio between reserve and consumption and to strive for the balance between production and consumption. The so-called balance means the temporary relative unity of contradiction. After the year is over, this balance as a whole will be upset by the struggle of the contradiction. This kind of unity will have changed. Balance becomes imbalance, unity becomes disunity. The balance and unity of the second year must again be achieved. This is the superiority of our planned economy."³ Therefore it can be seen that it is incorrect to consider balance-imbalance as not belonging to the category of conformity and hostility. For the same reason, it is erroneous to consider attraction and repulsion, condensation and evaporation, combination and separation, heredity and mutation, assimilation and evolution, fitness and unfitness, unity and conflict, unison and criticism, etc., as not belonging to the category of conformity and hostility.

Therefore, if we admit that attraction and repulsion, balance and imbalance, etc., are contradictions and possess the unity of opposites relationship, that they are the concrete expression of the conformity and hostility of contradictions, then we cannot but also admit that the conformity and hostility of these contradictions can also form contradictions and possess the unity of opposites relationship. Otherwise, it is not only illogical but also contrary to objective reality.

But some comrades fear that if we consider the

conformity and hostility of a contradiction as another contradiction, then it will go on ad infinitum in logic, and dialectics will become a game of ideas after all.

This kind of fear has some reasonable basis. If we start from pure ideas, it is quite possible, in logic, to find there are contradictions among contradictions, and contradictions among the contradictions of contradictions...all the way to infinity. Thus it becomes a game of ideas. Comrade Hsieh Ching discarded the contradictory relationship of matter and things, separated the relative and the absolute, refused to admit that there is absoluteness in the relative and that absoluteness is the absoluteness of the relative, discarded the contradiction between the absolute and the relative, and only idealistically tried to find the unity of opposites relationship between conformity and hostility. In this way, it certainly can go on forever. Surely, Comrade Hsieh Ching himself did not create this infinite process, but the research method he used contained this possibility. This process, even though it looks like dialectics, actually is the metaphysical method which does not admit the contradictions of matter and things.

Naturally, this is not to say that infinity has no place in logic. The point is that the infinity in logic must reflect the infinity of the natural world. For instance, our idea of the infinity of the universe is the reflection of the actually-existing, ever-developing, ever-changing material world. The infinite and the infinitesimal in mathematics are both also the reflection of actual relationships. Without the infinity of matter in time and space and its unlimited qualities, there can be no concept of infinity. Without the infinite qualities of the basic material atoms, there can be no concept of the infinitesimal. The real infinite is combined with the finite. It exists through the finite forms of matter, and is not what Hegel called "the bad infinite." This infinity is the reflection of the dialectics of matter and things. No one should, and no one can, disavow it.

We are dialectic materialists. What we are studying is the dialectics of matter and things. Therefore, we must be loyal to matter and things, start from reality, analyze the conformity and hostility of contradiction of matter and things, and see if there is another contradiction and if it possesses the unity of opposites relationship. If this is so, then it is impossible to turn dialectics into a game of ideas just because we admit this true fact and have analyzed this fact concretely. The reason is that in the contradictions of realities, there is no problem that can go on to the infinite. Actually, as we have already seen, the contradiction of

conformity and hostility cannot exist independent of the contradictions of matter and things. It is the dual nature of all concrete matter and things. Whenever it is separated from the contradictions of concrete matter and things, there will be no contradiction of conformity and hostility. Therefore, we consider the fear of turning dialectics into a game of ideas because of the admission that conformity and hostility form another contradiction as entirely unnecessary.

3. The Relative and Absolute Relationship Between the Conformity and the Hostility of Contradiction is a Unity of Opposites Relationship.

The relationship between conformity and hostility is a relative and absolute relationship. This fact has been admitted by most of the comrades in the discussion. But because of the different ways of understanding this problem, there have been many diversified opinions on the question of the relationship between the two. Therefore, the gist of the problem is how to understand the relative and absolute relationship between conformity and hostility.

We think that the relative and absolute relationship between them is a unity of opposites relationship. The conditional and relative conformity and the unconditional and absolute hostility are mutually independent and mutually exclusive. In the meantime, "hostility is contained in conformity; without hostility, there would be no conformity." ("On Contradiction"). The absolute hostility can only exist within the relative conformity. Something unconditional and absolute exists in something conditional and relative. Without the relative conformity, there could be no absolute hostility. On the other hand, without the absolute hostility, there could be no relative conformity. The absolute can only exist through the relative; without the relative, there can be no absolute. In other words, whether it be the absolute hostility or the relative conformity, one cannot exist without the other. They are the opposites of each other; they are mutually exclusive, mutually independent, but also mutually dependent, and mutually penetrating.

"If they are not enemies, they will never meet; if they are enemies, they will surely meet head on." This dual nature of the contradictions of matter and things is at once contrary and complementary in quality. This "contrary-complementary" dialectical relationship is a unity of opposites relationship. If the conformity and hostility of the contradictions of matter and things do not form a contradiction,

if there is no absolute and relative relationship, then there will be no contradictions of matter and things and there will be no development. The reason why any contradiction of matter and things becomes another contradiction is because it possesses the relative conformity and the absolute hostility at the same time--the two contrary and complementary qualities. "The conditional and relative conformity and the unconditional and absolute hostility combine and form the contradictory movement of everything."

But if we admit that the relative conformity and the absolute hostility are mutually dependent, constitute the premises of each other, and co-exist in the same entity, will we, like Comrade Hsieh Ching, draw the conclusion that hostility is also relative, or like some other comrades, arrive at the conclusion that conformity is also absolute?

From this viewpoint of materialist dialectics, the difference between the relative and the absolute is also relative. The relative and the absolute are interdependent, and inter-permeating. There can be no relativity apart from absoluteness, and there can be no independent absoluteness. But this is not to say that there is no difference between the two, that absoluteness can be transformed into relativity, or vice versa.

The absolute and relative relationship of conformity and hostility of the contradictions of matter and things cannot be clearly separated. The objective universe itself is both relative and absolute. It is the unity of opposites of the relative and the absolute. But the infinite and absolute material world and its motions can only exist through the finite and relative matter and things and the motions of concrete things. All matter and things and all the motions of concrete objects are conditional, temporary, finite, and relative. But at the same time, they are the component parts of the unconditional, infinite, and absolute material world and its motions. The conditional and finite things form the unconditional and infinite things. The common quality is inside the individual quality, and the absolute is within the relative. Therefore, we can never separate the relative from the absolute. Otherwise, we will have to look upon the material world as a rigidly dead and an absolutely stagnant thing, or a world of confusion. We can only see a universal, infinite, perpetual, absolute, and moving material world through individual, finite, temporary, and relative matter and things and their motions. This is a contradiction, but it is a realistic contradiction. We cannot imagine the absolute and the relative without any contradiction.

Lenin said: "Attention: The difference between subjectivism (skepticism and sophistry) and dialectics lies inside the (objective) dialectics. The difference between the relative and the absolute is relative. From the standpoint of objective dialectics, the absolute is inside the relative. From the standpoint of subjectivism and sophistry, the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute."⁴ Therefore, using materialist dialectics, we can never arrive at the conclusion that struggle is also relative because of the interdependence of the relative and the absolute, and because of conformity and hostility. Only by separating the relative from the absolute, and by looking upon the relative as relative and incompatible with the absolute, can one arrive at the conclusion that struggle is also relative because of the interdependence of the absolute and the relative.

For the same reason, we can say that the difference between materialist dialectics on the one hand and metaphysics and absolutism on the other lies in the fact that from the standpoint of materialist dialectics the difference between the absolute and the relative is relative. The absolute can only exist through the relative. In metaphysics and absolutism, the absolute is absolute and excludes the relative. Therefore, in materialist dialectics, we cannot draw the conclusion that conformity is absolute just because of the interdependence of the absolute and the relative and of conformity and hostility. Only by adopting the viewpoint that the relative and the absolute are separate, and that the absolute is absolute only and is incompatible with the relative, can we arrive at the conclusion that conformity is absolute because of the interdependence of the relative and the absolute.

The relative and absolute relationship of conformity and hostility can never be separated; otherwise, we will inevitably approach the theories of relativism or absolutism because of the position we adopt as to the incompatibility of the relative and the absolute.

To correctly solve the problem of the relative and absolute relationship between conformity and hostility, we must understand clearly the meaning of the relative as well as that of the absolute.

Some comrades think that since hostility exists in the temporary, ephemeral, and transient conformity, then hostility is also transient, relative, and not absolute. Other comrades think that since hostility cannot be separated from conformity, then conformity can only be universal and absolute and not relative. This kind of reasoning not only separates the relative from the absolute, but also raises the question of whether there is conformity in the process of the change of

quality. If there is no conformity during the process of change, surely hostility cannot be ubiquitous, and it must change into the relative. On the other hand, if we say that conformity exists forever in spite of the process of the change of quality or quantity, then conformity becomes absolute.

As a matter of fact, the conformity during the process of quality change is different from the conformity during the process of quantity change. In the process of quality change, the unity of contradiction dissolves, and conformity, one of the two once mutually dependent poles of contradiction which co-exist in the same entity, breaks up and transforms itself into a new conformity. After this mutual transformation of the two contradictory poles, a quick process becomes complete. The original uniformity is replaced by a new conformity, and thus a new contradiction is born. The mutual transformation of the two contradictory poles is the breaking off of the slow process of development; it is the sudden flight of quality; it is the unification of the absolute and the relative, and of the existing and the non-existing. Therefore, we say that conformity is relative.

But no matter how the conditions change, the mutually exclusive hostility of contradiction always exists either in the stage of quantity change or in the stage of quality change, or during the co-existing stage or the interchanging stage of the two contradictory poles. Therefore, the hostility of contradiction is absolute.

The uniform relative and the hostile absolutes are, when applied to conformity, temporary and ephemeral, and when applied to hostility, ever-present and ubiquitous. Furthermore, the main point is that conformity is conditional and hostility is unconditional.

We think that when we say that the conformity of contradiction is relative, we chiefly mean the conditional quality. Any conformity of contradiction, be it the interdependence or the inter-changeability of the two contradictory poles, must possess a certain concrete condition. Without this certain, concrete condition, there will be no conformity. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said: "There is conformity within two opposite things, therefore the two can co-exist in an entity, and can interchange. This is what is called the conditional quality. This is to say that under certain conditions, the contradictory things can achieve unity, and can interchange. Without these conditions, there can be no contradiction, no co-existence, and no interchange. The conformity of contradiction is formed under certain conditions. Therefore we say conformity is conditional and relative." ("On Contradiction," emphasis, the

quater's.) Because of this, the conformity of everything in this world is real, concrete, and not abstract. This is to say that it exists under a certain condition. It will disappear when that certain condition disappears. Because of this conditional quality, the conformity of any contradiction is changeable, temporary, and transient, but not abstract, not solidified, and not changeless. Also, because of this conditional quality, the conformity of any contradiction is special, and possesses an individual character of its own. There is no uniform and abstract conformity. Each conformity is unique, possesses its individual characteristics, and is concrete in nature. The conformities of different contradictions in the different processes are each different, and each possesses its own special and common qualities. The conformities of the different contradictions in the same process also have their own special quality and cannot be looked upon as similar. Even in the same contradiction, the conformity shows differences and characteristics during its different stages of development. Obviously, we cannot mix the different conformities of nature with those in social life. Nor can we consider the conformities during the different stages of social development as quantitatively equal. In the same way, take for example the same contradiction which existed throughout the Chinese peoples' anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist stages of revolution. Its conformity in the anti-Japanese period is entirely different from that of the Liberation War period, and cannot be looked upon as the same. This is because the conditions are different.

Therefore the relative quality of conformity is, principally speaking, its conditional quality. Because conformity is conditional, it is temporary and changeable; because it is conditional, it is the special and individual quality of contradiction. If we negate the relative quality of conformity, or fail to see that its relative quality chiefly means its conditional quality, and we negate both motion and development. Therefore, nature and society would not have their own history of development. It would have been so in the past, it will be so in the future.

When we say that the hostility of contradiction is absolute, we mean that it is unconditional. In a contradiction, because of the different conditions, the conformity constantly changes from one concrete conformity to another. But the mutually exclusive hostility is ever-present, ubiquitous, and never disappears because of the different conditions. The contradictions between the Chinese people and the Kuomintang reactionaries, who represented imperialism, big capitalists, and feudalistic landlords, were different during the

different stages of the democratic revolution. The conformity changes as the conditions changed. (For instance, the ten-year civil war period is different from the anti-Japanese period, the anti-Japanese period is different from the Liberation War period, etc. But no matter how the conformities at the different periods were different, the conflict of the fundamental interests between the Chinese people and the Kuomintang reactionaries and the mutually exclusive hostility always existed. It was true during the first and second revolutionary civil war period; it was true during the anti-Japanese war period, and it was even more so during the liberation war period. It was true during the period of cooperation between the Communists and the Kuomintang and was even more so during the split between the Communists and the Kuomintang. It was true during the non-violent, political, and economic thought struggles, and it was more so during the blood-shedding armed struggles. Surely, this is not to say that the intensity of the struggle between the two contradictory sides and the forms of struggle were changeless. Exactly the opposite is true. The intensity of the hostility and its various forms shifted and changed in accordance with the conformity of the contradiction. Because the conformities were different, the intensity of the hostility and the forms of hostility were also different. When we say that hostility is absolute, we do not mean that the intensity and the forms of hostility under different stages of development remain the same. We rather mean that no matter how different the intensity and its forms, the unconditional and mutually exclusive hostility remains the same. It will exist until the solution of the contradiction, and end of the process, and the appearance of a new contradiction and new process. When the new contradiction takes form and the new process starts, the new hostility of the contradiction appears.

Because of this, the hostility is unconditional and absolute. This is the universal and common quality of contradiction. Whoever negates the absoluteness of hostility or fails to understand that absoluteness means the unconditional quality, negates motion and development. If hostility is relative and conditional, then how can the development of matter and things be imaginable?

As a summary of the above, the conformity and the hostility of contradiction denote the mutual opposition, the mutual exclusion, and the dual nature of the opposites. One is relative, conditional, temporary, and changeable; the other is unconditional and everlasting. One is the special and individual quality; the other, the universal and common quality. Within conformity, there is hostility. With the

special, there is the universal. Within the individual quality, there is the common quality. To quote Lenin's words, "The absolute is inside the relative."

Finally, can conformity and hostility interchange? And if so, can conformity become absolute and hostility relative?

Certainly, the contradiction between the relative conformity and the absolute hostility, like all the other contradictory things, can turn toward the opposite direction and interchange. It is not fixed and changeless. But this kind of interchange, like all the interchanges of other contradictions, is conditional and concrete. We cannot abstractly divide the relative conformity and the absolute hostility into two different poles and then use the rules of syllogism to find out the interchange between them. We can only analyze the concrete conditions of the contradictions of matter and things and see how they interchange. Engels said, "On the earth, the dividing movement is the interchange between motion and equilibrium. Individual motions tend to approach equilibrium, but the overall movement destroys the individual motions." This is the interchange of the absolute motion and the relative rest. Objects will not lose their relative rest and temporary balance just because the whole world moves. In the meantime, the world will not be rigidly dead and changeless because the motions of the individual objects reach the state of rest and temporary balance. In other words, the interchange of motion and equilibrium does not change the absoluteness of motion and the relativity of equilibrium. We can only see the living unity of motion and equilibrium.

In social life, the relationship between the productive forces and the production relationships, and the contradiction between the lower and the higher economic strata, create the interchange from basic fitness to basic unfitness because of the development of the productive forces (i.e., conditions). Due to the change of production relationships (conditions), as a result of revolutionary innovations, there comes the interchange from basic unfitness to basic fitness. In the same way, the conformity and hostility of the balance and the imbalance of the people's economic departments and those of the different classes of the united front can interchange because of the changing conditions. But we must understand this kind of interchange correctly. We must not think that during the period of fitness, balance, and unity, conformity is the main and absolute factor and hostility becomes secondary and relative. We cannot say that hostility is absolute merely because the basic contradiction between the capitalistic societies and the socialistic societies has its antagonistic and non-antagonistic aspects, and the contradiction between the

workers and the capitalistic productive forces and relationships is an antagonistic one. Nor can we say that the contradiction between the productive forces and the production relationships is non-antagonistic, and therefore the hostility is relative and the conformity is absolute.

The interchange of the fitness and the unfitness of productive forces and production relationships and the balance and imbalance of the people's economy both exist in the capitalistic societies and the socialistic societies. The point is that the quality and the situation of the two are different. In the capitalistic societies, the balance of the national economy is achieved through economic crises. In the socialistic societies, it is done through national economic planning. Therefore we cannot refuse to admit certain kinds of balance in the capitalistic societies, nor can we deny certain kinds of imbalance in the socialistic societies. The imbalance under capitalism as a result of the contradiction between expanded production, private ownership, and anarchy of production, and can retain some kind of balance through the adjustment afforded by economic crises. Under the socialistic system, the national economy develops in accordance with planning and a set ratio. The imbalance can thus be regulated, but it does not disappear. By destroying private ownership, we can consciously control and utilize the objective rules of imbalance to create many relative and temporary balances. Balance and imbalance are the two sides of a contradiction. Without the one, the other cannot exist. Anyhow, balance is relative and conditional; imbalance is absolute and unconditional. This is the universal rule. It can be applied to the capitalistic societies and the socialistic societies alike. Actually, the above-stated fitness and unfitness, balance and imbalance, etc., and their interchanges, are nothing but the conformity and hostility of contradictions. Because of different conditions, one is sometimes more prominent than the other. When there is fitness, there is also unfitness. When there is balance, there is also imbalance. On the other hand, they both exist at the same time. The relative quality of fitness and balance, and the absolute quality of unfitness and imbalance do not change because of this interchange. Therefore if, because of the interchange between fitness and unfitness and balance and imbalance, we conclude that the absolute hostility can be changed into relative hostility, and the relative conformity can be changed into absolute conformity, we are in complete error.

Surely, there is interchange between the relative and the absolute, but we cannot understand this interchange

from the standpoint of metaphysics which separates the relative from the absolute. Actually, we have already answered this question in the above-quoted words of Lenin. He pointed out that the difference between the relative and the absolute is also relative, and the absolute is in the relative. This is to say that the absolute and the relative inter-permeate and interact. This is interchange.

Now then, is the difference between the relative quality of conformity and the absolute quality of hostility so indefinite? Yes, from the standpoint of materialist dialectics it is so that we can make a clear line of demarcation from the absolutism of metaphysics. We are dialectic materialists. Our view of the "essence of the contradiction of matter and things" and the relationship between the relative and the absolute can only be shown by means of dialectics. This is to say that the absolute struggle can only be seen from the relative conformity, but the absolute hostility cannot be put in the category of the relative conformity, and vice versa.

Metaphysicians do not understand materialistic dialectics. They invariably separate the relative and the absolute, and unilaterally hold on to one side. Either they hold on to the relative and deny the absolute with the relative, and thus approach the relative through subjective idealism, or they hold on to the absolute and deny the fact that the absolute can only exist within the relative, and thus approach subjectivism through objective idealism. If there is no absoluteness with the relative, then the relative is only relative. It would thus be impossible to recognize the world, and there would be no objective truth. On the other hand, if absoluteness is only absoluteness, and this absoluteness is just another name for God. Actually, there is no pure absoluteness or pure relativity in this world. Therefore, if anybody, from his own way of thinking, splits the absolute from the relative, starts with the dialectical principle of the interchange of the contradictory poles, and uses syllogism to arrive at the conclusion that the pure relative can transform itself into pure positive, then it will be the greatest error of all errors.

* * *

The relationship between conformity and hostility is that of the unity of opposites. To recognize this relationship is to know the dialectics of matter and things, and not a game of ideas. Conformity is conditional and relative, while hostility is unconditional and absolute. Therefore, they are contrary and mutually exclusive. But the unconditional and absolute hostility exists within the conditional and relative

conformity. Without hostility, there will be no conformity. Therefore, the relative conformity and the absolute hostility are interdependent, inter-permeating, and interchangeable. The relationship between conformity and hostility actually is the dialectical relationship of the relative-absolute, the particular-universal, and the individual-common. This is also the relationship of the unity of opposites. To understand correctly this relative-absolute relationship is to give rise to the relationship between conformity and hostility without mistake. This is our basic view of this problem.

This view is a simple one, but we feel that the discussion of the problem of the relationship between conformity and hostility has important meaning both theoretically and realistically. Theoretically speaking, whether we understand this problem correctly or not is not only the key to the solution of other problems confronting us now, but also the answer to the problem as to whether we want dialectics or not. Realistically speaking, the correct solution of this problem possesses significant meaning in relation to the understanding and the realization of the line, principle, and policy of our Party's socialistic revolution and socialistic reconstruction and the accomplishment of our revolutionary and reconstruction work. Therefore, we did some research into this problem. Our aim is learning. If there are any mistakes, we request the readers to correct us.

Footnotes:

¹Engels, "Dialectics of Nature," People's Press, p. 178.

²The Complete Works of Lenin, People's Press, p. 408.

³Mao Tse-tung, "On the Proper Handling of the Problem of Contradictions among the People," p. 12.

⁴The Complete Works of Lenin, People's Press, vol. 38, p. 108.

CONFORMITY AND HOSTILITY CANNOT BE DISCUSSED
WITHOUT INCLUDING ALL ASPECTS OF CONTRADICTIONS

[Following is the translation of an article by
Lin Ching-yao (2651 0079 3613) in Che-hsueh Yen-chiu
(Philosophy Research), Peiping, No. 1, 25 January
1961, pp. 42-50.]

The conformity and the hostility of all aspects of contradictions are the basic contents of the theories of the unity of opposites. After gaining a clear view of this concept, it is comparatively easier to understand the other problems of the unity of opposites, and then we can understand the essence of dialectics. Recently, the study, research, and discussions concerning the theories of the unity of opposites have been developed further on the foundation we had before. The relationship of the conformity and hostility of all the aspects of contradiction is the central problem discussed lately. We consider the discussion on this problem is very significant in theory as well as in practice.

This article is my understanding of the conformity and hostility of all aspects of contradiction. Comrades are welcomed to criticize and to correct the mistakes if any.

1. Concrete Analysis Of Concrete Matters Is The Soul of Dialectics.

In the discussion of the problem of the relationship between conformity and hostility, there are two viewpoints and two contrasting methods. One is the concrete analysis of the concrete matters and the study of conformity and hostility of all aspects of contradictions. The other is the abstract analysis of the abstract concepts and the discussion of the relationship of conformity and hostility without touching all the aspects of contradictions. The former is the soul of materialistic dialectics, and the latter is the characteristic of metaphysics. Marxism considers that materialistic dialectics should be historical and logical and that

theories and practices should be uniform. Therefore, the key problem is the concrete analysis of concrete matters.

What is the relationship between conformity and hostility? How should we understand it? Comrade Hsieh Ching (5641 7231) said: "The contrasting conformity and hostility indicates the nature or relationship of the two contrasting phases. This nature or relationship also forms contrasting phases between which there is also a relationship of contrasting conformity and hostility."¹ He also said: "The relativity of the contrast and the absoluteness of the contrast are contrasting and unified. The conformity and hostility are also contrasting and unified. This contradiction was originally the objective contradiction in the process of the development of matter."² In Comrade Liu Che-ping's (0491 0772 0365) article "Uniformity and Hostility are Contrasting and Unified" in the "New Construction," No. 10-11, 1960, his basic viewpoints are the same as Comrade Hsieh Ching's. He said: "The dialectics of Marxism show that the contrasting phases of any contradictions contain conformity and hostility. The result of the interaction of these two natures causes matter to develop constantly." Again he said "... conformity and hostility are the contrasting phases of contradictions. Thus, between them there must be conformity as well as hostility (Comrade Wu Ping-yuan (0702 4426 0337) agrees on this point). The exclusion of the tendency of the absolute development of hostility by conformity and the exclusion of the relative and stable tendency by hostility are shown through the relationship of conformity and hostility."³

In some of the articles of the comrades, although they have criticized some of Comrade Hsieh Ching's viewpoints, however, they have agreed with his basic viewpoints. They agreed that conformity and hostility contrast with unity. Comrade Yen Li (6056 4539) said: "Materialistic dialectics considers the absoluteness of hostility and the relativity of conformity as repulsive to each other on the one hand, and as unified on the other." "It is the unification of two contrasts (dialectical unity)."⁴ Also, as Comrade Wu Ping-yuan said: "Materialistic dialectics considers the conformity and hostility of the contradictions of any things as all dialectical unity. They are closely related, and cannot function individually."⁵

We think that the viewpoints of the above-mentioned Comrades Hsieh Ching, Liu Che-ping, Yen Li, and Wu Ping-yuan are all worth discussing. Lenin, in the Digest of Hegel's Logic showed us that "Dialectics is a theory on how conformity can be reached in the contrasting phases, and under

what conditions the contrasting phases become uniform and mutually effective..."⁶ In Comrade Mao Tse-tung's "On Contradictions", he has fully and clearly stated and developed this idea of Lenin's. And he has also developed the dialectical methods of Marxism regarding the theory of contrasting unity. The so-called relationship between the conformity and hostility of the contradictions indicates the relationship between the conformity and hostility of all aspects of contradictions. Any contradiction is concrete and real. We who study conformity and hostility must study the conformity and hostility of all aspects of contradictions. It is the study of conformity and hostility of concrete matter. Otherwise we will be doing an abstract analysis of the abstract concepts.

Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping studied the scope of the dialectics from abstract concepts, and intended to explain, subjectively and with pure metaphysical methods, these concepts and this scope. We know that the concepts and scope of any science are the scientific abstracts of objective matter, therefore, it reflects more deeply and correctly the nature of matter. Contradiction is the highest scope of dialectics. It is in the same order as the material versus the spiritual in materialism. It reflects the basic and general rules of nature, human society, and human thoughts. It is the system of contradictions. When we study the conformity and hostility of contradictions, we must study the conformity and hostility of the contradictions of the objective matters and the real contradictions, not the contradictions of abstract research. It does not mean the study of contradictions of conformity and hostility. Otherwise, it would be the same as to add another scope on top of the highest scope of contradictions. It is completely meaningless, and comes from nowhere. According to this method, the concept of contradictions can be divided indefinitely and limitlessly.

It is true concepts are not unchangeable and dead. They are growing and changing and vascillate. Therefore, concepts are living. The living and moving concepts are the reflection of the living and moving reality. In examining and researching concepts, we forgot about this by departing from the real matters of the objective existence and starting from the subjective abstract to analyze the abstract concept by abstract analysis. This is basically against the dialectics. Lenin said: "Concepts are whole and general liveliness and reach to the contrasting and uniform liveliness. This is where the problem lies. If the liveliness is applied subjectively, it is eclecticism and sophistry. If the liveliness is applied objectively, it will reflect the wholeness and the uniformity

of the process of matter. This is dialectics. It is the correct reflection of the constant development of the world."⁷ Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping had hold of the liveliness of concepts. For instance, they said that conformity and hostility of contradictions are contrasting uniformity, and so forth. They applied the concept of contradictions subjectively, not objectively. They left all aspects of contradictions and talked abstractly about conformity and hostility being contrasting uniformity. This would not reflect the process of development of the material world. When it is carried through, it will lead to eclecticism and sophistry.

Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping considered that any contrasting phases of contradictions were contrasting uniformity. In other words, uniformity and hostility both existed in contradictions at the same time. We think this is not logical. Comrade Chou ching-fang (0719 2529 5364), in his article "How to Understand and Utilize the System of Conformity and Hostility" (see Philosophy Research, nos. 7-8, 1960), correctly criticized and mistaken viewpoints of Comrade Hsieh Ching. In the same article, there are other points worth discussing. He said: "Conformity and hostility of contradictions are the dual nature of contradictions". He also said: "To deny the dual nature of contradictions (conformity and hostility) is to deny the dual nature of everything." I think that to take conformity and hostility as the dual nature of contradictions is not appropriate. If this is deducted logically, the result will be the same as the viewpoints of Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping. That means conformity and hostility are contrasting uniformity, and in reality are the same. If we say that conformity and hostility are the dual nature of contradictions, it is like saying contradictions of contradictions, or the dual nature of the dual nature. This is meaningless.

The comrades who advocated that conformity and hostility are contrasting uniformity said that Engels pointed out in his "Natural Dialectics" that conformity and hostility are the "two ends of one thing. The reason they are real is due to the fact that they are mutually active and the difference is included in conformity." "Conformity and difference, necessity and accident, cause and effect: these are the main contrasts..."⁸ Doesn't this mean to say that conformity and hostility are contrasting unity? We think what Engels said is correct. Conformity and hostility are used as two scopes of thinking and are contrasting uniformity. They are in the same order as the other scope of dialectics (necessity and accident, general and specific, cause and effect). But we can not mix conformity and difference with

conformity and hostility of contradictions. When we say difference, we mean contradictions. Any differences are uniform and hostile. But if we say differences are hostility, it is not right. Therefore, contrasting uniformity does not equal the contrasting uniformity of conformity and difference, but it is contrasting conformity and hostility.

In the theory that conformity and hostility are contrasting uniformity of Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping, the basic defect is in making contradictions abstract, away from real matter and away from "all aspects of contradictions". The so-called contradictions, simple speaking, are with spear and shield. Unity is formed by two contrasting phases. In capitalistic society, there is the capitalistic class and also the proletariat. In the unified body of the capitalistic society, the struggle between these two classes helps the development of the capitalistic society until the capitalistic society is destroyed and socialism takes over. However, Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping both left out the mutual relationship of all aspects of contradictions (such as between the capitalistic class and the proletariat) and the unceasing development of the matter pushed by uniformity and hostility, and abstractly treated uniformity and hostility as "one single contradiction." Furthermore, they said: "These contradictions are the objective contradictions existing in the process of material development." And they also said: "Contradictory movement is formed by relative uniformity and absolute hostility." Comrade Yen Li in his criticism of Comrade Hsieh Ching's article also considered that the contrasting unity of uniformity and hostility formed contradictory movement. What is contradictory movement? The contradictory movement we mean here is the contradictory movement the real matter, not the contradictory movement of conformity and hostility pointed out by Comrade Hsieh Ching. May I ask how the contradictions of conformity and hostility of the capitalistic class and the proletariat form a contradictory movement? And how does it cause the capitalistic society to develop until its last day?

Engels said: "Principle is not the starting point for study, but the final result of study. These principles are not to be applied to nature and human history, but they are separate from nature and human history. It is not that nature and human history should fit the principles, but it is the other way around. Principles are not correct until they fit nature and human history. This is the only viewpoint of materialism...."9 The metaphysics of the idealists and Engels' materialistic viewpoints are opposite. The mutual

relationship between principles and nature and human history is all upset. Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping adopted the meditation method of speculation to create some principles and used them as starting points to study the problem. For example, they first assumed uniformity and hostility as one contradiction, then assumed that these contrasting phases have characteristics of relative uniformity, and finally applied the principles to the real matters. We can see that their principles cannot go through the test. If we use their principles for the real matters, they will not function, and will become abstract without any contents.

We know that in contradictions there are primary and secondary phases. The primary phase of contradictions decides the nature of matters. Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: "No matter what kind of contradiction it is, and no matter when it is, the development of contradictions of all aspects is not balanced. Sometimes it appears balanced, but it is only temporary and relative. The basic shape is not balanced. One phase of contradictions must be primary and the other secondary. The primary phase is the part that has the leading function. The nature of matters mainly is decided by the primary phase, which takes the leading position."¹⁰ He also said: "However, these conditions are not fixed. The mutual influences of the primary phase and the secondary phase of contradictions changes the nature of matters."¹¹ If we say conformity and hostility are relative unity and have contrasting phases, then we must admit that one of the phases of contradictions is primary and the other secondary. In the meantime, the positions of these two phases under a certain condition affect each other. On this point, Comrade Liu Che-ping has given an affirmative and clear answer. Comrade Hsieh Ching also has actually given an affirmative answer. But, there is still one problem unsolved, which is "the primary side of contradictions decides the nature of matters, then how does either of these two, conformity or hostility, decide the nature of matters? For instance, the work of any one of us is a problem of nine points and one point. The accomplishments and defects are a relative unity. If the accomplishments are primary and basic, and his work should be encouraged. If his defects are nine points and his accomplishments one point, then his defects are primary and basic, and his work should be discouraged. If we leave out the concrete aspects of real contradiction (such as accomplishments and defects), and study abstractly the conformable and hostile relationship between the conformity and hostility of the contradictions of all aspects, then, when conformity is the primary phase of the contradictions, how do we

decide the nature of matters? When hostility is the primary phase of the contradictions, how do we decide the nature of matters? To these problems, Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping could not give a direct answer.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung in his "On contradiction" has told us the meaning of both the conformity and hostility of contradictions: First the contrasting sides depend upon each other, and are in the state of uniformity; and secondly, the contrasting sides mutually influence each other under certain conditions. According to the theory that the conformity and hostility of contradictions are contrasting uniformity, the uniformity of conformity and hostility has these two meanings. All those who have this viewpoint have affirmed this point. Comrade Hsieh Ching thought that "The uniform relationship between conformity and hostility lies in their interdependence upon each other; and they are logical premises of each other, and they contain each other."¹² Comrade Liu Che-ping thought that "Conformity and hostility are both in one uniform body, and according to a certain pattern, change in different directions."¹³ Materialistic dialectics has taught us that to study the conformity of contradictions is to study under what conditions the matters of real contradictions would mutually depend upon each other and mutually influence each other. For instance, when we study the conformity of thoughts and existence, we can only study under what conditions they depend on each other and influence each other. We should not be like Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping who studied the unity of conformity and hostility of thoughts and existence. They left out the real matters and studied concepts abstractly, and they did not have any results.

Everybody agrees that the conformity of real contradictions is conditional. Comrade Mao Tse-tung again and again has pointed out that the two sides of contradictions "Under certain conditions are united and conformable."¹⁴ "When all the necessary conditions are in order, the process of the development of matters will develop certain contradictions, and these contradictions will depend upon each other and influence each other. Otherwise, nothing is possible."¹⁵ "Between two contrasting matters there is conformity. Therefore, they can be in one uniform body and affect each other. This is to say that under certain conditions, contradictory matters can be unified and affect each other. Without these conditions, there are no contradictions, and they cannot exist together and develop."¹⁶ Since Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping thought conformity and hostility were one contradiction and they are both in the uniform body and follow

a certain pattern to develop in different directions, then what are the conditions of the "co-existence" and "mutual influence?" In other words, how do they become uniform? Because comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping did not apply the system of contrasting uniformity to the concrete analysis of the concrete matters and did not have hold of the aspects of contradictions of the concrete matters, they remained in the maze of concept and could not solve these problems in a concrete way.

It is the same with the hostility of contradictions. Let us take the relationship of the progression and backwardness within people for instance. Comrade Hsieh Ching and others did not analyze the hostility of progression and backwardness in a concrete way, but they analyzed and studied the hostility of conformity and the hostility of progression and backwardness. According to comrade Hsieh Ching, progression and backwardness are not fighting against and excluding each other, but the conformity and hostility of progression and backwardness are fighting against and excluding each other. And they also thought this was what formed the "contradictory movement," "urging things to develop unceasingly." What result will this have?

To speak of the relationship between conformity and hostility without including all aspects of the concrete contradictions and to use metaphysical methods to abstractly study the conformity and hostility while leaving out the real matters, and then say that the conformity and hostility of contradictions are contrasting uniformity is only a game of concepts. The theory that conformity and hostility are contrasting uniformity leads to the indefinite division of the concept of "contradiction," and the result will lead dialectical concepts farther and farther away from reality.

2. The Contrast of Dialectics and Metaphysics in the Understanding of Conformity

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said that: "We Chinese frequently say that 'things opposed to each other correspond with each other.' This means that things opposed to each other have conformity. This sentence is dialectical, and is opposed to metaphysics. 'Opposition' means the mutual exclusion or struggle between the two contradictory phases. 'Corresponding' means that, under certain conditions, two contradictory phases become united and show conformity. Hostility is in the conformity; without hostility there is no conformity."¹⁷ This is the dialectics of objective

matters. We should rely on the dialectics of objective matters as pointed out by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to analyze and to study all things, and must find hostility in conformity and conformity in hostility and apply this method to actual work.

According to Comrade Hsieh Ching, the conformity and hostility of contradictions are two natures and two relations of contradiction. According to comrade Liu Che-ping, conformity and hostility are mutually repulsive. "If conformity is not in the way of hostility's progress, it is the other way around". Under the guidance of these viewpoints, their understanding of conformity and hostility is metaphysical and separate conformity from hostility. According to Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-Ping, the contradictory sides have the nature of opposing and repelling each other. One is conformity and the other is hostility, and the former obstructs the latter, or the latter destroys the former. This is also abstract analysis, and the result of conceptual study. We think that any contradiction has conformity and hostility. The conformity and the hostility of the contradiction of matters are what we mean when we say "things opposed to each other correspond with each other." From this, matters are caused to develop unceasingly. The contradiction of productivity and production relations is the basic contradiction of society. The two are contrasting uniformity. They have conformity and hostility. Productivity and production relations are uniform and hostile, and they are the motivating power of the development of society. They have different natures under different social systems, but according to comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping, the contradictions of productivity and production relations are uniform and also hostile. In addition, there is another nature of hostility. To look for hostility outside of conformity and to look for conformity outside of hostility: if this is not the division of conformity and hostility, then what is it?

The key point here is how to understand conformity, metaphysically or dialectically? If the understanding is metaphysical, then the conformity abstract; and this conformity would be conformity without contradiction and hostility, and the hostility would be hostility without conformity. In a word, conformity and hostility cannot be blended. According to Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping, they are mutually repulsive. If the understanding is dialectical, the explanation is just the opposite. In objective reality, the mutually opposite and mutually hostile sides only exist in their mutual correspondence and unification. In other words, their mutual correspondence and unification only exist in their opposition and hostility. On this point, Engels said:

"On the basis of the results of the experiments of research with nature, dialectics prove that the oppositions are decided by the interaction of the contrasting oppositions and prove that separation and opposition only exist in the mutual correspondence and unification. In other words, their uniformity only exists in their separation, and their mutual correspondence and unification only exist in their opposition."¹⁸ This is the best explanation of the contrasting phases of conformity and hostility.

Comrade Hsieh Ching thought that the conformity of the capitalistic class and the proletariat was in the complicated relationship between them, and the hostility was in the relationship of the oppression and anti-oppression between them. The former is uniformity and the latter is hostility. Look, isn't this the crystallization of the characteristics of the contradictions? Here, Comrade Hsieh Ching obviously divided conformity and hostility. We know that all the complicated relationships between the capitalistic class and the proletariat include the relationship between the oppressors and the oppressed, and therefore include the struggle between oppression and anti-oppression. If the struggle between oppression and anti-oppression does not take shape, then there won't be any complicated economical relationship. This is to say that hostility is in conformity. If there is no hostility, there is no conformity, because according to Comrade Hsieh Ching, the conformity of the complicated economical relationship is the hostility of repressing the oppression and anti-oppression; and the hostility of oppression and anti-oppression represses the conformity. How do you expect people to understand the capitalistic class and the proletariat as uniform and hostile?

Owing to the fact that comrade Hsieh Ching made a metaphysical division of conformity and hostility, he understood conformity in an abstract way. What he understood is a kind of conformity without hostility. Therefore, he made wrong explanations of many practical problems. For instance, he thought that "the basic uniformity of the people's welfare is the uniform essence of the inner contradictions of the people." "Mutual repression of the partial welfare of the people" is an inner contradiction of the people. Here, when the welfare of the people is uniform, there is only conformity, and there is no hostility nor contradiction. When the partial welfare of the people contradicts itself, then there is only hostility and no conformity. If we follow this viewpoint to settle the inner relations of the people, when we see uniformity, we won't be able to see hostility. In other words, when we can see contradictions

and hostility we cannot see conformity. This is very disadvantageous to us.

In practical activities, if we don't have the system of contrasting uniformity, we may be inclined to make all kinds of mistakes. With the understanding of conformity as abstract conformity, we frequently treat the formula "solidification--criticism--solidification" with solidification as conformity and with criticism as hostility. Thus, hostility is excluded in solidification, and conformity is excluded in hostility. Therefore, in solidification, hostility is forgotten, and the result must be that either it is like during our first national revolution when Chen Tu-hsiu's opportunism was leaning toward the right wing and all were united and against struggle, or it is like the second national revolution when the opportunists leaned toward the left. And in the party struggle, they adopted the wrong methods of "cruel struggle and ruthless blows." In the theory of having a unified party line, we also have this problem. Comrade Hsieh Ching thought the united front was "the concrete shape of unification."

In the explanation of the relationship of the Nationalists and the Communists, Comrade Liu Che-ping thought that the unification of the Nationalists and the Communists during the Sino-Japanese war had an important position, and hostility had a secondary position. Our party relied on this "united front with the Nationalists. After the war, the hostile relationship between our party and the Nationalists advanced to the important position. Comrade Liu Che-ping also thought our party, on the basis of these different situations, decided whether we should unite with the nationalists or should fight against them. Here, Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping took the "united front" and "unification" as the equivalent of conformity in philosophy.

We know that the united front of our party is one type of class struggle. "It is a combined policy of unification and hostility. The so-called unification is the united front with the capitalistic class. The so-called hostility is the peaceful and bloodless struggle in thought, in organization, and in politics, when the proletariat is united with the capitalistic class. It will change to armed struggle when the oppressed breaks off from the oppressors."19 This is a united and hostile policy. In unification, there is hostility, and with hostility, we seek for unification. Right wing opportunists and left wing opportunists made mistakes in the united front. Besides, there is the origin of class, and there is the origin of epistemology. This is the subjective and one-sided view of the methods of thinking.

None of them had the system of contradiction of conformity and hostility. We consider that when we formed the united front with the Nationalists, the Nationalists and we had conformity and hostility. It is not that we had only conformity and we had no hostility, or the former was more important than the latter. When our united front broke down, the Nationalists and we still had conformity and hostility. However, only the nature of contradictions changes. The form of struggle was different. Therefore, when we think of unification or hostility in terms of philosophy, we think that contradiction contains the problem of conformity or hostility. It is not right. This is to divide conformity and hostility, and this is the result of making conformity abstract. Dialectics is mutually opposite and mutually corresponding. Conformity is contained in the hostility. If there is no hostility there is no conformity.

Dialectics considers that the development of matters is the contradiction of conformity and hostility. If your understanding of conformity is metaphysical, you will definitely separate conformity and hostility from the process of development. Comrades Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping considered that the stable tendency was decided by conformity and the tendency of absolute development was decided by hostility, and they were fighting constantly in the process of development. As a result, if conformity did not defeat hostility, hostility would defeat conformity. Comrade Liu Che-ping said, "In the process of material development, conformity has the function of preserving the shape of unification. These two functions are always repulsive to each other and opposite to each other."²⁰ Therefore, Comrade Liu Che-ping considered that the development of matters is in the stage of quantity change. Conformity stands in the principal position and becomes the principal content of the development. Conformity stands side by side with hostility. In the stage of quality change, hostility has the principal position and becomes the principal content of the development, and hostility stands outside of the unified body.

Here Comrade Hsieh Ching and Liu Che-ping have divided conformity and hostility metaphysically. They took out hostility from the stable tendency of material development. Actually they excluded hostility from the stage of quantity change of matters, because it is said that when matters develop under this condition, uniformity repulses and excludes hostility and obstructs the advance of hostility even to the point of defeating it. In the stage of quantity change, even if hostility is there, it is conformity that brings it into the unified body; it is not contained in contradiction.

In addition, they exclude uniformity from the tendency of absolute development of matters. Actually, they exclude uniformity from the stage of quality change of matters. This is so in the stage of quality change; hostility repulses and excludes uniformity, and hostility stands outside the unified body. In that way, conformity can exist without hostility, and hostility is not in conformity. Comrade Hsieh Ching said that conformity and hostility in the development of contradictions have order and have the relationship of creator and created. They separated conformity and hostility.

To separate conformity and hostility and to understand conformity metaphysically will lead to the negation of the absolute nature of hostility and recognize the opposition of hostility.

Comrade Hsieh Ching said: "Hostility cannot be separated from conformity. If there is no hostility there is no conformity. Hostility is relative."²¹ He also said, "Hostility is within the unified body; hostility is in conformity. Hostility is absolute; it is the motivating power of the development of matters."²² It also means hostility is absolute as well as relative. How did he reach this conclusion? When hostility is in the unified body, hostility is in conformity. When hostility is outside of the unified body, hostility exists without unification. Conformity and hostility are irrelevant and cannot be mixed. When hostility is not in conformity, hostility is absolute. It is the motivating power of material development. When hostility is in conformity, hostility is relative. According to Comrade Hsieh Ching's logic, the universality and commonness of contradictions are all relative. Because universality is always in specialness, and commonness leave specialness and individuality and exists abstractly, they are absolute. According to this logic, we can also say that this conformity, specialness, and individuality are relative as well as absolute. Obviously, this viewpoint cannot stand.

Lenin said that dialectics studies "how the contrasting phases can be unified". How can it be done? Comrade Mao has said: "...it is because their existence depends upon each other".²³ And it can also be said that all the contrasting matters, because of the certain conditions and mutual relations and mutual dependence and interaction, cannot form concrete and real contradictions without certain conditions. We know it is due to the result of the hostility of the contradiction within the matter that the conditions make the contrasting phases uniform and constantly change. Following these changes, contradictions constantly change also. In this manner, the mutual connection of the both sides of

contradictions change, and one kind of conformity gives way to another kind of conformity. It forms a speciality of contradictions. Therefore, it is said that conformity is conditional, temporary, and transient, and so it is relative. The hostility of the contrasting phases is not like this. It exists in the beginning and the end of the process of development, and makes the process change from one process to another. In a word, contradictions are everywhere. The hostility of contradictions exists from the beginning to the end. Therefore, hostility is unconditional and absolute.

To make conformity abstract, and to understand conformity as conformity without hostility, they will definitely say hostility is relative and they will think movement and development are also relative; and then they will make conformity abstract and make the continuance of the process absolute. If we use this viewpoint to guide our practical activities, we will be making the mistakes of compromising contradictions and avoiding hostility.

Footnotes

¹New Construction, No. 6, 1960.

²New Construction, No. 10-11, 1960.

³New Construction, No. 10-11, 1960.

⁴New Construction, No. 7, 1960.

⁵Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 2 September 1960.

⁶Philosophical Notes, People's Press, p. 86.

⁷Philosophical Notes, People's Press, p. 87.

⁸Engels, Natural Dialectics, People's Press, p. 178.

⁹Anti-Duhring, People's Press, 1956, p. 34.

¹⁰Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, p. 310.

11 Ibid.

12 New Construction, No. 6, 1960.

13 New Construction, Nos. 6-11, 1960.

14 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, p. 317.

15 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, p. 320.

16 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, p. 321.

17 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, p. 321.

18 Engels, Natural Dialectics, People's Press, p. 48.

19 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, p. 599.

20 New Construction, No. 10-11, 1960.

21 New Construction, No. 6, 1960.

22 New Construction, No. 10-11, 1960.

23 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, p. 316.

SCRUTINIZE THE THEORY OF CONTRADICTIONS ON HOSTILITY DWELLING IN CONFORMITY

Following is the translation of an article by Chao Feng-chi (6392 7364 1477) in Che-hsueh Yen-chiu (Philosophy Research), Peiping, no. 1, 25 January 1961, pp. 51-59.

This question was brought forward in a recent discussion: Is there conformity in the process of the development of events in their qualitative transformation? According to my knowledge, in philosophical research, this question was mentioned by some comrades several years ago; and furthermore, the same question was also the focal point of debate in our discussion.

1. The Question and its Answers

The question of whether there is conformity in the qualitative stage in the development of events is a question with principal significance. In order to explain this point clearly, let's first recall how this question was brought out and, after the question has been brought out, its several different answers so far as they are known to us. The question was brought out like this: "In the process of development, the nature of conformity only conditionally exists in the process of quantitative change, and not in the process of qualitative change; but the nature of contradictory struggle exists unconditionally from the beginning to the end in the process of the development of events." Here, the question of whether there is conformity in the qualitative transformation is related to the problems of contradictory conformity and struggle and relative conformity and absolute struggle, and it is also closely related to the understanding of the relations between conformity and struggle and of the basic content of the law of contradictory uniformity.

After the question had been brought out, we saw various kinds of and different answers. One answer was "yes," another was "no," and another was both "yes and no, the synthesis

of existence and non-existence." Some comrades say that the question cannot be answered with yes and no, because both answers are one-sided, not dialectical. Some comrades say, on the stage of qualitative change, there are only natures of mutual transformation of the contradictory oppositions within conformity, but there is no such nature of interdependence [of the contradictory elements]; and some comrades contend that since there is mutual transformation, there must be interdependence. In short, the answers are varied and they have indicated that the understandings of this problem are not unanimous, and a further discussion is necessary.

What does the question "is there conformity at the stage of qualitative change" explain under the meaning mentioned above? What do the various answers reflect? In other words, what is the actual significance of the question? According to my personal understanding, the nature of the question of whether there is conformity at the stage of qualitative change is the problem of the general application of the law of dialectics. It is the problem of the general significance of the law of dialectics at different stages of the process of development, such as the stage of qualitative change. It is a question of whether we should thoroughly develop the principle of the nature of contradictory struggle within conformity, or should we give up this principle.

Based on the above understandings, I wish to discuss my own opinion through the following points:

2. Isn't There Conformity At the Stage of Qualitative Change?

There is no basis for saying there is no conformity at the stage of qualitative change. Conformity of conditional opposition and the unconditional and absolute struggle are the basic contents of the law of thesis-antithesis-synthesis (dialecticism). The contradiction of the two becomes the "essence" of the problem of contradiction of the events; the movements and changes of everything are taking place in the process of conformity and struggle in the phase of contradictory opposition.

As the basic nature of the law of dialecticism, the contradictory conformity and struggle are inseparable, and the principle of the struggle within conformity must be developed thoroughly. The inseparability of the contradictory conformity and struggle is not only expressed in all kinds of events, but it is also expressed throughout the process of development. The theory of struggle within

conformity not only can be applied in the quantitative stage of the development of the event, but it is also applicable to the qualitative stage. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that at the quantitative stage of the development of an event conformity and struggle are inseparable, but they are separable at the qualitative stage. Elements without contradiction do not exist in nature, society, and human thought. Things without contradictory nature (e.g. to have only conformity but not struggle, or vice versa) do not exist either. Progressive thought is contrary to backward thought, without consolidation, there is no so-called expansion; in dynamics, the attractive force and repulsive force are the fundamental nature of matters; in the social class struggle, the contradictory opposite classes have natures of conformity and struggle. The nature of absolute struggle is throughout the process of development. The reason why the contradictory struggle is absolute is because contradiction is general, movement is absolute, and contradictory struggle is from the beginning to the end within the nature of conformity within the different conformities.

Thus, according to dialecticism, it is not the problem of whether there is contradictory conformity at the stage of qualitative change, but it is the problem of how the oppositions conform, and how they become conformity. It is the problem of under what conditions contradictory oppositions are interdependent and mutually transforming. Consequently, the entire problem is on the nature of conditions. It is because the interdependence and mutual transformation of the oppositions are taking place under definite conditions; and under definite conditions, they are conforming and become conformity. The absolute nature of contradictory struggle exists not because it is separate from substantial conformity and is in progress outside of this or that kind of conformity; it is because the absolute nature of contradictory struggle exists unconditionally in the changeable conformity. The absolute exists in relativity, and there is absolute in any kind of relativity. The struggle-absolute nature exists unconditionally under any conditions, and expresses itself through the conditional and relative conformity. Therefore, the principle of absoluteness and relativity, the general principle and particular principle, and the theory of "mixture" of the conditional and relative conformity and unconditional and absolute struggle are the "essence" of the problem of the contradiction of matters and become bases of the movements and changes of all matters and events. Hence, the "connections" of absolute and relativity, condition and uncondition, indicate that they are inseparable in objective

events. Therefore, in the concept which reflects the objective events, they must be "connected."

When we say that some comrades cut off the relations between the contradictory conformity and struggle, absolute-ness and relativity, and unconditional and conditional, we do not mean that in the objective dialecticism of the events, those relations can be cut into parts. We only point out that in their subjective ideals and concepts which reflect the objects, those relations are not "being connected." Therefore the so-called severance is nothing else but an abstractive severance of the abstract concept. It is precisely the separation of subjective concept from objective reality. The characteristics of the abstract severance of the abstract concept are: It either conforms or struggles, there is no struggle in conformity, and no conformity in struggle; this is conformity, that is struggle, this is struggle of absolute nature, that is conformity of relative nature; whenever and wherever struggle and conformity are "connected" and related, struggle becomes relative. When struggle and conformity are not "connected" and struggle develops from the conformity, then the nature of struggle becomes "absolute"; when conditions are mentioned, the comrades believe that the conformity does not exist at the stage of qualitative change. If anyone says that there is conformity at the stage of quantitative change, it means they deny the conditional nature of conformity, and it becomes absolute. Such opinions, abstract severance of the abstract concept is precisely "thinking in absolutely uncompromised opposition" (Engels); and this "absolute opposition" in the process of thought is un-dialectic. It conceptionally severs the objective and real relation of the events, and cannot accurately reflect the events.

Under the conditions of the abstract concept and abstract severance, one cannot accurately understand the nature of conformity, and also cannot accurately understand the nature of struggle. Consequently, the relations of conformity and struggle and the situation of conformity and struggle at different stages of their developments are naturally becoming inconceivable. No wonder some comrades are getting more confused when talking more about the connections between conformity and struggle. The more they talk about the "connections" between conformity and struggle, the more the conformity and struggle become mutually repelled, and finally, they can only conclude that there is no conformity at the stage of qualitative change.

We are of the opinion that the contradiction in the materialistic dialecticism means substantial contradiction;

it means the contradiction of real matters and events. Struggle outside the contradictory conformity definitely does not exist, therefore we must thoroughly develop the theory of contradictory struggle within the conformity. The absolute nature of struggle is not its separation from conformity, but it unconditionally exists within conformity. The change of conformity cannot alter the absolute nature of struggle, and the absolute nature of struggle can only exist within this or that kind of substantial conformity. From the point of denying the existence of conformity at the stage of qualitative change, one not only cannot explain the relative nature and conditional nature of conformity, but also, in denying conformity, one inevitably makes the nature of contradictory struggle abstract and inevitably abandons the theory of struggle within conformity. From this point of view, one who denies the conformity at the stage of qualitative change indicates that he also negates struggle and contradiction. We believe that the relative nature of conformity is its conditional nature. The change of conditions can only change the nature of conformity, but cannot abrogate it. Therefore, one cannot conclude that the conformity which changes constantly according to the constant changes of conditions does not exist at the stage of qualitative change. The so-called qualitative change without the existence of conformity is definitely not the qualitative change of the process of reality. Obviously this kind of viewpoint is incorrect.

In relativity, there is absoluteness, and absoluteness can only be in relativity. The absolute nature of struggle exists because it exists unconditionally within all conditions, and is conditional and ever changing conformity. Without clearly understanding the principle of absoluteness and relativity, and attempting to search for absoluteness outside of relativity or attempting to understand relativity without referring to absoluteness, one definitely will go to either extreme while cutting off the relations between absoluteness and relativity. Furthermore, these two extremes will also mutually change under certain conditions. In fact, when they combine struggle and conformity, the struggle at the stage of quantitative change will then be covered with the color of relativity--a road to relativism. When they separate struggle and conformity from each other, they will deny the contradictory conformity at the stage of qualitative change, and simultaneously make the nature of struggle absolute and abstract. Obviously, the absoluteness outside conformity is abstract absoluteness and it is absolute absoluteness. At the surface, they sometimes

deny the nature of struggle, basically deny the existence of conformity, and paint absolute color on conformity and say that struggle is relative. When they connect struggle and conformity at the stage of quantitative change, the absolute becomes relative, and relativity becomes absoluteness. When they consider that there are no relations between struggle and conformity at the stage of qualitative change, absoluteness departs from relativity and it becomes absolutism. Similarly, relativity can also depart from absoluteness and it becomes relativism.

In insisting on dialecticism, one must oppose both relativism and absolutism. To insist firmly on the theory of contradictory struggle within conformity is to understand an important aspect of the "essence" of the problem of the contradiction of events. It is also an important point in line with dialecticism.

3. Is Conformity at the Stage of Qualitative Change the "Synthesis of Existence and Non-existence?"

The "synthesis of existence and non-existence" is a dialectical concept. It profoundly reflects the thinking of dialecticism. But if any correct concept is analyzed subjectively and utilized improperly, it will lead one to error. I am of the opinion that the use of the "synthesis of existence and non-existence" or "synthesis of have and have-not" to answer the problem of whether there is contradictory conformity at the stage of qualitative change is the result of the improper use of this concept. Comrade K'o Chi's (4270 0415) article "the Contradictory Conformity at the Stage of Qualitative Change is the Synthesis of Existence and Nonexistence"² reflects such a situation.

The problem of whether there is conformity at the stage of qualitative change has been brought out as follows: As to previous arguments, according to the original meaning of dialecticism, it is not the problem of whether there is conformity, it is the problem of how to unite the oppositions, and how the oppositions become united. Since the problem has been critically brought out, and it has been brought out with the significance based on the fundamental interpretation of the law of the synthesis of opposition and from the particular angle which directly relates the general meaning of the law of the synthesis of opposition, therefore we are of the opinion that a clear and definite answer must be given. The answer is to confirm the conformity at the stage of qualitative change, to confirm the inseparability

of the conformity and struggle at that stage, and to insist on thoroughly clarifying the theory of contradictory conformity within conformity, and it cannot be wavering and vague. Otherwise, if "existence is also non-existence," and "to have is also to have not" mean the "synthesis of existence and non-existence," it indicates improper compromise to the significance of the problem mentioned above. In other words, the comrades who deny the conformity at the qualitative change stage use the method which severs conformity and struggle from each other at different stages of development to explain the relative nature of conformity and the absolute nature of struggle, and they finally deny the general principles of the law of opposition-conformity. Thus, we cannot but consider that the difference between comrades Hsieh Chung (5641 7231), Liu Che-ping (0491 0772 0365), and others and us is fundamental. First, is there contradictory conformity at the qualitative change stage? Second, does the relative nature of conformity mean its non-existence at the qualitative change stage? Third, is the theory of struggle within conformity unapplicable at this particular stage? It is just because of these that we feel the answer, "synthesis of existence and non-existence" is ambiguous and incorrect.

Next, and also important, Comrade K'o Chi has quoted Lenin's words in his warped interpretation, and has given erroneous answers to the problems we are discussing. In his article, Comrade K'o Chi criticized the two kinds of incompleteness as due to the formula "yes is yes, no is no." What he means by "yes is yes, no is no" actually is the answer to whether there is conformity at the stage of qualitative change. Then he puts forward his anti-metaphysical "dialectical" interpretation. He believes that "the realization of contradictory transformation--the contradictory conformity--is the synthesis of existence and non-existence, the synthesis of have and have not." In order to prove this point, he quoted the words of Lenin and those of Hegel's quoted by Lenin. These quotations include: "Since growth exists, it is also the reality of non-existence." "...change is also growth." "...the synthesis and inseparability of existence and non-existence...provide changes and growth." "...the disappearing circles equal existence and non-existence." "These crossing points are the synthesis of contradictions; it means, on a certain circle of movement, the disappearing circles of existence and non-existence coordinate with each other in the brink of time." "What are the differences between the dialectical change and non-dialectical change? The differences are the swift leap,

contradiction, breaking off of gradual development, and the synthesis of existence and non-existence." The rest of the quotations are Lenin's discussion of development and change. Here we have copied almost all of the quotations of Lenin in Comrade K'o Chi's article, but what have they explained to us? For what significance did Comrade K'o Chi quote them? Can these quotations be the theoretical basis of the theory, "the conformity at the stage of qualitative change is the 'synthesis of existence and non-existence'?"

According to our understanding, there are two points from the above quotations which need clarification. First, Lenin, based on the concept of development, used a thorough dialectical method which contradicts metaphysics, emphatically pointed out the significance of "transformation" in the process of development, and pointed out the basic difference between dialectical transformation and un-dialectical transformation. And in the understanding of what was transformation, Lenin again emphatically stressed the basic characteristics of the dialectical concept of development. These characteristics are the swift leap forward, contradiction, breaking off during gradual development, and synthesis of existence and non-existence. Obviously, the opposite concept of transformation is metaphysical; it is un-dialectical transformation. The characteristics of this kind of "transformation" actually deny transformation. It is characterized by simple increase or decrease of quantity to deny a swift leap forward, breaking off of gradual development, and inner contradiction of events, and affirms the un-dialectical method. In short, it denies qualitative change. We not only must really understand Lenin's original concept, but also must understand the internal contradiction of events and the synthesis of existence and non-existence based on such contradictions and the affirmative and negative dialectical thinking. Only the viewpoint of internal contradiction of events, the viewpoint of synthesis of contradictions, can provide us with the "key" to the understanding of the swift leap forward, transformation, and the breaking off of gradual development. But it is just at this basic point that we feel Comrade K'o Chi has not really understood the true spirit and nature of the concept of dialectical transformation. He obscures the qualitative line between the events, obscures the qualitative difference between the new and old events, and consequently, he has confused the basic oppositions of the two kinds of concepts of transformation. He does not understand the contradictions of events or processes and the nature of the synthesis of existence and non-existence from the viewpoint of the synthesis of contradictions. Thus in Comrade

K'o's thinking, dialectical transformation, the idea that qualitative change is more basic than quantitative change, and the thinking that the negative is the progressive phase of development are all absent. Everything becomes a mechanical combination, and becomes the synthesis of this or that. Are these critical comments exaggerated? Do these warp Comrade K'o Chi's original ideas? Let's analyze them.

First, according to our understanding, when Lenin says "existence and non-existence," it is, through the unlimited developing process of events, to point out the transformation character of all substantial events and to point out the negative interpretation within the positive interpretation of the existing events, and so to point out that both existence and non-existence are the "disappearing links." When Lenin says the "sudden coincidence" of the two disappearing links of existence and non-existence, he means the contradictory transformation. When Lenin says the "synthesis of existence and non-existence," it means contradictory transformation. We know that the contradictory transformation does not contend with the inseparability of conformity only; it has a more important meaning. Without understanding and recognizing the more important significance that transformation is an entire contradiction, it is impossible to have a correct understanding of conformity, and it breaks the significance of conformity into parts. Since Lenin's "synthesis of existence and non-existence" means transformation, and since transformation is one of the more important significant points of conformity, it cannot be used to deny the contradictory conformity at the stage of qualitative change, and cannot be interpreted as the basis of the theory of "there is and is not" conformity at the stage of qualitative change. On the contrary, the "synthesis of existence and non-existence"--the transformation itself--actually proves the existence of contradictory conformity at the stage of qualitative change, and proves that the main phenomenon of contradictory conformity at this stage is the mutual transformation of the oppositions. This kind of transformation rightly indicates a more important significance of the contradictory conformity.

As to the so-called "growth," it is nothing but the beginning, development, and maturing of the new event. "Transformation is also growth." The "transition" from existence to non-existence is accomplished through transformation.

Secondly, the answer of the so-called "synthesis of existence and non-existence" is not only ambiguous in principle, but it also cannot explain such a situation. Concerning the development of the process of any existing event,

because of the contradictory nature of the event itself, we may freely speak of it as the synthesis of existence and non-existence. Not only at the stage of qualitative change but also at the stage of quantitative change, and even in every second, we all can say that it is the synthesis of have and have not, the synthesis of existence and non-existence. This means nothing but that there are contradictions within the event. Because of the inner contradiction of the event, it creates every substantial event in the process of ceaseless development and change. Therefore, we must understand any substantial event through this nature, and understand the positive and negative dialecticism of the event. It cannot be viewed as dead, frozen, and unchangeable. In the simplest mechanical movement, there is the same situation: the moving train is at a certain point, but it is also not at a certain point. Life is the same: it is correct to say that there is no metaphysical absolute line between life and death, but it is completely wrong to say that there is no line at all between life and death. But, to use the viewpoint of the "synthesis of existence and non-existence" to determine whether there is conformity as Comrade K'o Chi does will result in the fact that the contradictory conformity is not only at the stage of qualitative change but also at the stage of quantitative change, and at every movement of the development of an event there are the "syntheses of existence and non-existence." This kind of answer is not only unable to solve problems, but it also cannot distinguish the different situation of contradictory conformity of the stage of quantitative change from that at the stage of qualitative change.

4. A Substantial Understanding of the Conformity at the Stage of Qualitative Change

The comrades who advocate that there is no conformity at the stage of qualitative change always worry that they cannot clearly distinguish the line between absoluteness and relativity. They consider if there is conformity at the stage of qualitative change, the conformity thus becomes absolute. But to deny the conformity at the stage of qualitative change is to deny the struggle, because the nature of struggle, under such a concept, has lost its place. This naturally makes the nature of struggle absolute.

Actually, the relative nature of conformity is not determined by its existence or non-existence at a certain stage. Of course, if someone uses the method of "deduction," the result will be like this: since there is conformity at

the stage of qualitative change, and since struggle at the stage of qualitative change is within the conformity, does this mean that the conformity is throughout the process? Does this also mean that there is conformity as the struggle becomes "absolute?" If so, the result would be the abandonment of the theory of contradictory struggle within conformity.

According to our understanding of the nature of the contradiction of events, conformity is relative to struggle, and struggle is relative to conformity. They don't have isolated and individual significance. Here, we feel that the key to the problem is the nature of conditions. The reason why the conformity between oppositions is relative is because conformity is conditional. It is just like the nature of struggle is unconditional. The relative nature of conformity is also because of its temporary, disappearing, and transitional nature. The so-called temporary, disappearing, or transitional natures are determined by the ceaseless change of the conditions. Therefore, we can concentrate the problem of the relative nature of conformity on the nature of the conditions, and control the relative nature of conformity through the constant change of conditions and constant development of the process. But the so-called "conditional" means the constant change of the conditions on which the oppositions are based and the constant replacement and change of the substantial conformity which follows the conditional changes. It does not mean the inconsistent existence of the contradictory conformity which changes by following the conditional change. Therefore, the relative and temporary nature of conformity cannot be misunderstood as non-existence at the stage of qualitative change. Under certain substantial processes, from beginning to end, the oppositions, the oppositions exist and depend mutually according to a given condition. Following the development of the processes, the result of the mutual struggle of the oppositions causes the increase or decrease of the power of either side of the oppositions and the conditional changes.

When the power ratios of both sides reach a certain degree, and a certain new condition emerges, the mutual dependence of the opposition will become a mutual transformation. The conditions for the oppositional mutual dependence and mutual transformation are different. When the condition changes, the oppositional conformity also changes. But the nature of struggle is existant throughout the entire process. No matter whether it is at the mutual dependent stage or at the mutual transforming stage, the struggle exists. The sign of struggle is more obvious particularly during the time of

mutual transformation. Thus, in the same process, from its beginning to its end, the conformity has at least two kinds of change. From mutual dependence to mutual transformation, the nature of struggle exists throughout the process. Therefore, conformity is relative, and its relative nature is conditional; but struggle is absolute, and its absoluteness is unconditional.

Lacking certain necessary conditions, there will be no conformity, and it is not a realistic contradiction. Any contradictory conformity must be under a certain necessary condition. Not just this, for in the development of the process of the event, the self-emergence of certain contradictions in the process must also be under certain conditions. "When a certain necessary condition is ready, the process of the development of the event will create certain contradictions, and this kind of contradictions are mutually dependent and mutually transformed, otherwise all will be impossible." ("On Contradiction") For instance, after the People's Republic of China was established, only after the land reform was basically accomplished could the contradiction between the individual economy and cooperativization emerge in the realistic process, and the realistic program of the agricultural cooperativization could then be carried out. This means that the above-mentioned combination between the small farm economy and cooperativization took place under definite conditions in the process of the development of productivity. Because of the required conditions, new contradictions emerged in the process. This condition is the accomplishment of the nation-wide land reform under the proletarian dictatorship. Obviously, under the conditions before the accomplishment of the land reform, the contradiction between the individual economy and cooperativization was unable to emerge sharply. When the certain conditions were ready, the contradictory oppositions of the individual economy and cooperativization obtained a certain conformity, then contradiction began. The result of the mutual struggle of the contradictory opposition is transformed under certain conditions and leads to cooperativization. No doubt, it is a qualitative change from the individual economy to the realization of cooperativization. It is a transition and a swift leap forward from the old nature of the small farm economy to the new nature of socialism.

The swift leap forward from the old quality to the new quality, and from the individual economy to the realization of cooperativization cannot be realized in one morning. It is not right to say that unless the cooperativization be realized on a nation-wide scale, it cannot be considered as a

qualitative change. It means that when cooperativization obtains the leading position on a nation-wide scale, and obtains the ruling position at the important phase of contradiction, which means that nation-wide cooperativization is being basically realized, it is the crucial point of the qualitative change from the old quality to the new quality. It is the realization of the swift leap forward. It means the quality of events is determined by its obtaining of the dominant position at the important phase of contradiction. Therefore, when the important phase of contradiction and its unimportant phase begins to transform, it is the qualitative change. As we know, the decisive conditions for the realization of the above transformation are the correct leadership of the Party and the determination and demand of the five hundred million peasants for cooperativization. On the bases of the development of productivity and the positive demand of the peasants, the accurate policy has been the decisive factor for the accomplishment of the qualitative change mentioned above. It greatly promotes the coming of the high tide for cooperativization, and speeds up the early realization of the process of qualitative change.

Thus we can see that the so-called "conditions," are not, as some comrades understand, unrelated to the opposition. On the contrary, the mutual dependence and mutual transformation of the oppositions cannot be separate from certain and substantial conditions. Concerning the transformation of events, the reasons for the Kuomintang's transformation to anti-revolution in 1947 was determined by the reactionary class and nature of the Kuomintang compradore-capitalist class and feudal influence. Of course, the imperialist temptation was also one of the conditions for the above change. With the same reason, the change which forced the Kuomintang to fight the Japanese during the anti-Japanese war was the reflection of the contradiction between the Anglo-American Imperialism and the Japanese imperialism. It was also due to the united front policy of our Party. If the sharpening contradiction between China and Japan, and the contradiction between the Anglo-American imperialism and Japanese imperialism were the objective condition which forced the Kuomintang to fight the Japanese, our Party's united front policy was the decisive condition which pushed the Kuomintang to fight the Japanese. Therefore, we must correctly understand the theory of mutual dependence and transformation of oppositions of material dialecticism, and we cannot get away from the given conditions basically to talk about the contradictory conformity.

The relative nature of conformity is due to the transitional and conditional nature, and the nature of struggle is in the relative and conditional conformity. Therefore the relative nature of conformity cannot be understood by separation of the relations between hostility and conformity, and the conformity at the stage of qualitative change cannot be denied and cannot be used to explain the relative nature of the conformity. The nature of this problem is an argument between dialecticism and metaphysics. By denying the contradictory conformity at the stage of qualitative change, it not only means the denying of transformation, but it also means the denying of contradiction. This kind of methodology not only cannot correctly explain the relative nature of conformity, but also cannot explain the absolute nature of struggle.

It is wrong to separate conformity and struggle from each other. It is more wrong to exclude transformation from contradictory conformity. But is it right to separate mechanically the two meanings of contradictory conformity, the mutual dependence and mutual transformation, to insist that this is dependence and that is transformation, and to use the method of "division of stages" to separate the two meanings of conformity? Or on the other hand, is it right to waive entirely the line of difference, and make no difference between the two meanings of mutual dependence and mutual transformation? We think both are wrong. The existence of contradictory conformity at the stage of qualitative change refers to the entire content of the conformity. It means that we understand the conformity at the stage of qualitative change from the point of complete meaning of the contradictory conformity. Here, it includes the mutual dependence of oppositions, and it also includes the mutual transformation. It is just as if there is no mutual "dependence" without transformation. Transformation originates from mutual dependence and always transforms itself in the opposite direction. This means the opposite mutual transformation. Transformation, qualitative change, and antithesis are philosophical categories which reflect the same process from different sides and contents. Therefore, they have the meanings of the same series with a certain significance. The qualitative change is the ending of the gradual process of development. It is the fundamental change of the nature of events. Transformation is the transformation of the opposition to the opposite directions at the same time, it is also antithesis. Here we feel that two points need clarification.

(1) Qualitative change is naturally a process. The

natures of events are different, and the forms of movement of various events are different; therefore, different events contain different forms of swift leap forward. These are determined by the variety of the material world and by the variety of the forms of movement. But no matter how different the forms of swift leap forward are, they are all qualitative change. Qualitative change is after all the breaking off of the process of gradual change. Although qualitative change is a process, it after all has the intermingling of the old process with the new process, and has a clear line. This line, according to our understanding, is the point of contact of the mutual transformation of the important phase and unimportant phase of contradiction. Therefore, the point of contact should not be blurred because the qualitative change is the process. To use our national revolution as an example, in the change from the revolution of the New Democracy to the Socialist revolution, the key point of the qualitative change was the establishment of the People's Republic of China. This key point indicates that the basic accomplishment of the previous revolutionary stage and the beginning of the latter revolutionary stage is the key point at which the first stage of revolution begins its transformation to the second stage of revolution. When we say that qualitative change is a process, we cannot ignore the key point of transformation of events.

2. Transformation and antithesis are the links of development and relations. In terms of the link of development, transformation itself is the "transition" between the old process and new process, and between their opposite compound. It is the "bridge." It is just as Comrade Mao has pointed out: in between the oppositions, "there is a bridge, and its philosophical term is conformity, mutual-transformation, or mutual-infiltration: (On Contradiction)". Thus, in between the oppositions, and between the new and old events, if the conformity between them exists only at the stage of qualitative change, or there is only mutually dependent conformity without the more significant mutual-transformation, there is no qualitative change, no development, and no "transition" from the old process to new process. Obviously, the unchangeable conformity is the dead conformity; it is the unchanging and frozen mutual "dependence." This kind of dependence or conformity has no similarity with the dialectical conformity. On the other hand, "the self-contradictory matter does not dissolve itself to zero or the abstractive "have not," it dissolves itself to the "negative according to its particular nature." It means that

in the process of dissolution of the unified event at the stage of qualitative change, the contradictory oppositions are not dissolved into abstractive "have not." There is no vacuum in the change. We cannot say that conformity exists at the stage of quantitative change and not at the stage of qualitative change. In any stage of the process (including the stage of qualitative change), contradiction without conformity does not exist. By the same reason, even at the stage of qualitative change, when the main form of expression of the conformity is transformation, it does not exclude the mutually dependent relations and relations between oppositions or opposite compounds. The transformation is always the transformation of the mutually dependent oppositions to their opposite directions. The difference is that the conformity at the stages of qualitative and quantitative change develop changes of its expressing form. For example, under the situation of the quantitative change of the event the mutual dependence of the oppositions becomes the main character if there is mutual transformation between the partial opposite compounds, then at the stage of qualitative change, when the transformation of the opposite becomes dominant, there also exists the certain relations between the oppositions or mutually dependent conditions. "Contradictory matter changes from this to that; within it, there is a certain conformity" ("On Contradiction"). "The ruled proletarian class becomes the ruling class through revolution, and the original ruling capitalist class becomes the ruled, and transforms itself to the position of its opposite... if there is no conformity and connection under definite conditions, how can this kind of change take place?" ("On Contradiction")

Some people say that there is conformity between the proletarian and capitalist classes during the period of the united front, and when it breaks up, there is no conformity between the oppositions. Or some say that when the bourgeois rightsits violently attack the Party and people, there is conformity between the rightists and the people, but when the masses rise up against the rightists, there is no conformity between them. We think that neither of them is right. "United front" cannot simply be used as a philosophical term for "conformity." Conformity means that many contradictions are real and substantial contradictions. The contradictions between the Chinese working class and capitalist class is the real and substantial contradiction of the modern Chinese social development. But under certain historical conditions, they have established an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united front, and under other different historical conditions, they have broken the united

front. Despite the establishment or breaking off of the united front, there is conformity between the contradictory oppositions; but there are different conformities under different historical conditions. The offensive of the bourgeois rightists against the people and the counter-offensive of the masses against the rightists are all struggles, and are expressions of the class struggle under certain conditions. This kind of struggle is in the conformity.

The qualitative change signifies the change between the new and old process and the beginning of the new process and the end of the old process. But that is the beginning of the new process? According to comrade Mao Tse-tung's words, "This is the old conformity and the oppositional factor which forms the conformity giving its position to the new conformity and the oppositional factor which forms the new conformity, and the new process replaces the old process. The old process ends and the new process begins. The new process contains new contradictions and begins its own history of contradictory development" ("On contradiction"). According to our understanding, the taking over of the new process for the old process naturally signifies the stopping of the gradual progress. It signifies the dividing line of quality between the new process and the old process. But we are of the opinion that we cannot understand the stopping of the gradual progress with the concept of "there is no conformity at the stage of qualitative change," because the "retirement" or "substitution" between the new process and old process themselves are transformations, and are of more important significance in conformity. In the changing process between the new and old processes and between the opposite factors which form the new and old processes, each opposite "exchange" is not only the transformation, but the important expression of the contradictory conformity, because the complex situation of the exchange of the opposite factors between other secondary and yet-to-be opposite factors still maintain relation and connections when the main opposite factors are transforming. Therefore, in the entire process, there emerges the situation in which the opposite factors are both mutually dependent and mutually transformed.

Dependence is the dependence which certain secondary opposite factors begin to transform before its accomplishment. Transformation is the transformation between the new and old opposite factors. It is wrong to separate the two meanings of the conformity, quantitative change dependence, and qualitative change transformation by using the "class-dividing" method to distinguish the two meanings of conformity, and to say this is dependence and that is transformation,

Because, the two meanings of contradictory conformity, mutual dependence, and mutual transformation cannot be separated this way. On the contrary, they are organically united, and they contain even greater significance for material dialecticism. Obviously, dependence is the mutual dependence of the oppositions. Dependence itself contains factors of mutual transformation, and the process of mutual dependence of the oppositions contains partial transformation. Transformation has its origin in dependence, and it transforms in the opposite directions. Transformation itself signifies the breaking off of the old dependent relations and the birth of the new dependent relations. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that there is no conformity at the stage of qualitative change, or to say that there is only "transformed: conformity apart from mutual dependence.

In summary, the problem of whether there is conformity at the stage of qualitative change is actually the problem of the general significance of the law of contradictory unity. It is a problem of how to understand the basic content of the law of contradictory unity. My opinion here is only a first step toward the understanding of this problem. There must be numerous errors, and I expect criticisms and teachings from the comrades.

Footnotes:

¹ See New Construction, 1960, No. 6, Hsieh Ching's article.

² See New Construction, 1960, No. 7, Comrade K'o Chi's article.

³ Engels, Natural Dialectics, People's Press, p. 184.

THE CHANGES AND STRUGGLE BETWEEN MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM

Following is the translation of an article by
Ho Lin (6320 7792) in Che-hsueh Yen-chiu
(Philosophy Research), Peiping, No. 1, 25
January 1961, pp. 60-68.

Discussions on the existence of conformity between idealism and materialism will enable us, through discussion and free airing of opinions, to have a more profound and broader understanding of the essence and core of materialistic dialectics--the law of the unity of opposites--so that it can be more closely associated with practice. Besides, I am convinced that through discussion we will be able to gain a more concrete understanding of the struggle between materialism and idealism.

In the discussions on the history of Chinese philosophy carried out in the winter of 1956, the struggle, conformity, or inter-permeation between idealism and materialism were touched upon. Some of the comrades who took part in the discussions at that time, myself in particular, showed many erroneous opinions and went astray. Of course, through the discussions, we received much assistance and enlightenment.

At that time, when discussing the identity or inter-permeation between idealism and materialism, some of the comrades went astray because first they erroneously accepted the so-called "rectification of deviation." It was alleged at that time that doctrinairism was quite influential. So everybody emphatically asserted that the struggle of materialism against idealism had gone to the "excess" and that idealism had been "over-negated." In order to "rectify the deviation," they asserted that more attention should be paid to the aspect of identity between idealism and materialism and gave idealism a higher estimation. As a result, they became immersed in the error of confounding the demarcation line between idealism and materialism.

Secondly, some people, in presenting the problem, did not determinedly or strictly use the law of the unity

of opposites as the basis. Thus, in seeking the identity between idealism and materialism, they became immersed in the abstract, formal, and metaphysical conformity and not the dialectical conformity or the conformity of inter-dependence and mutual transformation which Chairman Mao has expounded. They also forgot the basic principle that "the conformity of the opposites is relative, while the struggle between the opposites is absolute." They sought the "common ground" between idealism and materialism, divorcing themselves from dialectics. They neglected the struggle between materialism and idealism and confounded the demarcation line between materialism and idealism.

As I recall, at that time some comrades held at least the following three formal and abstract, i.e., un-materialistic dialectical viewpoints in their explanations of the conformity between idealism and materialism:

First, some comrades regarded idealism and materialism as two aspects of an entity. They thought that of the entity of philosophy, one aspect is idealism and the other materialism, which are the two main schools of philosophy. They thought that herein lies their conformity. Obviously, this is merely the abstract, formal, and metaphysical conformity and not the conformity in the inter-dependence and struggle of contradiction as dialectically proven.

Second, some comrades erroneously thought that in some idealistic systems there existed "rational cores," or in other words, some idealistic systems or writings embodied materialistic elements and dialectical elements. These so-called "rational cores," "dialectical elements," and "materialistic elements" are the basis of the unity or conformity between idealism and materialism. Actually, this was not seeking the dialectical unity between the two, but rather the common ground between two incompatible opposites. This was not waging a determined struggle on the stand of materialism against idealism, but rather "seeking common ground" between the opposing ideological camps. This viewpoint also erroneously regarded the "materialistic elements" in the idealistic systems as the things which are in common with the essence of dialectical materialism, and that the "dialectical elements" in the idealistic systems are the things which are in common with materialistic dialectics and which can be readily absorbed and assimilated by dialectical materialism without expending efforts in criticism, reformation, and struggle. This not only showed ignorance of the conformity of the dialectical contradictions in seeking formal and abstract "common ground," but also sought the peaceful co-existence of materialism with idealism or even

the laying aside of the weapon of struggle against idealism. In fact, this reflected that some people (including myself) with bourgeois idealist ideas were unwilling to reform their world outlook and wished to retain the so-called "rational elements" in idealistic philosophy to resist or boycott dialectical materialism.

Third, there were also comrades who opposed the two above-mentioned erroneous viewpoints. However, they reasoned that the identity between idealism and materialism lies in that both study the same objectives, themes, and problems. For instance, both study philosophy; both have ontology, epistemology, and world outlook as the objectives of their studies; and both study the relation of thinking and being, differing only in the basically opposite viewpoints on the common objectives and problems. This view is still seeking the common ground, without dialectically pointing out how idealism and materialism are a unity of opposites.

Now, as we are conducting further discussions under new conditions of the unity of opposites of idealism and materialism, it would be beneficial to the discussions to review the wrong direction we look and to derive lessons from our mistakes.

As regards the mutual transformation between idealism and materialism, Lenin made a definite affirmation. In discussing Hegel's exposition of the objectivity of ideas, Lenin pointed out: "Objective idealism was changed (umschlagen) into the 'eve' of materialism."¹ This means objective idealism can be transformed or changed into materialism. Also, in "Hegels 'Dialectical Materialism'," Lenin also said, "Objective (particularly absolute) idealism tortuously (and even by turning somersaults) closely approaches materialism, or even partially becomes (verwandelt) materialism."²

Besides, in mentioning the transformation of materialism into idealism, Lenin said, "As for the explanations of the leap from things in general in nature into the soul, the leap from the secondary to the primary and the leap from materialism into idealism, this means the two extremes conform to each other (and also change themselves)."³ "Leap" in this connection, as Lenin pointed out elsewhere, means "dialectical transformation (ubergang)."⁴

However, we must understand the here Lenin meant that under given conditions in a certain period of the history of philosophy, materialism was transformed into idealism. This does not run counter to our view that the most correct, most scientific, and most developed dialectical materialism would not transform into idealism or be replaced by idealism.

Therefore, it is contrary to facts in the history of philosophy and Lenin's teachings to admit the transformation of idealism into materialism and to refuse to admit the transformation of materialism into idealism. At the same time, we shall see that it is also erroneous to assert that dialectical materialism may also transform into idealism and be replaced by subsequent idealism on the strength of the admission that in history materialism might transform into idealism.

Therefore, we can see that Lenin thinks that, in the process of the development of the history of philosophy, there did occur the transformation of idealism into materialism and vice versa, that is to say, the mutual transformation and transmutation between idealism and materialism. In other words, the law of the unity of opposites of materialist dialectics runs through the struggle between idealism and materialism in the history of philosophy. Therefore, if we are not to be bound by the methods of metaphysics, if we are to concretely understand the "universality of contradictions," if we are to apply the struggle and identity of contradictions to the study of the history of philosophy and to the struggle between idealism and materialism, we must admit the mutual transformation of idealism and materialism.

In order to prevent immersion into involved study of diction, here we shall understand "umschlagen", "verwandeln," and "ubergang" all as "transformation." In general, in the Chinese version of Lenin's Philosophical Notes, "ubergang," more often than not, is translated as "transformation." In diction, it is less easy to understand when we say that idealism may "transmute" into materialism than to say that idealism may "change," or "change" into materialism.

From the viewpoint of materialistic dialectics, we have affirmed that in the history of philosophy idealism might transform into materialism and vice versa. However, we must further expound the meaning of "transformation." In addition to criticizing the metaphysical viewpoint which fundamentally opposes mutual transformation, we must forcefully criticize the idealistic dialectical understanding of "transformation."

First, the mutual transformation of the opposites as understood in idealistic dialectics is fundamentally different from the mutual transformation as understood in materialistic dialectics. Materialistic dialectics regard that "the unity (coincidence, conformity, and balance) between the opposites is conditional, temporary, ephemeral,

and relative, while the struggle of the mutually expelling opposites is absolute."⁵ On the other hand, idealistic dialectics regards that when the struggle of the opposites reaches the absolute concept and absolute spirit, it has attained the summit and the absolute unity is attained, and therefore the struggle of the opposites is relative while the final unity of the opposites is absolute.

Second, idealistic dialectics emphasizes that the transformation of things is due to their own nature, activities, transition, or transformation into their opposites, while neglecting objective conditions and disregarding social and historical conditions, particularly the conditions resulting from situations of class struggle. For instance, Hegel says: "The limited things are not only subjected to external limitations, but, owing to the rejection by its own nature and its own activities, they transmute into their opposites."⁶ As pointed out by Chaimran Mao in "On Contradictions," materialistic dialectics admits that "external causes take effect through internal causes."⁷ and that "contradictions within a thing are the basic cause of its development, while its relationship with other things, their inter-connection, and inter-action, is a secondary cause."⁸ However, it emphasizes that "the two opposing aspects of a contradiction, under given conditions, transfer themselves to the position of their opposites."⁹ It would be conceptual dialectics to speak of the conceptual self transformation detached from certain conditions. It would also be fundamentally running counter to historical materialism and materialistic dialectics to speak of the transformation of opposing things in context with general external conditions but detached from concrete social and historical conditions, particularly class conditions.

Third, idealistic dialectics may emphasize the transformation of thinking itself into its opposite and then, through the negation of the opposite, return to itself, resulting in becoming immersed in the idealistic formula of thinking being thinking. . . Idealistic dialectics may emphasize the mutual transmutation and mutual transformation between limited things such as "extreme anarchy and extreme dictatorship may transform into each other; extreme pain and extreme joy may transmute into each other."¹⁰ That is to say, they are "compelled" to transform or "destined" to transmute into the opposite. This is taking a "fatalistic" view of the transformation and struggle of contradictions and the mutual transformation of things. This would mean they are predetermined, utterly negating man's subjective motivating power and his effect in promoting the transformation

of things. For instance, Hegel says, "A finite thing originally takes another thing as itself. Owing to internal contradictions, it is compelled to transcend its current being and transmute into its opposite." He also says, "When we say 'All things (meaning all finite things) are destined to contain contradictions,' we can surely see the universal and irresistible force."¹¹ It is correct to explain the universality and mutual transformation of contradictions. However, it has precisely exposed the weaknesses of idealistic dialectics in using fatalist-flavored phrases such as "compelled," "compelled to transmute into its opposite," and "destined to contain contradictions," which imply that contradiction is a universal and irresistible blind force and fail to see any prospects of progress and improvement in the process of transformation. This may give rise to such side effects as fear of contradictions and escape from contradictions.

As demonstrated by the situation in which the New Hegelism of the Western countries forsakes dialectics and covers up or does away with the contradictions of things and the transformation of contradictions, it is obvious that idealistic dialectics tends to cover up contradictions and the harmony of contradictions. In direct contradiction to this, Chairman Mao points out the universality and particularity of contradictions on the one hand, and emphasizes man's subjective motivating power to solve contradictions and points out that "employing different methods for the solution of different contradictions is a principle to which Marxism-Leninism must strictly adhere,"¹² on the other hand. Therefore, contradictions can be solved and cannot be said to be an absolute "irresistible force." Of course, when old contradictions are solved, new contradictions are born. Therefore, while expounding the law of "the mutual transformation of contradictory things," Chairman Mao emphatically taught the comrades "to propagandize the original dialectics of things to promote the transformation of things in order to attain the goals of revolution."¹³ Thus we are made to understand that the original dialectics of the transfer and transmutation of a thing into its opposite in accordance with its own nature is also the objective law of change and development. Furthermore, after men have grasped the objective law of the transformation into the opposite according to certain conditions, they have to make full use of man's subjective motivating power "to promote the transformation of things in order to attain the goals of revolution."

When we study the conformity of opposites or the mutual transformation between idealism and materialism in accordance

with Chairman Mao's materialistic dialectical viewpoint which dictates that man's subjective motivating power should be developed and the mutual transformation of things promoted according to the original dialectics of things, we shall have a firm and clear direction and shall be able to use different methods for the solution of the different contradictions between idealism and materialism under different conditions. We shall also develop man's subjective motivating power in accordance with the revolutionary interests of the proletariat, adhere to the principles of Marxist materialism, and wage a determined struggle against idealism in order to promote the transformation of idealism into materialism. This also means that in the contradiction between the two world outlooks and in the struggle waged by materialism against idealism we must attain victory and realize the goals of revolution. Thus, the transition and transformation of idealism into materialism means the solution of the internal contradiction in idealism itself, a transformation gained through struggle and not a fatalistic, blind, and voluntary transformation. Besides, we understand that the antagonism or struggle between materialism and idealism is not something terrible which one has to cover up or escape from. We welcome face-to-face opposition. We face up to the contradiction or original dialectics between the two, and promote the transformation of idealism into materialism through effort and struggle.

I remember that the Italian New Hegelian Benedetto Croce, in discussing the relationship between idealism and materialism, once made some remarks to the following effect: When you see idealism gain popularity here, you will very soon see materialism gain popularity there; when you see materialism gain popularity there, very soon you will see idealism gain popularity here. (These remarks were probably made by him around 1930 at an international philosophical conference.) Here he understood the opposites of the mutual transformation based on the original dialectics of things as the alternate waxing and waning of the two. In his viewpoint, we cannot detect the principal and non-principal aspects of a contradiction or the internal inevitability or external objective conditions of transformation. We also cannot see the motivating efforts which promote transformation through struggle. Croce came to this conclusion seemingly by superficially summarizing some phenomena in the history of philosophy. It also seemed to be based on the theory of human nature. (William James, in his book Pragmatism, advanced the theory based on human nature that materialists are mostly hard-hearted persons while idealists are mostly soft-hearted persons.) The reasoning is that as the idealism advocated by

persons of a certain temperament gains prevalence, it is opposed by the materialism advocated by people of another temperament, and vice versa. Thus, it seems that the entire history of philosophy is the alternate undulations of the different philosophies (idealism and materialism) sponsored by people of different temperaments (soft-hearted and hard-hearted people) which are in power by turns. I must admit that in the past, I thought all along that Croce's views on the relations of idealism and materialism embodied the dialectical outlook. Only recently, after having deeply studied "On Contradiction," I realized that Croce's views were idealistic and ludicrous and a distortion and vulgarization of dialectics. We admit that idealism and materialism may transform into each other. However, this transformation is fundamentally different from the idealistic "transformation" advanced by Croce.

And then Hegel, in his theory on logic, was of the opinion that all finite things transform into their opposites. This seems to imply that only finite things transform into their opposites, while infinite things, such as infinite thinking and absolute ideas, would be the function of thinking itself, embracing the opposing aspects, and therefore, would not transform into their opposites. This idealistic viewpoint has long since been refuted by dialectical materialism. First, dialectical materialism regards the process of the transformation of things as perpetual and universal. As Chairman Mao has said, "The transformation of one thing into another is the process of metabolism." And he also said, "Metabolism is the universal and perpetual irresistible law in the universe."¹⁴ Therefore, we would not recognize abstract absolute ideas which are said to be without metabolism and transcend the process of transformation. Second, speaking of the transformation between mind and matter and between thinking and being, dialectical materialism insists on the principle that matter or being is primary in the formula of being-thinking-being which is diametrically opposed to the objective idealistic formula of mind-matter-mind or thinking-being-thinking. Lenin said, "Hegel, the exponent of dialectics, could not understand the transformation from matter to idea."¹⁵ This scores a direct hit at the vulnerable point of Hegel's idealistic viewpoint of transformation.

Since Hegel regarded the absolute idea as matchless and unable to transform into its opposite, when discussing the process of development of the history of philosophy, he did his best to cover up the processes of struggle and transformation between idealism and materialism and stressed the identity between different philosophical systems. He stressed that

different philosophical systems "simultaneously become the different links of an organic whole wherein they not only are not in conflict but also inevitably the same."¹⁶ In his Dissertation on the History of Philosophy, he also said, "Every philosophical system is also a scope. However, it does not become mutually repellent with other scopes on this account. These scopes have their inescapable destiny. That is, they inevitably will be linked together and relegated to the links of a whole."¹⁷ We may say that, in this assertion, Hegel attempted to melt, to integrate, or, we may say, to forsake other philosophical systems, particularly the materialistic system, with his powerful objective idealistic system. Superficially, he did not regard materialism as the opposite of idealism with which it was engaged in a life and death struggle. He declared that he would "link them up" and "reduce them to the different links of a whole." Thus, his idealism would not be transformed from materialism, but would be "the richest, the most comprehensive, and the most concrete philosophical system"¹⁸ which combines the essence of the philosophical systems of all times. However, as a matter of fact, Hegel's objective idealism was developed as a result of his inheritance of and criticisms of the idealism of Kant, Schelling, and others and his ruthless criticism of and struggle against all materialism, particularly French materialism. He could not cover up the struggle between materialism and idealism, nor could he repudiate the mutual transformation between the two. We would rather say that the tricks Hegel employed in transforming materialism into idealism lie in transforming or relegating the opposite into a link in his own system. As a matter of fact, Hegel's own objective idealistic system could not escape from the process of historical dialectics. Through criticism and struggle, it was first transformed into Feuerbach's materialism and later into dialectical materialism.

The crux of the matter lies in whether dialectical materialists would also adopt Hegel's methods in "linking up" other systems, particularly idealist systems, and relegating them into the links of a whole. As regards this question, we must say dialectical materialists insist on their own partisanship and do not camouflage their own class nature. Even though we declare that we must criticize and absorb the rational cores of opposing systems and are willing to learn from the enemy, still we are opposed to unscientific and non-critical "linking up" of the philosophical systems which in the past served the exploiting class with the dialectical materialist system. We also cannot reduce the scope or principles of opposing systems to organic links of our own system.

Take Hegel himself. In his system of logic, there existed "being," "quantity," "matter," "realizability," and "objective body" which it shared in common with materialism. However, he had distorted them from an idealistic standpoint and relegated them to a secondary position under the soul and mind. Therefore, these had lost the positions they had in the materialist system and had been "transformed" by him into improbably organic links in the idealist system.

From the foregoing discussions, we can derive the following conclusion: the mutual transformation between idealism and materialism is shown in the struggle between two lines. One line takes the idealist stand, wages struggle against materialism in accordance with the formula of thinking-being-thinking, and transforms materialism into idealism. That is, it urges materialism to transfer into its opposite, thus "integrating" and "linking up" materialism and idealism. Materialism is relegated to a link in idealism. This was the way of Hegel which we must oppose and criticize.

The other line is the line of Marxist philosophy. In accordance with the formula of being-thinking-being, that is, "the original dialectics of things," we struggle against different versions of idealism, "promote the transformation of things," and transform ~~idealism~~ into materialism; that is, promote the transfer of idealism into its opposite, materialism. Thus, the opposing aspects of a contradiction are made to transfer themselves to the positions of their opposites, and this transformation is not unconditional and does not follow the undulating lines without undergoing the critical process of struggle. This is a new process of development. In his "On Contradiction," Chairman Mao regarded the process of transformation as a process of metabolism. In discussing transformation, Chairman Mao said, "In the world, the new always replaces the old through this process of metabolism."¹⁹ This remark is rich in profound materialistic dialectics and struggle.

Having learned Chairman Mao's exposition of the transformation from the materialistic dialectical viewpoint, we will not go astray. We will understand that in studying the transformation of idealism and materialism into each other we aim "to promote the transformation of things in order to attain revolutionary goals." That is to say, our goal is to promote the transformation of idealism into materialism, to promote "the replacement of the old by the new," and to promote "the metabolism of things" through struggle and the development of the subjective motivating power in accordance with the original dialectics of things. In criticizing idealism in the history of philosophy, in criticizing the contemporary idealism of the bourgeoisie in various countries, and

and in our efforts to remould old ideologies and the old world outlook, we have as our goal the transformation of the two world philosophical outlooks under new conditions and the promotion of the transformation of idealism to dialectical materialism. In discussing the identity or transformation between idealism and materialism, our aim is not to seek out the common characteristics between the two, nor to study the cyclical undulations of idealism and materialism. In studying the transformation of idealism into materialism, we are serving the political needs of the proletariat and the cause of revolution.

In this connection, we have to provide an answer to this question: According to the law which says "each of the two contradictory aspects, according to given conditions, tends to transform itself into the other," cannot we say that the proletarian world outlook and dialectical materialism may also, according to given condition, transform themselves into a certain form of idealism? In other words, cannot dialectical materialism, according to given conditions, transfer itself into the position of its opposite? As we know, "The contradiction between materialism and idealism will exist in a socialist society and a communist society and will be expressed in various forms."²⁰ Since in a socialist society and a communist society the world outlook of the proletariat will have taken the dominant position and, even if the contradiction between materialism and idealism still exists, idealism may be transformed into materialism through criticism, cannot dialectical materialism, according to given conditions, also be transformed into idealism?

I touched upon this problem in an article published early in 1957. I said, "I also believe that as the history of philosophy develops into dialectical materialism, the highest, the most developed, the most scientific, and the richest materialism, it will never be vanquished by any idealism. Even though the struggle between materialism and idealism will still exist in a socialist society and a communist society, this struggle can only make dialectical materialism richer and more developed."²¹ Basically, I still uphold this view. However, I have to augment and demonstrate it. First, I have to say that, before the appearance of Marxist materialism, there truly had been situations in which materialism and idealism had taken ascendancy over and transformed into each other alternately in the history of philosophy. (It is not the purpose of this article to concretely analyze the process of the transformation of idealism and materialism into each according to

given historical conditions in the history of philosophy.) However, dialectical materialism, as the world outlook of the proletariat and their ideological system and as the superstructure of the socialist society and communist society, cannot be transformed into other forms of idealism, because history cannot retrogress, the proletariat cannot retrogress and become the capitalist society or feudal society. In the socialist society and communist society, idealism which served the exploiting class has already lost its class basis. Even though some residue of idealistic ideas may remain in the minds of a few persons, and even though when people become immersed in wrong thinking and subjective one-sidedness, they may have idealistic ideas with which they oppose materialism and induce struggles of materialism against idealism. This idealism which lacks substantial class roots and social basis, or in other words, lacks a mass basis, has become a homeless ghost and cannot become a strong philosophical system (such as the idealism of Plato and the German classical idealism). It is no match for dialectical materialism and cannot urge dialectical materialism to transform into idealism, thus replacing dialectical materialism. Therefore, I affirm that Marxist materialism cannot be transformed into idealism and be replaced by a bigger idealistic system. However, we must emphasize that, even in a socialist society and a communist society, erroneous idealism which reflects the consciousness of exploitation will appear incessantly, and the struggle between materialism and idealism will continue. It is the mission of Marxist materialism to continuously wage a struggle against idealism (including, of course, rectificationism) of any form which may appear any time, and to continuously promote the transformation of idealism in order to enrich and develop dialectical materialism.

While Marxist materialism cannot transform into idealism, this does not mean it will become stagnant and has already reached absolute perfection. Through continuous correct reflection on the progress of society, the changes in nature, and the rich experiences of human life and revolutionary struggle, it continuously enriches, develops, and improves itself. It will forever develop and progress with the development of society and the progress of time. It will forever possess vitality. It is the motivating power and guidance for the transformation and reformation of all things. Therefore, it cannot transfer to its opposite and be replaced by it. Among those who study Marxist philosophy, particularly those who have yet to be well versed in it, some may have empiricist, doctrinaire, rightist, and "leftist" deviations. Amidst these deviations, internal criticisms, self-criticisms,

and ideological and theoretical struggles must be unfolded. This shows precisely the vitality and the process of contradictions and development of Marxist philosophy and does not mean that it may transfer to its opposite and be replaced by idealism, or transform into idealism.

The above explains that dialectical materialism cannot be transformed into idealism by emphasizing class sources. Speaking of it epistemologically, Lenin once pointed out: "Linearity, one-sidedness and stiffness, subjectivism, and subjectivist blindness are the epistemological source of idealism."²² Contrary to linearity, Lenin pointed out, "Human knowledge...is infinitely similar to a series of circles, or to spiral curves."²³ Contrary to one-sidedness, materialist dialectics "is the most perfect, profound, and broadly developing theory."²⁴ Instead of being stiff and stubborn, materialist dialectics emphasizes conceptual agility and flexibility. Contrary to subjectivism and subjective blindness, dialectical materialism is the truthful reflection of objective facts and is the correct reflection of the perpetual development of the world.²⁵ Therefore, we think the problems are how to use materialist dialectics to criticize and reform idealist dialectics in order to promote its transformation and how dialectical materialism is to criticize and wage struggles against idealism and expose its errors and one-sidedness theoretically and epistemologically in order to promote its transformation into materialism and not vice versa. It is precisely for this reason that Marxism is "omnipotent" and invincible. As Lenin so aptly put it, "Marxist theory is omnipotent because it is correct."²⁶ Only correct things can transform and reform wrong things, and not vice versa. Only complete and broad things can transform and improve lopsided and one-sided things, and not vice versa. Marxist materialism is omnipotent and all-conquering because it can, according to the original dialectics of things and the internal contradictions of idealism, promote the transformation of idealism and force idealism to transform to its opposite in order to enrich and improve materialism and attain the revolutionary objectives.

In the process of the struggle between materialism and idealism, because materialism which represents the demands of the progressive classes has defeated idealism and promoted the transformation of idealism and its transfer into its opposite--materialism, therefore, the unity of opposites is attained. It must be clearly understood that this unity is achieved in materialism and not in idealism.

As regards the process of unity through struggle and promotion of the transformation of opposites, Chairman Mao

once made a great exposition on Marxism. Even though he was referring to the political situation in China or the unity of the contradictory struggle between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, the basic theory on struggle and unity presented by Chairman Mao is very enlightening and is entirely suitable for application in our discussions of the unity of opposites between materialism and idealism.

In his article "The Reactionaries Must be Sanctioned," Chairman Mao said: "China must unite. Without unity, there can be no victory... We should have demanded national unity a long time ago. First, unity in the war of resistance.... Second, unity in unification.... Third, unity in progress. The whole nation must progress, and the backward must be asked to keep abreast with the progressive people and not vice versa." Since the contradiction and unity here referred to are replete with significance in realistic struggle and profound and great materialistic dialectical ideas, Chairman Mao repeatedly expounded the theory. I think these remarks should be fully quoted.

Secondly, in "An Interview with the Central News Agency, Shao-tang Pao, and Hsin-min Pao," he said: "China needs unity. However, unity should be effected in the war of resistance, in unification, and in progress. If unity is to be effected in the opposite direction, then China will perish."²⁸

In his speech on "Unify All Anti-Japanese Forces, Oppose Anti-Communist Die-Hards," Chairman Mao also exposed the "bogus unity theory" of the reactionaries. He presented his own genuine, realistic, and rational theory of unity, saying, "Unity! Unity! The faction which advocates surrender has its own theory on unity, asking us to achieve unity through surrender; the anti-Communist die-hards have their theory on unity, asking us to achieve unity through division and retrogression.... Our theory of unity is the theory of unity of the entire people and the theory of unity of all people with a conscience. It is based on the war of resistance, unification, and progress."²⁹ In "Ten Demands Directed at the Kuomintang," he again stated: "Unity not through surrender but through the war of resistance; unity not through division but through unification; unity not through retrogression, but through progress. Unity on the basis of the war of resistance, unification, and progress is genuine unity, rational unity, and practical unity."³⁰ The "unity" referred to here by Chairman Mao is of great significance. First, it refers to political and national unity. Second, it refers to the struggle and unity or conformity between the opposites of war of resistance and surrender, unification and division, and progress and retrogression. This is unity or conformity with dialectical significance. Third, it refers to the

promotion of the transformation of the opposites; that is, the transfer of things to their opposites. The promotion of the transformation of surrender into the war of resistance means unity in the war of resistance. The promotion of the transformation of backwardness into progress means unity in progress. The unity or transformation referred to here embraces the significance of the development of subjective motivating power, combativeness, and the revolutionary spirit to promote the transformation of things.

In discussing political struggle here, Chairman Mao presented the principle of the unity of opposites of materialistic dialectics which is entirely in accord with the principle of the struggle, unity, and transformation of the opposites expounded in "On Contradiction." Looked at epistemologically, this principle means that the struggle of the correctness and trust against wrongness should be united in truth and correctness. Marxism is omnipotent because it is correct, because it is the combination of truthfulness, revolutionary spirit, and combativeness. In studying this universal basic principle, we have come to understand the following points in connection with the unity of the opposites of idealism and materialism.

First, in order to earnestly carry out the materialistic dialectical principle of the unity of opposites, we must admit that idealism and materialism can transform into each other and unity does exist between them. As Chairman Mao pointed out, between backwardness and progress, between the land-owning class and the peasants, and between the working class and the bourgeoisie, mutual transformation is possible and unity does exist. The struggle between backwardness and progress is "united in progress." In the struggle between the landlords and the peasants, under the conditions of the land reform led by the Communist Party, "The peasants are transformed from the ruled to the rulers, while the landlords transform in the opposite direction."³¹ In the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, "the ruled proletariat, through the revolution, is transformed into the rulers; while the original rulers, the bourgeoisie, is transformed into the ruled, having transferred itself to the position of its opposite."³² Because the unity of opposites and mutual transformation, a weapon of materialistic dialectics, can only be possessed by the progressive and revolutionary classes, it urges idealism, which usually serves the reactionary classes, to transform into materialism and urges idealism to be united with materialism, and not vice versa. Since this principle of the unity of opposites has profound and abundant significance, it can be completely allied to explain the transformation and unity of idealism and materialism. Of course, we have no intention of

mixing idealism in philosophy or idealists with the landlords or the bourgeoisie.

Second, from the dialectical materialist point of view, the unity of opposites, the unity of idealism and materialism, is not achieved in a third system, something neutral which is neither idealist nor materialist, but is achieved in materialism, must as the struggle between progress and backwardness is not united in a third thing which transcends progress and backwardness or something neutral which is neither backwardness nor progress. This is because "sitting on the fence would not do and there is no third alternative."³³ According to this principle, we can refute certain schools of philosophy which use various tricks which transcend idealism and materialism and which are neither idealism nor materialism to cover their own idealist substance.

Third, the Kuomintang has its bogus, impractical, and irrational theory of unity. In direct opposition to this, Chairman Mao presented the genuine, practical, and rational theory of unity advocated by the Chinese Communist Party, which is unity on the basis of the war of resistance, unification, and progress. As we know, in a similar fashion, reactionary philosophers in the history of philosophy also had their own theories of the unity between materialism and idealism. Hegel, whom we have criticized above, was an outstanding one, who, from an idealist standpoint, proclaimed his theory of the unity of opposites in which "idealism and materialism are linked up" and materialism is relegated to a link of idealism. As we know, this conservative and reactionary theory of unity which serves the exploiting classes is a bogus, impractical, and irrational theory of unity. Therefore, we determinedly oppose Hegel's theory of unity which unites being into thinking. We are fundamentally opposed to Hegel's so-called unity of idealism and materialism which would unite materialism into idealism. This is because Hegel's line is a reactionary line which would unite materialism into idealism and progression into backwardness. This is basically contrary to our line which would unite thinking into being, idealism into materialism, and backwardness into progress so that backwardness would keep abreast of progress.

Fourth, we realize that even in the socialist and communist societies, the struggle between progress and backwardness and between materialism and idealism will always exist. It is our task to urge backwardness to transform and unite into progress, to urge idealism to transform and unite into materialism, and not vice versa, in accordance with the original dialectics of things and the law of objective development.

The above are some ideas which I have gained in studying

Chairman Mao's works and in my attempts to employ his ideology as a weapon in studying the identity between thinking and being and the conformity between idealism and materialism. Comrades are welcome to criticize and enlighten me, as I may be wrong in some aspects.

Footnotes:

¹Lenin, Philosophical Notes, People's Press, 1956, p. 153.

²Lenin, Philosophical Notes, People's Press, 1956, p. 283.

³Lenin, Philosophical Notes, People's Press, 1956, p. 272.

⁴Lenin, Philosophical Notes, People's Press, 1956, p. 290.

⁵Lenin, Philosophical Notes, People's Press, 1956, p. 352.

⁶Hegel, Logic, San-lien Book Shop, 1956, p. 362.

⁷Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, 1952, p. 769.

⁸Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, 1952, p. 768.

⁹Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, 1952, p. 768.

¹⁰Hegel, Logic, p. 191.

¹¹Hegel, Logic, p. 190.

¹²Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, p. 777.

¹³Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, 1952, p. 797.

¹⁴Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol 2., 1952, p. 778.

¹⁵Philosophical Notes, People's Press, p. 289.

16 Spiritual Phenomena, preface; see "German Philosophy at the End of the Eighteenth Century and the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century," Commercial Press, p. 127.

17 Hegel, Dissertation on the History of Philosophy, People's Press, vol. 1, p. 38.

18 Hegel, Logic, p. 66.

19 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, p. 791.

20 From "On the Historical Experiences of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."

21 "A Discussion of the Problems in the History of Chinese Philosophy," The Science Press, 1957, p. 190.

22 Lenin, Philosophical Notes, p. 365.

23 Lenin, Philosophical Notes, p. 365.

24 Selected Works of Lenin, 2 vol., no. 1, p. 70.
p. 70.

25 Philosophical Record, p. 87.

26 Selected Works of Lenin, 2 vol., no. 1, p. 69.

27 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, pp. 542-543.

28 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, p. 557.

29 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, pp. 690-691.

30 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, p. 694.

31 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, p. 791.

32 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, p. 795.

33 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 4, p. 1478.

PROBLEMS ON CHANGES AND THE STRUGGLE
IN MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM

Following is the translation of an article by
T'ang I-chieh (3282 0001 0094) in Che-hsueh
Yen-chiu (Philosophy Research), Peiping, No. 1,
25 January 1961, pp. 69-81.

There have been discussions recently on the law of the unity of opposites in certain newspapers and periodicals in which different expositions of the struggle and conformity of contradiction have been advanced, and as a result, there have been differences in explaining and solving problems by the application of this law. In an article in the latest number of Che-hsueh Yen-chiu, Comrade Chou Ching-fang (0719 2529 5364) asserted that this problem might be discussed in conjunction with many problems. He cited the problem of the existence or lack of it between materialism and idealism and between dialectics and metaphysics from the viewpoint of the history of philosophy. In the same number, Comrade Kuan Feng (7070 6912) in his article entitled "A Critique of the Philosophy of Chuang-tzu," also said that the fact that the subjectivist idealistic philosophy of Chuang-tzu was transformed from the objectivist idealism of Lao-tzu was related to the problem of conformity. In 1956 and 1957, scholars studying the history of philosophy also aired problems pertaining to the mutual transformation between materialism and idealism. Similar problems have been recently posed in the classroom. Therefore, I think it would be of great significance if, taking advantage of the current discussions of the law of the unity of opposites, a solution of the problem of the struggle and transformation between materialism and idealism is sought through discussions. A clear understanding of the struggle and transformation between materialism and idealism is of great help in solving such problems as the objectivity of the history of philosophy, the law of the development of philosophical ideas, and the inheritance of the philosophical heritage.

I.

The law of the unity of opposites is the universal law of the development of things. Recognition of the struggle of contradictions while denying the conformity will lead to the denial of the universality of this law and, in fact, will mean a lapse in metaphysics. This is because it is precisely owing to the struggle between the opposites of an entity that things themselves develop. Denying the co-existence of the two opposing aspects in an entity would render struggle meaningless. Denying the transformation into each other between the two opposing aspects would lead to a denial of the circuitous path of the spiraling rise of the development of things and a metaphysical viewpoint or vertical rise or decline. However, miscomprehension of conformity would also lead to metaphysics. Regarding conformity as the common character of a degree of common character between the opposites would negate struggle, and as a matter of fact, negate the possibility of any mutual transformation. Regarding the transformation of the opposites into each other means the change of one aspect into the other aspect would, owing to the confusion of the distinction of the characteristics of the opposites, fundamentally negate the struggle and make transformation impossible. Furthermore, the conformity of contradiction must be conformity on the basis of struggle; negation of the conformity of struggle would make it absolute conformity, that is, metaphysics. Therefore, before we study the transformation of materialism and idealism into each other, we must have a clear understanding of the struggle between materialism and idealism and the characteristics and absoluteness of struggle. Otherwise, some one-sided conclusions are liable to be reached in discussing conformity.

In the history of philosophy, materialism and idealism are the two aspects of opposition and the history of the development of philosophy is the history of the struggle between materialism and idealism. This seems to have been agreed to generally. However, there have been differences in the understanding of this opposition and the mutual struggle resulting from the opposition.

Some people look mainly into the opposition between materialism and idealism through comprehension; that is, from comprehension of the correctness and errors and one-sided comprehension to relatively all-sided comprehension. By so doing, they cannot really understand the character of the struggle between the two. As regards the character of the opposition between materialism and idealism, it is a reflection of the class opposition in a class society; and the struggle is the

reflection of class struggle. The general tendency of the development of materialist ideas and dialectical ideas is related to the interests of the progressive class, particularly the working people (mainly the proletariat). And the general tendency of the development of the ideas of idealism and metaphysics is related to the interests of the exploiting class, particularly the reactionary exploiting class. Therefore, the struggle between the two is a class struggle and is related to the overthrow of the destiny of one class by another class. However, there is currently a viewpoint which seems to hold that the two lines in the history of philosophy did not reflect the class struggle before the birth of Marxist philosophy, because there was no philosophical ideas representative of the interests of the working people, and that even if such ideas did exist, there was a paucity of them which lacked any system. Therefore, there was the assertion that the struggle in philosophical ideas in Chinese feudal society reflected only the struggle between the big landlords and the middle and small landlords or between official landlords and commoner landlords. Such a view actually regards the struggle of philosophical ideas not as a struggle between the progressive class and the reactionary class and between the exploiting class and the exploited class, but merely as the struggle between one bloc of the exploiting class and another bloc. Thus, the character of the struggle of philosophical ideas in history is changed. Starting out from this viewpoint, various incorrect conclusions on the struggle and conformity of materialism and idealism, such as holding that there are some things in common between materialism and idealism, appeared. Of course, if the struggle of philosophical ideas is regarded merely as the reflection of the contradiction between two different blocs of the dominant class, then it is but natural to think there are some or even many things in common between them.

In order to understand that the struggle between materialism and idealism in the history of philosophy is the reflection of class struggle, and therefore the struggle is absolute and there is nothing in common between them, I think we should look at the problem from the following two aspects:

First, in a class society, any struggle in philosophical ideas is a reflection of the class struggle. This is to say, the struggle in philosophical ideas has always been related to the class struggle of that era. Class struggle presented questions and impelled philosophers to provide answers and solutions to them. There have never been problems which were not presented by class struggle. Even though the theory of "reason" expounded by Chu Hsi is very abstract, yet, upon

analysis, his philosophy completely reflects the realistic class struggle. In the Southern Sung Dynasty, both the national contradictions and the class struggle were very acute and this acute class contradiction demanded solution from the philosophers. Chu Hsi adopted a passive attitude to the then principal contradiction, the national contradiction, while evincing great interest in solving the contemporary class contradiction. This is because Chu Hsi did not only take into consideration the temporary interests of the land-owning class, but also sought to fundamentally solve the class contradiction (this was an impossible illusion entertained by Chu Hsi). Therefore, he brought forth a "world of reason" in accordance with the requirements of the feudal landlords in an attempt to set up a permanent law for feudal rule. This is what Tai Tung-yuan meant in saying that Chu Hsi was "committing murder with reason."

Usually problems do not arise in this respect. Problems emerge in that in the history of philosophy materialist ideas did not all represent the interests of the laboring people or at least did not take the laboring people's interests as their starting point. For instance, Fan Chen was an outstanding materialist. However, we can hardly describe him as a thinker for the laboring people. That is only one aspect of the problem. If we view the struggle between Fan Chen and Emperor Wu of the Liang Dynasty within the whole class struggle of that era, we can see that Fan's assaults on Emperor Wu were the results of the struggle of the masses of laboring people against the dominant class. Without the contemporary struggle of the broad masses of laboring people, there would have been no necessity to debate over "the destructibility of God" or "the indestructibility of God." And judging from the effects of Fan's struggle, they had an influence on production and the rollers. Therefore, failure to analyze the struggle of philosophical ideas in conjunction with their contemporary class struggle leads to an analysis of the phenomena of some political struggle, without being able to trace the deep class fount of the struggle of philosophical ideas. Superficially, some struggles of philosophical ideas seem to be the internal struggle of the ruling class, while actually these struggles are the reflection of class struggle in the ideological struggle between the different blocs of the dominant class. Therefore, the struggles of philosophical ideas cannot be summed up as the struggles between political blocs. We should further study the struggles of philosophical ideas in conjunction with the class struggle of the entire society. Once this is understood, we will know the character of the struggle between materialism and idealism in the history of philosophy and the

absoluteness and antagonism of the struggles, and we will think that in character materialism can be transformed into idealism and vice versa.

Second, it is not sufficient to merely admit the relationship between the struggle of philosophical ideas and the class struggle. We must further analyze which philosophical ideas in the history of philosophy represented the interests of the exploited class and were the ideas of the toiling people in order to further understand the relations between class struggle and ideological struggle.

In the society of the exploiting class, the exploiting class' ideology is the ideology of domination. Therefore, the exploiting class' ideology enjoyed incomparable advantages for its propagation and development over the exploited class' ideology. Before the entry of the working class on the stage of history, owing to the limitations of the times and their own class, the toiling people could not have a very systematic and complete philosophical ideology. The number of thinkers reflecting the interests of the toiling class was comparatively smaller. This is understandable. This explains that the dominant class used all its instruments of class struggle to oppress the toiling people. However, this is just one aspect of the problem. The other aspect of the problem is that the toiling people have always resisted exploitation and oppression. The greater the oppression of the dominant class, the greater the resistance of the toiling people. In their struggle with the exploiting class, there had to be a world outlook as their guidance. Maybe the ideas were very incomplete and isolated, but they did exist; and it is our task to sort out, analyze, and systematize the ideology of the toiling people. In the history of philosophy, we can see that philosophical ideas reflected the interests of the toiling people mainly in the following three situations (the situations described below were situations before the birth of Marxism):

(1) The philosophical ideas distilled by the toiling people from the production struggle and class struggle. In addition to the abundant philosophical ideas of the toiling people embodied in the content of the folk sayings, soothsayings, and folk literature in the struggle waged by the toiling people against the exploiting class, very rich philosophical ideas were shown. These ideas, judged by the systematic criterion of the exploiting class, were of course "unsystematic." If judged by the philosophical criterion of the exploiting class, these ideas of course lacked "the flavor of philosophy." However, to the toiling people, these philosophical ideas had played a great role in guiding them to wage struggles against the exploiting class. And, judging by their

practical function in the class struggle, these ideas could not be said to be entirely devoid of a system. From the Marxist view of philosophy, they cannot be said to lack completely the flavor of philosophy. Even though these ideas may be incomplete, they have usually been brilliant in solving practical problems. In 1959, I wrote an article entitled "Some Opinions on the Study of the Characteristics of the History of Chinese Philosophy"¹ in which I mentioned the ideas of the agrarian revolution in the last years of the Han Dynasty. Among them were not only progressive social and political viewpoints but also materialistic and dialectical ideas. These are only the ideas of the early agrarian revolution. With the deeper development of struggles, the philosophical ideas of the agrarian revolution also become more developed. I would like to set forth some of my views on the ideas of agrarian revolution reflected in The Water Margin with the aim of discussing the character of the struggle of philosophical ideas.

The Water Margin is the product of the great agrarian revolutions which embodied the ideas and experiences of the struggle of the agrarian revolutions since the Sung and Yuan Dynasties. First, The Water Margin, with a clear-cut class viewpoint, pointed out the principal contradiction of the feudal society; that is, the fundamental opposition between the bureaucratic ruling class and the broad masses of peasants and other exploited and oppressed masses. The author penetratingly exposed the corruption and reaction of the entire dominant class from the emperors Kao Ch'iu and Liang Shih'lu down to Huang Wen'ping, Hsi Men-ch'ing, and Mao Ta-kung, and the prison guards Ch'ang Chien and Li Wan who formed a big bloc. Together, they perpetrated all the crimes in persecuting the people. The good toiling people, under their cruel oppression and persecution, led a life of living hell. "The blazing sun sends scorching rays; the rice is withered and dying; worries are boiling in the hearts of the peasants; the rich aristocrats wave their fans." (Chapter 16). The author asserted that this sinful world could be changed. He deemed that only by organizing the broad masses of the exploited and oppressed "to break through the nets in heaven and the snares on the earth" (chapter 37) and "to overrun the entire country" (chapter 7) could the feudal order be destroyed and the position of the toiling people changed.

Second, The Water Margin enthusiastically paid tribute to the great power and justice of the toiling people's resistance and struggle, which was not only "to kill a few rapacious fellows so as to assuage our grievances." He believed that, "it is a matter of course and nothing strange that a

country without honor must eventually perish, and the wealth acquired illegally will eventually be taken away under the assault of the power of the peasants' uprising. It is the immutable law of history that the entire feudal regime will collapse." (chapter 68). In the author's view, the uprising of the peasant masses and the behavior of the participants in other similar rebellions were entirely right and "correspond with fate and popular wish."

Third, taking the interests of the peasants under feudal rule as the starting point, The Water Margin presented a political platform "executing the wishes of Providence." This fighting political platform had as its operational directives, "distribute wealth and administer justice" and "rob the rich and give relief to the poor." The ultimate objectives were "wiping out all the evil officials," "resisting government troops," and "marching to the Eastern Capital and wresting away the emperor's throne." This constitutes an open negation of the exploiting system and the feudal monarchical prerogatives.

Fourth, the author gave expression to the ideal of the revolution of the toiling people--a primordial ideal of communism. The "good points of The Water Margin are, "people from all corners of the globe form one big family" and "all trust each other with life and death and help each other in hardship." "...class had been eliminated, and from the big leader down to the private citizen, all were equal in stature" and they "called each other brothers and there was no distinction of poverty and affluence." And economically, a fixed equal distribution system was set up. (Chao Kai ordered that the birthday gifts, treasures, gold, and jewelery, as well as the gold, silver, and money on which his own household lived, be brought out and be given to the lower-ranking leaders and the private citizens.) (chapter 24).

Fifth, The Water Margin affirmed the revolutionary truth of "right of rebellion" and demonstrated with ample facts that the morals of the dominant class in a feudal society are hypocritical and selfish and that only the moral heritage of the laboring people is the genuine quintessence of our national morals. By reading The Water Margin we can easily see the richness of the revolutionary ideas of our peasants.

The Water Margin also expresses the highly developed wisdom refined in the practice of class struggle by the laboring people. They voluntarily applied materialist dialectics. In strategy, they not only realized the antagonism of class contradiction in feudal society and that the oppressed and exploited people had no alternative but to unite "in the common cause" and to wage a determined struggle in order to live,

but also knew that tolerance and retreat in the face of the dominant class meant perdition. They knew that in the revolutionary struggle, when facing strong enemies, they must alienate the enemy camp in order to bolster their own ranks. In concrete battles, they sought to understand the situation and mapped out strategems accordingly. Making use of the enemy's internal contradictions, they sometimes beat a retreat when it was expedient and, at other times, they would infiltrate their own men into the enemy camp. They knew themselves and the enemy and possessed the qualities of shrewdness and courage. The three assaults on the Chu Village by Sun Chiang and the defeat of Hung, the boxing instructor, by Lin Ch'ung are vivid examples. From the above, we see that there is an abundance of revolutionary ideals and experiences in struggle in the peasants' uprisings depicted in The Water Margin. We should earnestly seek out materials for the history of philosophy from it.

(2) In the "Communist Manifesto," Marx and Engels pointed out, "In times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of the old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands." This is the case when one society is in a revolution and changes into another society. This is also the case at different stages of the undulations of the development of the same society. At the climax of every agrarian revolution in feudal Chinese society, a small section of the ruling class cut itself adrift and joined the ranks of the agrarian revolution. In his article entitled "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," Chairman Mao pointed out, "The cruel exploitation and political oppression of the peasants by the land-owning class forced the peasants into many uprisings in resistance to the rule of the land-owning class. From Ch'en Sheng, Wu Kuang, Hsiang Yu, and Liu P'ang in the Ch'in Dynasty through Hsin Shih, P'ing Lin, Ch'ih Mei, T'ung Ma, and Huang Chin in the Han Dynasty, Li Mi and Tu Ch'ien-te in the Sui Dynasty, Wang Hsien-chih and Huang Ch'ao in the T'ang Dynasty, Sung Chiang and Fan La in the Sung Dynasty, Chu Yuan-chang in the Yuan Dynasty, and Li Tzu-ch'eng in the Ming Dynasty, and till the T'ai P'ing Kingdom Movement in the Ch'ing Dynasty, there have been hundreds of major and minor uprisings. These were all peasants' resistance movements and peasants' revolutionary wars." Of these agrarian revolutions mentioned by Chairman Mao, a considerable number of the leaders had cut themselves adrift from the ruling class and changed their

stand after joining the ranks of the agrarian revolutions. (We refer to the stage of their participation in the agrarian revolutions. Their later change of character is something else again.) These persons, after joining the agrarian revolutions, authored some books or voiced some opinions which should be regarded as important materials for us in studying the ideas of agrarian revolutions.

Besides, P'i Jih'hsiu, who joined the ranks of Huang Ch'ao in the agrarian revolution in the latter part of the T'ang Dynasty, was originally an intellectual belonging to the land-owning class. P'i Jih'hsiu wrote a fair quantity of works, some of which embodied a degree of opposition to the cruel exploitation of the feudal economy, political oppression, hypocritical ethics and morality, and family succession of monarchical rule as well as materialist and atheistic ideas which opposed Buddhism and other religious superstitions. We should study them. Li Yen, who joined the ranks of the agrarian revolution headed by Li Tzu-ch'eng in the last years of the Ming Dynasty, was a successful candidate for the second degree civil service examination. We should pay attention to his ideas. All these serve to show that there is no dearth of materials and ideas reflecting the interests of the laboring people. A serious study of these materials will clarify the philosophical ideas reflecting class struggle, and thus will lead to a more profound understanding of the substance of the struggle between materialism and idealism.

(3) The ideas of some progressive thinkers of the ruling class in history sometimes also embodied some elements of the ideas of the toiling people. The ideas of these progressive thinkers in history correspond to the requirements of historical development. We say their ideas embodied some elements of the ideas of the toiling people in the following senses: first, in opposing such ideas which impeded the progress of history, these thinkers usually were in accord with the interests of the toiling people. For instance, during the transformation of our nation from a slave society to a feudal society, Confucian advocacy of a change of the toilers' position in production corresponded to the progress of history and was therefore, to a certain degree, beneficial to the toilers at that time even though Confucius was motivated by a desire to strengthen the interests of his own class and the development of the power of the bloc he represented in opposing the old forces. However, so far as his advocacy of a change of the toilers' position in production is concerned, it is still progressive.

Second, some thinkers of the ruling class, in the

process of opposing old ideas, opposed in general a certain aspect of the exploitation system in order to oppose old ideas. This, of course, was not an expression of the wishes of the class they represented and, to a certain degree, this was in contravention of the wishes of the class they represented. However, so far as their opposition to a certain aspect of the exploitation system is concerned, it was also beneficial to the toiling people. One may even say it corresponded to the ideas of the toiling people. Of course, their opposition was not a fundamental opposition to the exploitation system, but an oblique contact with a certain aspect of the exploitation system. Further, their opposition to a certain aspect of the exploitation system in opposing old ideas was also a reflection of the class struggle at the time. For instance, in his critique of the feudal dictatorship, Li Tsan said that the "morality, etiquette, punishment, and politics" of the ruling class were all tools for oppressing the people. Therefore, in this respect, it approached a critique of the feudal system in general. However, as far as Li Tsan's world outlook as a whole is concerned, it was still the world outlook of the feudal land-owning class. In exposing the seamy side of society, some literary writers of the 18th and 19th centuries in Western Europe often directed criticisms at certain aspects of capitalist society. However, their world outlook remained the world outlook of the bourgeoisie. Under such conditions, we may also say that the ideas of some progressive thinkers of the exploiting class embodied some elements of the ideas of the toiling people. That is understandable.

Third, the ideas of some progressive thinkers of the exploiting class may directly embody some elements of the ideas of the toiling people. For instance, the classic Li Yun embodied the idea of equality which represented the interests of the toilers. This serves to show the complexity of class struggle and the inter-permeation of ideas. However, such ideas of the toiling people do not constitute the organic component of the ideological system of the exploiting class, but run counter to it. Therefore, they often stamped on these ideas the stamp of that class. This requires our analysis and criticisms. The above-mentioned conditions amply illustrate that there have been ideas representing the interests of the toiling people in history, but they were usually reflected in circuitous conditions. Only by taking the stand of the proletariat with profound feelings for the toiling people, and analyzing them from the standpoint of Marxism can we reach the proper results.

Since the struggle between materialism and idealism

reflects the class struggle, we must analyze their ideological systems within the framework of the struggle between them. Only by so doing can we see the essence of their ideological systems. If not, then we cannot truly have a clear idea of the class essence of an ideological system and, as a result, the demarcation line between materialism and idealism will be blotted out.

II.

The problem of the identity of materialism and idealism consists of two aspects: one is their inter-dependence and the other is their transformation, according to given conditions, each into its opposite. There does not seem to be much controversy over the inter-dependence issue. In this article, we want to stress the mutual transformation.

As mentioned above, in order to understand the essence of materialism and idealism, we must understand the struggle between them. We have said that we should understand the materialist ideological system and the idealist ideological system in their struggle, precisely because they are a pair of contradictions. That is to say, they live in inter-dependence in one body. Otherwise, struggle would be impossible. Therefore, in order to understand one aspect of the opposition, we must simultaneously understand the other aspect of the opposition. Or else, we cannot have a deep understanding of the essence of any one aspect of the opposition. For instance, if we want to understand the viewpoint ("respect for substance") and method ("speak the mind fully") of the materialism of P'ei Wei and others in the era of the Wei and Tsin Dynasties, we must understand the viewpoint (respect for nothingness) and method ("do not speak the mind fully") of the idealism of Wang P'i. Otherwise, we cannot grasp the essence of the materialist ideology of P'ei Wei. This is to say that we should analyze the two inter-dependent aspects in the struggle between the two lines of materialism and idealism and uncover the sharply opposed viewpoints and methods. Only by so doing can we get to the essence of the two ideological systems.

The inter-permeation between materialism and idealism is the conformity of materialism and idealism. Chairman Mao has said, "Conformity, unity, coincidence, inter-permeation, inter-penetration, inter-dependence, inter-connection, or co-operation: all these different terms mean the same thing." By inter-permeation between materialism and idealism, we do not mean that the basic viewpoint of one of the two aspects embodies the viewpoint of the other aspect. That would

be taking inter-permeation as meaning the conformity in contradiction. That would not be a pair of contradictions since one aspect remained. Thus, not only the antagonism becomes relative, but also the identity is eliminated. That is to say, in method, this is metaphysics. Theoretically, this would mean the admission of the existence of an immutable and identical absoluteness. That is idealism. The inter-permeation as we understand it means inter-dependence, on the one hand, and, on the other, the transformation each into its opposite according to given conditions. In the process of the struggle between materialism and idealism, owing to the influence of idealism on materialist thinkers, their system may embrace some deficiencies such as metaphysical viewpoints which are themselves contradictory to the materialist viewpoint. There is nothing strange about it. However, so far as its materialist viewpoint is concerned, it remains materialist, and not both materialist and idealist for that reason. As for the relationship between materialism and dialectics, both are fundamentally identical. Materialism itself demands dialectics; and dialectics itself demands materialism. Therefore, so far as the materialist viewpoint is concerned, it corresponds with dialectics; and so far as the dialectical viewpoint itself is concerned, it corresponds with materialism. As for the fact that between materialism and idealism and between dialectics and metaphysics influence is exerted each upon the other during the struggle, it is precisely for this reason that the materialists are cautioned to maintain constant alertness, to struggle against idealism all the time, and to educate our fellow comrades.

In studying the problem of materialism and idealism transforming into each other, we must first have a clear understanding of the mutual transformation of the two opposites. Chairman Mao, in his article "On Contradiction," pointed out that the second condition of the conformity is that "each of the two contradictory aspects, according to given conditions, tends to transform into its opposite." He also said, "Each of the opposite aspects within a thing, owing to certain conditions, tends to transform itself into the other, to transfer itself to the position of its opposite." At the same time, Chairman Mao cited the example of the contradictions of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, saying, "By means of revolution, the proletariat, which was the ruled, becomes the ruler, while the erstwhile ruler, the bourgeoisie, becomes the ruled, changing places with its opposite." By the mutual transformation of the two aspects of opposition, Chairman Mao does not mean the transformation of aspect A into aspect B and vice versa, but the transposition of the positions of aspects A

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The inter-permeation between materialism and idealism is the conformity of materialism and idealism. Chairman Mao has said, "Conformity, unity, coincidence, inter-permeation, inter-penetration, inter-dependence, inter-connection, or co-operation: all these different terms mean the same thing." By inter-permeation between materialism and idealism, we do not mean that the basic viewpoint of one of the two aspects embodies the viewpoint of the other aspect. That would

be taking inter-permeation as meaning the conformity in contradiction. That would not be a pair of contradictions since one aspect remained. Thus, not only the antagonism becomes relative, but also the identity is eliminated. That is to say, in method, this is metaphysics. Theoretically, this would mean the admission of the existence of an immutable and identical absoluteness. That is idealism. The inter-permeation as we understand it means inter-dependence, on the one hand, and, on the other, the transformation each into its opposite according to given conditions. In the process of the struggle between materialism and idealism, owing to the influence of idealism on materialist thinkers, their system may embrace some deficiencies such as metaphysical viewpoints which are themselves contradictory to the materialist viewpoint. There is nothing strange about it. However, so far as its materialist viewpoint is concerned, it remains materialist, and not both materialist and idealist for that reason. As for the relationship between materialism and dialectics, both are fundamentally identical. Materialism itself demands dialectics; and dialectics itself demands materialism. Therefore, so far as the materialist viewpoint is concerned, it corresponds with dialectics; and so far as the dialectical viewpoint itself is concerned, it corresponds with materialism. As for the fact that between materialism and idealism and between dialectics and metaphysics influence is exerted each upon the other during the struggle, it is precisely for this reason that the materialists are cautioned to maintain constant alertness, to struggle against idealism all the time, and to educate our fellow comrades.

In studying the problem of materialism and idealism transforming into each other, we must first have a clear understanding of the mutual transformation of the two opposites. Chairman Mao, in his article "On Contradiction," pointed out that the second condition of the conformity is that "each of the two contradictory aspects, according to given conditions, tends to transform into its opposite." He also said, "Each of the opposite aspects within a thing, owing to certain conditions, tends to transform itself into the other, to transfer itself to the position of its opposite." At the same time, Chairman Mao cited the example of the contradictions of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, saying, "By means of revolution, the proletariat, which was the ruled, becomes the ruler, while the erstwhile ruler, the bourgeoisie, becomes the ruled, changing places with its opposite." By the mutual transformation of the two aspects of opposition, Chairman Mao does not mean the transformation of aspect A into aspect B and vice versa, but the transposition of the positions of aspects A

and B. If the transformation of materialism and idealism into each other is understood as materialism becoming idealism and vice versa, this is obviously wrong. It is the same as, when we say the bourgeoisie and the proletarian transform into each other, we do not mean that the bourgeoisie has become the proletariat and vice versa. Taking the transformation of materialism and idealism into each other as meaning materialism becomes idealism and vice versa would not be dialectics. It would be sophistry, and the ideological source would still be metaphysics. That is because in so doing not only do we do away with the possibility of the development of things and lead to the theory of cycles, but we also confuse the character of the two aspects of contradiction and come to the erroneous conclusion that there is something in common between the contradictory aspects.

If the transformation of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie into each other means that the proletariat becomes the bourgeoisie and vice versa, then the contradictory aspects would always go in circles and the opposition between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie would always exist and the contradiction could never be dissolved, and there would be no development to speak of. The proletariat, which is the ruled, does not become the bourgeoisie by means of revolution and struggle. In character, it is still the opposite of the bourgeoisie. If we say that the transformed proletariat, by means of struggle, has become the bourgeoisie in character, it is not so in fact, and theoretically, we would be smudging the demarcation line between the class character of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This would lead to the conclusion that between the two exists a common class character. Of course, when the proletariat, by means of revolution, transforms into the ruler, its own character changes from the proletariat which owns nothing to a class which possesses all social wealth. The basis of the change still develops from the proletariat. Therefore, in character, it is opposite to and has nothing in common with the private ownership of capitalism.

We can only understand the transformation of the two contradictory aspects into each other, according to Chairman Mao's understanding, as "transposition of positions" and as "transformation in the direction of the opposite." That is to say, the transformation of the contradictory aspects into each other means transposition of positions, and during the process of the transformation or afterwards, the character changes and develops on its original basis. Owing to the transformation into each other of the contradictory aspects, the character of things changes. Old contradictions

are solved, while new contradictions are formed. For instance, in the capitalist society, as a result of the struggle of the proletariat, the bourgeois regime has been overthrown and the proletariat has become the ruler. The character of things has changed from the capitalist society into the socialist society. Old contradictions have been solved and new contradictions have taken shape. The working class, occupying the ruling position after the transformation, is different from the original proletariat in character. And, it still develops on the original basis and does not become the bourgeoisie. Its character still stands in opposition to the bourgeoisie and there is nothing in common between them. It would be metaphysical to think that only the existence of a common character makes the transformation of the contradictory aspects possible. Materialism and idealism being the contradictory aspects, how do they transform? Theoretically, the mutual transformation between them is the transposition of their positions according to given conditions. Let us use the development of the history of philosophy itself to prove this viewpoint.

The development of the history of Chinese philosophy is determined by the practice of class struggle and the production struggle. Apart from the latter, not only is there no way to tackle the development of philosophy, but there can be no philosophy itself. However, how do philosophical ideas determined by class struggle and the production struggle develop? Do they develop according to some law? Or is there no law? Or does it change in accordance with a law which dictates the transformation of materialism into idealism and vice versa, or the transformation of subjectivist idealism into objectivist idealism and subsequently into materialism? No, it develops according to the law of the unity of opposites. Concretely speaking, it develops according to the struggle between materialism and idealism. The struggle between materialism and idealism exists in one thing, and they are interdependent. By means of struggle, materialism and idealism transpose their positions. The history of Chinese philosophy amply proves this point. Following are concrete examples to illustrate it.

Tung Chung-shu was a well-known idealist philosopher of the Han Dynasty. His ideology took a dominant position after the reign of Wu-ti. This was made possible in part by the political power of the ruling class. However, was political power alone sufficient to enable Tung's idealist ideology to take the dominant position? Certainly not! First, if so, philosophical ideology as the superstructure would have no function and the motivating power of philosophy in

the class struggle would have been eliminated. Second, if so, why were other ideologies not regarded as orthodox and helped to take the dominant position? This obviously proves that there was a historical inevitability that Tung's idealist philosophy should become the dominant philosophy of the time. That is to say, the given historical conditions existed at the time to make Tung's ideology take the dominant position. Since Emperor Wu-ti had established a united feudal kingdom, and had no complete ruling ideology, Tung's ideology precisely reflected this need. Tung's idealist philosophy occupied the dominant position not without a struggle. Instead, it was won after a bitter struggle against materialism. On the one hand, Tung Chung-shu inherited the orthodox idealism existing since the pre-Ch'in Shih Huang-ti period, and on the other, he distorted the materialistic ideology known since the pre-Ch'in Shih Huang-ti period. Capitalizing on its weaknesses, he tinted the materialist viewpoint with idealism and incorporated it into his system as a component. Thus his system occupied the dominant position.

The pre-Ch'in materialistic ideas made the principal contribution in presenting the theory that all things in the universe are composed of "air." However, they could not advance scientific explanations of the spiritual phenomena existing in the universe and failed to realize that spiritual phenomena are the products of material development to a certain stage and are the character of matter. Therefore, they recognized spiritual phenomena as composed of a kind of "air," calling it "air of the spirit," and thus making it possible to be utilized and distorted by idealism. Tung Chung-shu made use of and distorted the pre-Ch'in Dynasty materialism in this way. Starting from the premise that "the air of the spirit" is a spiritual phenomenon, he theorized that "air" possessed such emotions as joy, anger, sadness, and happiness and that "the air of spring is love; the air of autumn is severity; the air of summer is happiness; and the air of winter is sadness." He also asserted "air" has moral purposes, as "Yin /female or negative/ is the air of punishment; and Yang /male or positive/ is the air of morality." Thus, he further changed "air" itself from something basic and primary into something secondary and supplementary, saying that "air is derived from the spirit" and that "the mind governs air." Thus, on this point, he scored an interim victory and triumphed over the pre-Ch'in Dynasty materialism.

Besides, he also made use of and distorted the contemporary scientific achievements so as to make them support his idealistic system. Owing to the unification achieved in the Han Dynasty, astronomy, mathematics, physics, and

medicine all registered considerable development, discovering some related conditions in nature such as the resonance of sound waves and the inter-relations between the human body and the objective world such as the theory that "when the weather is about to turn cloudy and rains are coming, the symptoms of diseases are first manifested in the human body." Tung made use of these by distorting them and deduced the theory of the harmony between heaven and man. From the inter-relationships in the material world, he deduced the relationship between heaven and men, saying that "heaven accepts the dictates of heaven," that "the accord between heaven and earth and between the positive and the negative dwells in the human body which itself becomes heaven," and that "heaven also possesses the air of joy and happiness and the moods of sadness and gladness, the same as man. As things of the same kind tend to fuse, heaven and man are the same." Thus, he not only applied the principle of inter-relationship indiscriminately but also mystified it, making it the expression of the will of God, saying "catastrophies are the punishment of heaven and strange phenomena are the expressions of the powers of heaven." He said, "When one note is picked out on the strings of a stringed instrument, harmonics are engendered, it being the sympathetic movement of a kind." The movement of the harmonic notes is expressed in sound and not form. Man cannot see the form of the movement, and he calls it nature. Actually, it is not nature but an external being, and the external being has no form. According to a narrative in Shang Shu, as the fortunes of the Chou Dynasty were about to rise, big red birds holding rice plants in their beaks congregated on the roof of the king's palace. Emperor Wu rejoiced, and so did his courtiers. Prince Chou said, "An auspicious omen! Heaven let us witness this to give us heart." In this way, Tung established the theological system of harmony between heaven and man. In this way, his idealist philosophy waged a struggle against materialism and became the dominant philosophy in the Han Dynasty. The struggle waged by idealism against materialism consisted in distorting it by exploiting the weaknesses of materialism or by making use of some scientific achievements. Now can we say that Tung Chung-shu's idealist philosophy was transformed from the pre-Ch'in Dynasty materialism? Of course not. On the contrary, he inherited the traditions of the pre-Ch'in Dynasty idealism and established his own philosophical system on the basis of struggle against the pre-Ch'in Dynasty materialism. Therefore, in character and derivation, his philosophy stands in opposition to the pre-Ch'in Dynasty materialism and there is nothing in common between them.

Things must develop, and must do so in accordance with the law of the unity of opposites. In a class society, objective conditions have always existed for the transformation of materialism and idealism into each other. That is class struggle. Through class struggle, production struggles, and scientific development in the two Han Dynasties, class struggle increased in intensity in the middle period of the Eastern Han Dynasty when the rule of the Han monarchs became daily more difficult. Also the livelihood of the toilers became daily more insufferable. Therefore, criticisms of the society became the inevitable development. The thoughts of Wang Ch'ung and Chung Ch'ang-t'ung were born under such conditions, and the development of the weapons of criticism inevitably led to the criticism with the arms of the realistic society. That became the agrarian revolution of the last years of the Han Dynasty.

Wang Ch'ung was the most important materialist philosopher in the middle period of the Eastern Han Dynasty as well as one of the few materialist philosophers in the history of Chinese philosophy in ancient times. He carried out a fairly complete and all-round critique of Tung Chung-shu's idealist philosophy, the official philosophy of the two Han Dynasties. One by one, Wang criticized all of Tung's idealistic viewpoints. In criticizing Tung, Wang made full use of the scientific achievements attained. The level of Wang's critique of materialism outstripped by far the pre-Ch'in Dynasty materialists. He developed materialism in the process of concretely criticizing the idealistic viewpoints one by one. For instance, in criticizing the sympathy between heaven and man, he analyzed the "sound of thunder" and came to the conclusion that thunder is a natural phenomenon, thus negating the idealist viewpoint that it was a manifestation of the anger of heaven. Wang concretely analyzed some of the strange and miraculous phenomena and affirmed that they were all natural phenomena with their causation dwelling in nature and having nothing to do with "the anger of heaven" or "power of heaven" which were themselves natural phenomena which could not be changed by man.

In many chapters on natural phenomena in his dissertation, On Constancy, he utilized the available scientific knowledge to dialectically prove that there is no sympathy between heaven and man, thus setting up the materialist system of "air-less" monism, which asserted that the unity in the world is unity in matter and is not created by the will of God. On the question of God and form, he expelled to a certain extent the mythical tints of the former theory of air of the spirit and linked up air and spirit with concrete material things

such as blood and veins, taking a further step along the line of materialism. Even though Wang Ch'ung, in refuting Tung's philosophy, exhibited quite a number of mistakes in his own ideological system, the direction he followed was the correct one.

After the critique of Wang Ch'ung, materialism in transformation occupied the dominant position in the history of Chinese philosophy. This statement does not mean that his philosophy at the time wielded more influence than Tung's philosophy or that it became the official orthodox philosophy. On the contrary, owing to the suppression of the ruling class, Wang's philosophy not only did not wield more influence than Tung's philosophy, but it was almost lost to the world. That is also in accord with the law of class struggle. However, when viewed from the theoretical viewpoint and the viewpoint of philosophical struggle, Wang's materialist philosophy truthfully occupied the dominant position, because he had defeated Tung. Therefore, it became impossible for the official idealist philosophy of the Han Dynasties to develop along the pattern set by Tung's idealism. Thus emerged the idealist line (Ho Yen and Wang P'i) of the Taoism of the Wei and Tsin Dynasties. The "respect for the void" school of philosophy of that era attempted, under new historical conditions, to distort the objective world by applying more elaborate methods in order to defeat materialism on a new basis. This shows that Wang's materialist philosophy was not transformed from Tung's idealist philosophy. On the contrary, Wang's philosophy was diametrically opposed to Tung's idealism. So far as transformation is concerned, it was merely the transformation of materialism to a dominant position. Of course, as a result of the defeat of Tung's idealism by Wang's materialism, materialism in China underwent development.

Recognition of the transformation of materialism and idealism into each other would not obscure the demarcation line between materialism and idealism. Applying the above-mentioned line of thought, we would say that the mutual transformation between materialism and idealism means the mutual transposition of positions under given conditions (class struggle, production struggle, and the level of development attained by science.) Thus we can better understand the nature of the struggle between the two. Following the development of class struggle and production struggle, philosophy also develops. With the struggle and mutual transposition of positions between materialism and idealism, the history of philosophy as a whole develops. The general tendency of the progress is the closer tie in between materialism and dialectics and between idealism and metaphysics. The

tendency of development is that, as a result of the thorough fusion of materialism and dialectics, they eventually defeated idealism and metaphysics.

As regards the mutual transformation between materialism and idealism, the following five points may be made:

First, the mutual transformation between materialism and idealism does not mean that, in the history of philosophy, materialism was transformed into idealism and vice versa, but the transposition of their positions. The transposition of positions is a sign of qualitative changes in things, an expression of the defeat of one aspect of a contradiction by the other, and the solution of an old contradiction and the birth of a new one. The occupation of the dominant position by dialectical materialism and historical materialism signals the highest stage of development of materialism and dialectics and fundamental changes and means the total defeat of idealism and metaphysics.

Some people are of the opinion that the mutual transformation between materialism and idealism means not only the transposition of their positions, but also that the materialism per se in history may be transformed into idealism and vice versa. They argue that materialism and idealism are not thorough, each embodying elements of the other. Therefore, the transformation of materialism into idealism and vice versa is made possible. It is of course correct to say that the materialism in history is impure, embodying certain idealistic elements. Furthermore, there have been cases in which the idealistic elements in the system developed into idealistic systems. However, this does not mean the transformation of materialism into idealism. It is but the development of certain idealistic elements in old materialistic systems into idealistic systems, according dominant position to idealism in the system, and thus transforming these ideological systems into systems of idealist ideology. It is precisely because idealistic elements may develop into idealistic systems that materialism has to constantly elevate and perfect itself. Therefore, it is erroneous to think that some kind of materialism in history may develop into idealism. Materialism as materialism means recognition, and in the relationship between the mind of existence, matter is primary and the idea is secondary. Even though metaphysical materialism fails to see the motivating power of ideas, materialism remains materialism on this fundamental issue. And by developing on this basis and on the realization of the motivating power of ideas, materialism can be perfected, and not by negating this basis. Therefore, instead of asserting that materialism, owing to its lack of thoroughness, may turn to idealism,

we should say that materialism is materialism precisely because of its lack of completeness and thoroughness, and has to constantly make itself more complete and thorough. As for the relations between materialism and dialectics, the same holds true. It is precisely because of the lack of good fusion of materialism and dialectics in history that they failed to thoroughly defeat idealism. Therefore, the development of materialism demanded that it forsake metaphysics and fuse itself with dialectics. Such a fusion was realized when the proletariat entered the stage of history. Therefore, in the history of philosophy, either idealism occupied the dominant position and determined the character of philosophy as idealist or vice versa. As for a philosophical system, either it has materialism taking the dominant position and determining the character of the system or vice versa.

There are also people who hold that subsequent materialism always turns to materialism on the basis of preceding idealism. Mr. Feng Yu-lan once said, "Wang Fu-tsu turned to materialism on the basis of the philosophy of Chu Hsi and the Ch'engs to stand opposite Chu and the Ch'engs." This is incorrect. On the contrary, it is precisely the requirements of class struggle and production struggle that urged Wang Fu-tsu to oppose and struggle against the philosophy of Chu and the Ch'engs on the basis of the materialism of the old days, thus developing materialism. If Wang had developed materialism on the basis of the idealism of Chu and the Ch'engs, then the demarcation line between the two would have been obscured, thus eliminating their opposition. Idealism as idealism is always opposite to materialism in character. Just as we cannot change the nature of the reactionaries, so the nature of idealism cannot be changed.

Second, the mutual transformation between materialism and idealism can only be effected under given conditions and not otherwise.

The mutual transformation between materialism and idealism can only be effected under given conditions, like the opposition in all things in the world. Speaking of mutual transformation with given conditions would lead to relativism and transformation could only be abstract conceptual transformation and not realistic transformation. That is because transformation without given conditions would be deprived of any law, and transformation so understood is not dialectics but sophistry. And the conditions for the mutual transformation between materialism and idealism are class struggle and production struggle in class society and the subjectivist motivating power of the philosophers taking them as a basis. As for which of the opposites, materialism or idealism, is to take

the dominant position, it is determined on the comparative power of the classes. Divorced from such conditions as class struggle, any discussion of the mutual transformation between materialism and idealism would regard transformation as accidental. For example, why is it that Wang Ch'ung could defeat Tung Chung'shu in philosophy? If it is not regarded as the result of the class struggle and the gradual shift in the opposition of class powers to the disadvantage of the ruling class in power, then what could the cause be? Then one would have to turn to the personal talent, intelligence, and wisdom of Wang Ch'ung. That is obviously ludicrous. When one links the transposition of positions between materialism and idealism with the fundamental condition of class struggle in addition to other conditions (production struggle and the elevation of the level of science), one can see the inevitability of transformation.

If the conditions for mutual transformation were non-existent between the opposites, then transformation would not have been realistic. Therefore, some people posed the question: If the mutual transformation between materialism and idealism is the law of the development of the history of philosophy, then may not dialectical materialism some day be transformed into idealism? Of course not! Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the proletariat and the historical mission of the proletariat is the elimination of class and the establishment of a classless communist society. Thus, conditions for the transformation of idealism and metaphysics into something which takes the dominant position will have been fundamentally eliminated. In communist society, there will be no class which protects men who exploit others. Therefore, as a whole, idealism will have lost the basis for its transformation into something which occupies the dominant position. However, in the process of building communism, or even in communist society, it is not impossible for individuals or groups of people in some localities to embrace idealism as their world outlook. To these people, idealism occupies the dominant position. Dialectical materialism, therefore, must wage a struggle against these ideas and develop and enrich itself in the struggle. As a whole, dialectical materialism occupies the dominant position. However, dialectical materialism itself is developing and its development is still in accord with the law of the unity of opposites. That is to say, in the contradictions of subjectivism overcoming objectivism and between subjectivism and objectivism, the opposing subjectivism and objectivism transform into each other, thus giving impetus to development.

Third, materialism and idealism, under given conditions, transpose their positions. These conditions make one aspect rise in its development, from the ruled to the ruling position, and the other aspect decline from the ruling to the ruled position. As a result of the transformation, old contradictions are solved and new contradictions are formed, and materialism and idealism themselves are developed, with their character undergoing a gradual change. The transposition of their positions is the sign of the development and change of their own character.

Under given conditions, materialism changes to take the dominant position. Like idealism, it cannot be attained through political power alone. It depends on its theoretical power also to attain this. With the development of the relationship between God and form to the Buddhist "imperishable God" idea, it is apparently inadequate to explain spiritual matters in terms of the spirit of air of firewood and fire as of old. Fan Chen further elevated materialism by pointing out that the relationship between form and God is the relationship between "essence" and "application" and the relationship between "matter" and "application." This not only made full use of the theories of relationships between "essence" and "application" and between "primary" and "secondary" expounded in philosophy since the Tsin and Wei Dynasties, but also opened up a new approach for the correct solution of the relationship between spirit and matter, thus theoretically defeating idealism. This is why we say that in the process of the transformation of things, both materialism and idealism undergo development. If the one aspect of the opposites which occupies the position of the ruled remains stagnant at its original level, it cannot transform to occupy the dominant position.

In the entire process of the struggle between materialism and idealism, what is even more important is that materialism itself not only develops but also gradually changes its character. Eventually, a fundamental qualitative change is induced, and it develops into dialectical materialism. The fact that dialectical materialism occupies the dominant position is the sign of the basic change in the character of materialism and dialectics. By change in their own character, we do not mean a change of materialism into idealism or dialectics into metaphysics, but that the entire process of the development of materialism is the process of its increasing fusion with dialectics. Looked at from another angle, one may say that the process of the development of dialectics is the process of its increasing fusion with materialism. Such a fusion engenders qualitative changes in both materialism

and dialectics. Speaking of class nature, dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the proletariat. So far as understanding is concerned, this enables man to understand all sides instead of one side of things and in the completely correct way instead of the not quite correct way. The entire process of the development of idealism is the process of its drawing away from dialectics and its fusion with metaphysics. The imperialist reactionary philosophy of today is an ideological system of the complete fusion of idealism with metaphysics. Therefore, we may say that in the general tendency, materialism is daily fusing itself with dialectics and idealism is daily fusing itself with metaphysics. In character, materialism demands association with dialectics; while idealism, in character, demands association with metaphysics. Even though Feuerbach was a metaphysical materialist, from the standpoint of the opposition to idealism of his materialism, it is voluntarily in accord with dialectics. Hegel's philosophical system may embody many dialectical ideas. However, since his dialectics is associated with the idealistic system, it is eventually subjected to the limitations of metaphysics. Therefore, he remains a metaphysician. Also, dialectics itself requires its own association with idealism. Of course, the process of the development of the history of philosophy is a circuitous one and requires a concrete analysis. However, the general tendency of development is like this.

Fourth, the transformation of materialism and idealism into each other is the result of the attainment of a certain stage of the struggle between them. The more intense the struggle, the faster and more thorough the transformation. Without the determined struggle of materialism against idealism, materialism would have occupied the dominant position at its own volition.

Chairman Mao pointed out, "The struggle between contradictions is continuous. Whether they co-exist or are in the process of transformation each into the other, struggle exists. When they are transforming into each other, struggle is most conspicuous. This is the universality and absoluteness of contradictions." That materialism was able to transform to occupy the dominant position, under given conditions, is due to struggle. Wang Ch'ung's materialism, philosophically speaking, was able to occupy the dominant position only after it had criticized point by point Tung Chung-shu's idealism. Without struggle, it could only forever occupy the position of the ruled while the other aspect would forever occupy the dominant position. The more intense the struggle, the faster and the more thorough the transformation. Wang Ch'ung

determinedly waged struggle against Tung Chung-shu. Therefore, his philosophy very speedily occupied the dominant position and the idealist philosophy of the Han Dynasty was speedily deprived of its dominant position and had to change its form. That gave birth to the "respect for void" school of the Taoism of the Wei and Tsin Dynasties. On the contrary, the less determined the struggle, the slower the transformation, which at times even could not be effected. For instance, before Wang Ch'ung, such materialists of the Han Dynasty as Huai Nan-tzu and Yang Hsiung failed to transform to take the dominant position in their struggle against the idealism of the Han Dynasty. Therefore, we cannot think of struggle itself as transformation. Only when struggle develops to a certain stage can new conditions be created and things transform.

Peaceful transformation of materialism and idealism into each other is fundamentally impossible. Peaceful transformation not only negates the absoluteness of struggle but also denies that the struggle of philosophical ideologies is the reflection of class struggle. No reactionary class would voluntarily retreat from the stage of history. Therefore, unless a struggle is waged against the philosophy representing its class interests, it also would not voluntarily give up the prerogatives of its dominant position and dialectical materialism would not be able to attain the dominant position.

In this connection, I would like to touch upon a certain question; i.e., how to evaluate the historical positions of materialism in the history of philosophy. There have been many kinds of materialism. However, as judged today, some of them should take a higher position in history, while others should not be accorded very high positions. Why? I feel that in evaluating the historical positions of materialism, we should not take only new contributions to the development of materialist ideology into consideration, which are important of course, but even more important is the critical spirit with which it waged struggle against idealism. Therefore, I feel that Wang Ch'ung and Fan Chen should be accorded higher positions in the history of Chinese philosophy in ancient times, and Liu Tsung'yu and Liu Yu-hsi cannot be rated equally with Wang Ch'ung and Fan Chen. As for Wang Ch'ung, he dared to unreservedly oppose the official idealist philosophy of the Han Dynasty. This kind of spirit of struggle against the "imperishability of God" theory, the most controversial issue of the time. He carried on a debate against more than 70 scholars who were patronized by the court of the organization headed by Emperor Wu of the Liang Dynasty. This is really rare and valuable indeed. As for

Liu Tsung-yuan and Liu Yu-hsi, while they voiced some sharp criticisms against some aspects of idealism and made some contributions to the development of materialism, their spirit of struggle is of a much lower order as compared with that of Wang Ch'ung and Fan Chen. Not only did they fail to criticize Buddhism, the most important reactionary idealist theory at that time, but affirmed some aspects of it, thus greatly detracting from the revolutionary spirit of materialist criticism.

Fifth, the mutual transformation between materialism and idealism and between dialectics and metaphysics means, in substance, the conquering of one aspect of the contradiction by the other. However, this does not impede the variety in form of their mutual transformation.

The mutual transformation between materialism and idealism and between dialectics and metaphysics does not mean the transformation into the latter and vice versa, as we have discussed above. But the transformation between the two may take various forms. (1) Owing to the fact that some materialist systems embody elements of idealism, under given conditions, these idealist elements develop to establish an idealist system, thus defeating materialism. Under other conditions, owing to the fact that the idealist elements develop and take the dominant position, this system becomes an idealist system. That is the relationship between Tung Chung-shu's idealist philosophy and the materialist philosophy of the pre-Ch'in Dynasty period. (2) Owing to the fact that a certain materialist system is associated with metaphysics, the metaphysical ideas, under given conditions, destroy the materialist system and establish an idealist system. On the other hand, owing to the fact that an idealist system embodies elements of materialism and the rational kernel of dialectics, under given conditions, the development of these latter elements breaks through the system to establish a materialist system. For instance, under new historical conditions, the "basic kernel" and the "rational kernel" of German classical philosophy provided the Marxian philosophy with premises. Under this situation of mutual transformation, it is not the transformation of materialism into idealism, nor vice versa, but the triumph of one aspect of a contradiction over the other; and in the process of overcoming its opposite, it develops itself, urges the transformation of the contradiction, changes the character of things, and forms new contradictions. (3) Since the old materialism lacks thoroughness, it embodies some contradictions. So far as itself is concerned, it embraces the materialist viewpoint. However, it may turn toward idealism in its

further development. For instance, the old materialism, in recognizing matter as primary, is materialist. This is the basic aspect. However, the empiricism of materialism, in recognizing the dependability of experience, is materialism. However, in its obsession with the dependability of experience, it may become idealism in its further development. Even so, it is because of the intuitionism of the old materialism that it may become idealism in further development, and it is not due to the recognition of matter as primary that it becomes idealism. (4) Then there is another situation in which, not owing to the fact that either materialism or idealism embodies elements of the other, but owing to the fact that under given historical conditions the class position of some people changes and is transformed to its opposite. Does this mean that materialism has transformed into idealism or vice versa? Of course not. It means merely that to some specific individuals and schools of thought, materialism gives up the dominant position to idealism or vice versa. Therefore, the character of things changes and the two aspects of the contradiction change and new contradictions are formed. Transformation may take many other forms, such as the development of schools of thought and the individuals, or the mutual development of different schools of thought in their struggle. However, such developments may be a transformation from materialism into idealism or vice versa. It is not that there has been a transformation of materialism into idealism or vice versa, but that, as a result of the development, the aspect in the contradiction which originally occupied the dominant position has been relegated to the position of the ruled and vice versa. As the characters of things change, such a transformation of positions explains the process of the development from quantitative change to qualitative change, itself being the sign of a qualitative change.

We study the mutual transformation between materialism and idealism and between dialectics and metaphysics for the purpose of studying the laws of the development of the history of philosophy, how materialism has triumphed over idealism, how dialectics has triumphed over metaphysics, and how dialectical materialism and historical materialism have become the fundamental changes in the history of philosophy so that we can help the people establish and consolidate the proletarian world outlook so as to defeat the capitalist world outlook. Therefore, from the above five points, we may see that we cannot discuss the transformation of materialism and idealism into each other in abstract terms, but must

examine the question of transformation by placing it in the whole picture of how the relations between materialism and idealism illustrate the law of the unity of opposites. Otherwise, we are liable to reach one-sided conclusions.

Footnotes:

¹See Kuang-ming Jih-pao, Philosophy Supplement, 22 March 1959.

²Concerning the philosophical ideas in The Water Margin, most important is our editor's Selections from Chinese Philosophy, 1958.